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ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH 
The purpose of this diploma thesis is to develop a typology of European 
regions based on demographic variables and the link the resulting typology to 
economic indicators. In this context, this thesis does not only discuss the 
state of the demography of European countries, but rather concentrates on 
European regions at the scale of NUTS 2. Based on the awareness, that 
particular demographic trends and patterns exist across Europe, a classifica-
tion of European regions based on demographic variables was developed. 
This typology of 286 NUTS 2 regions is a comprehensive classification of the 
demographic structure and short-term trends in the EU27+4 and distin-
guishes between seven types of regions, which enable the user to capture 
the demographic diversity of European regions in 2005 at first glance. 
Additional analyses illustrate the demographic and socio-economic character-
istics of the different types of regions in terms of potentials and challenges. 
 
The typology of the demographic status sheds light on the prevailing demo-
graphic pluralism across Europe. It identifies diverse and heterogeneous 
spatial patterns beyond traditional categories like population growth and 
decline, which are shaping the demographic landscape of European regions at 
the beginning of the 21st century. When zooming beyond the geography of 
nation states, the often-underestimated extent of regional heterogeneity of 
demographic characteristics becomes apparent. In order to obtain homoge-
neous spatial patterns, a regional aggregation in terms of clustering makes 
sense. This regional level classification of the demographic status of Euro-
pean NUTS 2 regions facilitates the identification of similar challenges and 
solutions and enables to compare the various impacts of different regional 
policies in the context of social and economic cohesion. 
 
ABSTRACT IN GERMAN 
Das Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit ist die Entwicklung einer demographischer 
Typologie europäischer Regionen und die Verknüpfung dieser Klassifikation 
mit sozio-ökonomischen Indikatoren. In diesem Sinne wird nicht nur auf  
den Status Quo europäischer Länder eingegangen, sondern vor allem die 
regionale Ebene von NUTS 2 diskutiert. Die neu entwickelte Klassifikation 
europäischer Regionen nach demographischen Merkmalen bezieht sich auf 
das Jahr 2005 und unterscheidet sieben Regionstypen. Weitere Analysen in 
dieser Diplomarbeit beschäftigen sich mit den demographischen und  
sozio-ökonomischen Potenzialen und Herausforderungen der verschiedenen 
Regionstypen.  
 
Die Typologie ermöglicht die Identifikation homogener räumlicher Muster 
innerhalb des vorherrschenden demographischen Pluralismus in Europa zu 
Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. Die demographische Diversität von Regionen 
spiegelt sich nur zum Teil in der Geographie von Nationalstaaten wider und 
kann auch nur bedingt mit traditionellen dichotomen Kategorien – wie zum 
Beispiel Bevölkerungswachstum auf der einen und Bevölkerungsalterung auf 
der anderen Seite – beschrieben werden. Eine räumliche Aggregation im 
Sinne einer Klassifikation ermöglicht die Erfassung ähnlich gelagerter demog-
raphischer Herausforderungen und entsprechender regionalpolitischer 
Lösungsansätze.  
  ii 
PREFACE 
This thesis, written in Vienna between Christmas 2009 and Easter 2010, 
marks the highlight of my career as a geographer yet. I started my studies at 
the Department of Geography and Regional Research at the University of 
Vienna in Summer 2004. Between finishing secondary school, which we call 
“Gymnasium” in Austria, and starting to study I spent the most part of the 15 
years in between working – indicating that my personal life cycle is not 
necessarily following a mainstream sequence – in the fields of music, design 
and internet productions. Then why become a geographer? 
 
I am quite interested in how contemporary societies work. This keeps me 
curious about nearly all circumstances of life on planet earth, especially those 
related to places, which are – to my understanding – spaces and locations 
with meanings. To gain more understanding about how societies work in 
different places, basic knowledge in demography, ecology, economy, sociol-
ogy, cultural backgrounds and governance structures are necessary ingredi-
ents. Aiming to achieve some of this knowledge is enough reason to become 
a geographer. 
 
“Without a spatial thinking we miss the visual power, the spatial  
exploratory investigation, and the understanding of the impacts  
that space can have in life outcomes.” 
Marcia CALDAS DE CASTRO (2007:16) 
 
During my studies I specialised in spatial demography, a discipline that 
concentrates on the outcomes of life by studying populations in different 
spaces and places. It is all about questions addressing the social coexistence 
of people in different places (where?), by different age, sex and qualities 
(who?), at different times (when?) and under different social, economical, 
environmental and political circumstances (how?). Such differences are 
caused by a complex micro-macro level interplay of individuals and societies. 
Spatial demography, at its best, indeed sheds light on how all this is con-
nected.  
 
“In doing more and more sophisticated investigations on more  
and more trivial problems, (…) the results of such research (…)  
add something to our understanding of how the world works.” 
Paul R. EHRLICH (2008:108) 
 
Since January 2009 I am working as a research assistant for Professor Heinz 
Fassmann, who is not only the only the director of the Workgroup of Applied 
Geography at the Department of Geography, but also the head of the local 
DEMIFER research team at the University of Vienna, besides holding numer-
ous other leading positions in academia and beyond. Within the DEMIFER 
project team, I was provided with the opportunity to develop a demographic 
classification of European regions, which is not only a great task but also the 
centrepiece of this thesis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Europe is a continent of rich territorial diversity, which implicates manifold 
assets and challenges. On the one hand, the positive assets can contribute to 
consolidate and progress Europe’s position as a competitive, attractive and 
liveable place, on the other hand, its diversity – especially in the form of 
disparities – constitutes a challenge to European efforts to strengthen 
economic and social cohesion and integration (ESPON 2007:17; EC 2007a:3). 
 
1.1 Thesis Background 
From a European perspective, understanding each region’s situation com-
pared to other regions is an important aspect in identifying the need for 
action. For policy makers, the territorial dimension – with problems often 
cutting across sectors – is important to design integrated European policy 
approaches, with objectives on cohesion, competitiveness and territorial 
cooperation. In terms of territorial cohesion, i.e. the territorial perspective of 
economic and social cohesion, the need for solid and comparable regionalised 
information is evident (ESPON 2007:7; EC 2008b:3).  
 
1.1.1 ESPON – The European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
Corresponding to its self-description, ESPON was set up in 2002 by the 
European Union to provide policy makers on the European national and 
regional level with systematic and new knowledge on territorial trends and 
impacts.1 Today the network includes all 27 EU Member States, plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland (i.e. Eu27+4). Researchers from more 
than 100 institutions from all over Europe are connected in Transnational 
Project Groups (TPG) within ESPON’s applied research activities.  
 
Research under the ESPON banner is explicitly demand-driven and is claiming 
a strong usability. Consequently, the research activities are orientated 
towards the actual policy demand and its results and outputs shall be made 
available to potential users, i.e. policy makers and practitioners at EU and 
Member State levels, as well as research institutes and universities (ESPON 
2007:16; ESPON 2007:41). Hence, ESPON is not conducting bottom-up 
research; in fact, it is conducting applied research, inspired by the policy 
priorities of the Commission and EU Member States. In doing so, the  
scientific added value can be seen as a well-desired side effect (ESPON 
2007:29; FASSMANN 2008).   
 
The recent ESPON 2013 Programme, covering the period 2007 to 2013, is 
aiming to reinforce European regional policies with studies, data and obser-
vations of development trends (ESPON 2007:5). During the preceded EU 
Programming Period (2000-2006), accelerated globalisation, a new energy 
paradigm and demographic change were identified as the ongoing mega 
trends the European territory is facing (ibid., p.24). Taking a closer look on 
demographic issues, the ESPON 2013 Programme concludes that an ageing 
European population and migration is affecting the regions differently and 
enhance the competition for skilled labour” (ibid., p.5).  
                                               
1 Extensive information on ESPON (programming, projects, events, publications, tools, etc.) is 
available on the ESPON website at http://www.espon.eu. (retrieved 03.07.2009) 
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A SWOT analysis carried out by ESPON addresses the European territory and 
its evaluation and consequently specifies demographic ageing as one of the 
main threats (ESPON 2007:18ff): 
 
“Demographic development in Europe will be a particular challenge; 
regions facing ageing and out-migration may loose their economic 
base. This development threat may hit peripheral and rural areas first.” 
 
In the context of population mobility and dynamics the topic of “socio-
economic integration” was identified as another main threat (ibid.): 
 
“Integration of specific population groups progressively  
becomes a serious issue in numerous European countries,  
in particular in larger urban agglomerations.” 
 
These two threats, seen in a spatial context, affect all kinds of regions. On 
the one hand, peripheral and rural regions are facing the challenge of ageing 
and depopulation due to out-migration and a general decline in birth rates. 
On the other hand, urban regions have to manage the integration of more 
and more immigrants. Confronted with these structural changes in regional 
demography, Europe’s policy makers at all levels have to keep up with the 
connected potential implications for regional competitiveness and European 
social cohesion. 
 
1.1.2 The ESPON Project “DEMIFER” 
The ESPON project “DEMIFER” (Demographic and Migratory Flows Affecting 
European Regions and Cities) is making reference to the above-mentioned 
challenges. Population ageing and migratory flows already making a major 
impact on EU societies and economies. Hence, these demographic develop-
ments and their effects on different kinds of regions are framing the thematic 
scope and policy context of the DEMIFER project (ESPON 2008a:4f).  
Key Policy Questions 
According to the project specifications, the DEMIFER key policy questions 
read as follows (ESPON 2008a:5f): 
 
• How will the demographic development, i.e. natural development of 
population as well as migration, affect different types of regions and 
cities?  
• How and to which degree will future effects of climate change influence 
migration flows?  
• What is the need for increasing the labour force in order to avoid nega-
tive impact on the economic performance and on the social cohesion of 
these regions and cities?  
• Which skills are needed in different types of regions and cities in order 
to meet the demands of the economic base and to make better use of 
development opportunities?  
• To what extent could such skills be provided by internal migration in 
Europe?  
• What should be the profile of skills of migration to Europe to maximise 
the contribution of regions and cities to European competitiveness?  
• Which factors could have a positive effect on natural population devel-
opment in Europe?  
  7 
Research Questions 
In order to address these key policy questions the following research ques-
tions will have to be addressed (ibid., p.7): 
 
• What are current demographic developments and migration flows like? 
How distinct are they? What are the regions of destination? Are there 
flows that are more pronounced than others, and if so, why?  
• Why do some regions attract highly skilled people whereas others do 
not?  
• What are the causes of migration (e.g. economic development, devel-
opment on labour market)? What are the impacts on different types of 
European regions and cities (e.g. regarding regional competitiveness, 
provision of public services) and which effects will migration have on 
European cohesion?  
• What are the relations between migration flows to the ESPON countries 
and other major territorial challenges like accelerating globalisation 
and particularly climate change?  
• What are the financial consequences for the regions of origin of mi-
grants (e.g. size of remittances of migrants)?  
• Who is migrating? What are the qualifications of migrants coming to 
Europe? Do they meet the need of the labour market as such? How 
does their profile fit different types of regions and cities of Europe?  
• How and to which degree does the development of different individual 
factors (economic, social, environmental) impact on demographic and 
migration flows?  
 
Indeed, these policy and research question cover a wide range of socio-
economic, demographic and geographic issues. Because of that, DEMIFER – 
supported by the ESPON 2013 Programme – is carried out by an interdiscipli-
nary team of researchers from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic 
Institute (NIDI, Netherlands), the University of Vienna (UNIVIE, Austria), the 
International Organization for Migration/Central European Forum for Migra-
tion and Population Research (IOM/CEFMR, Poland), the University of 
Leeds/School of Geography (SoG, United Kingdom), the Netherlands Envi-
ronmental Assessment Agency (NEEA, Netherlands), the Nordic Centre for 
Spatial Development (Nordregio, Sweden), and the National Research Council 
(CNR, Italy). 
 
The research within DEMIFER includes seven activities (ESPON 2008b:40): 
 
• Activity 1: Demography and migration (coordinated by NIDI) 
• Activity 2: Typology of regions and cities (coordinated by UNIVIE) 
• Activity 3: Multilevel scenario model and reference scenarios (coordi-
nated by IOM/CEFMR) 
• Activity 4: Regional scenarios (coordinated by SoG) 
• Activity 5: Policy implications (coordinated by NEEA) 
• Activity 6: Data, indicators and maps (coordinated by Nordregio) 
• Activity 7: Case studies (coordinated by CNR) 
 
1.2 Aims & Objectives 
This diploma thesis is covering the DEMIFER research resumed under Activity 
2 (cf. Chapter 1.1), coordinated and conducted by the local DEMIFER re-
search team at the University of Vienna (UNIVIE) under the direction of 
Professor Heinz Fassmann, who is the head of the Workgroup of Applied 
Geography, Spatial Research and Spatial Planning at the Department of 
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Geography and Regional Research.2 As a research assistant of Prof. Fass-
mann, I was provided with the opportunity to develop a regional demo-
graphic classification under his guidance.  
 
The main research question regarding DEMIFER Activity 2 – and therefore 
also of this thesis – was specified within the DEMIFER Inception Report 
(ESPON 2008b:7 – see also Chapter 1.1) and reads as follows: 
 
“How will the demographic development, i.e. natural development of 
population as well as migration, affect different types of regions and 
cities?” 
 
Consequently, the effects of demographic and migratory flows on the size 
and structure of the population and particularly on the labour force need to 
be assessed. The conceptual framework of DEMIFER Activity 2 focuses on the 
size and structure of the population and particularly on the labour force 
(ESPON 2008b:7f). This brings us to the first and principal aim of this  
diploma thesis, also defined within the DEMIFER Inception Report for  
Activity 2 (ibid.; p. 40), namely:  
 
„(…) to develop a typology of regions and cities based on demographic 
variables and to link the resulting typology to economic (…) variables.“ 
 
This newly developed typology shall serve as basis for subsequently elabo-
rated models, projections and case studies within the DEMIFER project.3 
 
To achieve this superior aim (see above), some further aims need to be set: 
 
• Aim 2: Make out the drivers of demographic change in Europe. 
• Aim 3: Valuate the plausibility of the developed classification. 
• Aim 4: Link the demographic typology with socio-economic variables. 
 
The objectives to achieve these aims are the following: 
 
• Present the demographic status and trends in Europe, as well as the 
underlying dynamics. (aim 1+2) 
• Reveal, if a distinguished European demographic regime exists. (aim 
1+2) 
• Assess, whether recent demographic trends in Europe are converging 
or diverging, and if so, at which scale(s). (aim 1+2) 
• Point out the importance of regions in terms of population develop-
ment. (aim 1+2) 
• Investigate the available data sources and the applicability of the con-
sidered variables. (aim 1) 
• Summarise previously developed demographic typologies of (already 
completed) ESPON projects. (aim 1) 
• Develop a methodological approach to conduct hierarchical and non-
hierarchical cluster analyses in order to classify European regions by 
demographic characteristics. (aim 1+3) 
• Illustrate the developed classification. (aim 1+3) 
• Carry out different cluster analyses and compare the classification re-
sults. (aim 3) 
                                               
2 See: http://raumforschung.univie.ac.at (retrieved 03.07.2009) 
3 The envisaged applications of the demographic typology are specified in Chapter 4.1.1. 
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• Investigate the essential structure and possibilities of the LFS data set 
in order to link it to the newly developed typology. (aim 4) 
• Use the LFS data as dependent variables for a further illustration of the 
classification result. (aim 4) 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
After revealing the thesis background, the motivation, as well as the aims 
and objectives in the introduction, Chapter 2 provides the demographic 
toolbox, briefly explaining the data background, as well as demographic 
models, theories and projections for a better understanding of the descrip-
tions and analyses ahead. 
 
Chapter 3 will set the demographic scene for the following topics. Based on 
an analysis of the demographic status and trends of Europe, the question will 
be discussed, if anything like a European demographic regime exists and to 
which extent demographic developments in Europe show converging and/or 
diverging trends. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the regional 
perspective of population dynamics, before coming to the central part of this 
thesis in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4.1 covers the topic of the development of the classification, outlin-
ing the principles of spatial classifications and investigating available data 
sources and potential variables for the cluster analysis and further analyses. 
The methodological approach to conduct and realise hierarchical and non-
hierarchical cluster analyses is also specified in this Chapter. The empirical 
aspects of this thesis will be treated from Chapter 4.2 on, starting with a 
compilation of previously developed demographic typologies within the 
framework of completed (and ongoing) ESPON projects. Chapter 4.2 high-
lights the newly developed typology of European regions. The classification 
result will be illustrated in detail in Chapter 4.3. Finally, Chapter 5 demon-
strates that the strategy to link the demographic typology with socio-
economic variables obtained from the latest European Labour Force Survey 
(EU-LFS), indeed offers new insights in the principal research question of 
DEMIFER, which reads as follows: How do demographic and migratory flows 
affect European regions and cities? 
 
For ease of exposition, a brief summary of the respective empirical findings 
can be found at the end of Chapter 3, 4 and 5. The closing Chapter 6 con-
cludes the research findings, first of all in the context of the implications 
caused by demographic change. In further consequence, the limitations and 
potentials of the classification result are discussed, before closing with the 
challenges for future research arising from the results presented in this 
thesis. 
 
Last but not least, a considerable amount of maps at the national and 
regional scale were produced in the course of this thesis. Although the 
textual content often refers directly to these maps, most of them are com-
piled in the appendices 1 to 4 for a better readability of the thesis. In doing 
so, a small but fine atlas of the demography of Europe emerged, more or 
less, by accident.  
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2 DEMOGRAPHIC TOOLBOX 
This chapter aims to outline the basics of demography by addressing com-
mon measures (Chapter 2.1), underlying theories and models (2.2), and the 
principles of population projections (2.3). However, the reader might prefer 
to read the coming empirical parts first (from Chapter 3 on) and come back 
to the here presented fundamentals and theories later. 
What is a Population and what does a Demographer do? 
 
“To a statistician, the term “population” refers to  
a collective of items, for example, balls in an urn.“  
PRESTON et al. (2001:1) 
 
Scholars and researchers in the wide field of population studies use the term 
in a similar way to label a collection of persons.4 They refer to people alive at 
a certain time (or date), anchored to a certain territory. The members of 
these collectives are changing continuously through attrition and accession 
(cf. PRESTON et al. 2001:1). Furthermore, a population is not only defined by 
the quantity (of persons), but also by qualitative characteristics expressed by 
the state of education, health, and socio-economic status. Consequently, we 
can define a population as follows: 
 
“The population of a certain territory is a quantity,  
consisting of (qualitative) distinguishable persons,  
which belong to the territory for a certain time.“  
HEINRICHS (1973) 5; modified by the author. 
 
Demographic analysis focuses on the changes in the size of populations, on 
its growth rates and its composition. These aggregate processes are the 
consequences of (changes in) individual-level behaviour. In this sense, 
demography is a social science considering the linkage of micro- and macro-
level attentively (cf. PRESTON et al. 2001:1f). 
 
2.1 Demographic Data, Variables & Indicators 
All main demographic measures are based on events allowing a person to 
enter or leave a population. Determined by the laws of biology, one has to be 
born to come into the world and one has to die to leave it. Spatial mobility 
comes into play as a third possible event, when we see the world as an 
aggregation of different populations in different territories (world regions, 
nation states, provinces, districts, etc.). Hence, immigration is another way 
to enter a population and emigration a way to leave it. Demographic proc-
esses on the macro-level (i.e. fertility, mortality and migration) emerge from 
these demographic events on the micro-level (i.e. births, deaths and spatial 
mobility). 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Population Studies is a more comprehensive term than demography. Besides (formal) demogra-
phy, it incorporates a wide range of scientific disciplines: e.g. statistics, geography, sociology, 
history, economy, medicine, anthropology, educational science, etc. (cf. HUSA & WOHLSCHLÄGL 
2004:5). 
5 Cited after HUSA & WOHLSCHLÄGL (2004:4) 
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Population changes are attributable to the magnitude of these flows. Knowing 
the population stock for a specific date (N(0)) and also the number of births 
(B), deaths (D), in- and out-migrations (I and O) between time 0 and time T, 
the population stock at another date (N(T)) can be easily calculated by 
means of the so-called Basic Demographic Equation or Balancing Equation of 
Population Change (see PRESTON et al. 2001:2f):6 
 
 N(T) = N(0) + B(0,T) – D(0,T) + I(0,T) – O(0,T) 
 
where 
I(0,T) – O(0,T) = net migration, 
B(0,T) – D(0,T) = natural increase. 
 
This smart equation is the basic framework to understand population change.  
 
2.1.1 The (Migration) Data Problem 
The availability of demographic data (stocks and flows) cannot always be 
taken for granted. The most prominent source on population stock data is a 
census, which is held about every decade in most countries of the world. 
Besides various non-demographic information, a census captures the stock of 
the resident population at a specific date (by age, sex, place of birth or 
citizenship, formal education, occupation, etc.).7 Because a census does not 
take place every year, population stocks in between two censuses must be 
taken from population registers or must be calculated by means of the Basic 
Demographic Equation (see above).8 In general, the necessary data on births 
and deaths (vital statistics) is quite good, because (more or less) reasonable 
registers exist in almost all countries of the world. The problem is migration 
statistics, especially when differentiating between stock and flow figures.9 
 
Statistics on international migration are difficult to get, most of the time 
inconsistent and sometimes hard to believe. Unlike registering births and 
deaths, individual mobility in terms of migration is depending on proactive 
registration, making it tricky to capture. Apart from that, it is necessary to 
clarify the questions: Who is an international migrant and how and where 
shall international migration be recorded? The UN defines a (long-term) 
migrant by the length of stay:10 
 
“A person who moves to a country other than that of his or  
her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months),  
so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or  
her new country of usual residence.“ 
 
                                               
6 Of course, any component of this equation can be calculated separately by rewriting the equation. 
7 Census characteristics are differing from country to country and also from time to time, which 
makes it sometimes difficult to compare data – even from the same country. 
8 Twenty of the 27 EU Member States have a population register. The seven countries with no 
population register are Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and the UK (THIERRY 
2008:1). 
9 The flow of migrants is the number of migrants who enter or leave a country in a given period 
(usually a year). The stock of migrants is the number of migrants present in a country at a specific 
date (CASTLES & MILLER 2009:xviii). 
10 See: http://data.un.org/Glossary.aspx?q=migrant (retrieved 28.12.2009) 
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In regard to the definition of migrants, the EU issued a regulation in 2007 
which is based on the UN criterion, i.e. a period of residence of at least one 
year (cf. EC 2007b:24). 
 
Another problem is how to register migrants. A census reveals only the 
migrant stock by asking for the place of birth or the citizenship and the 
length of stay.11 Most EU Member States register immigrants by means of 
population registers (e.g. Germany, Italy, Spain and many others), the UK 
conducts border surveys and France depends on interviews during medical 
examinations conducted by ANAEM – the National Agency for the Reception 
of Foreigners and Migration (THIERRY 2008:2). By doing so, the UK and 
France are confronted with the problem, that immigrants have to declare 
their intention with respect to the (planned) length of stay a priori to classify 
them as (long-term) migrants. Even if the registration of immigrants can be 
managed in a proper way, one is still far away from consistent data on 
migration flows. To achieve reliable figures on net migration (i.e. the differ-
ence of in- and out-migration in a given period), it is also necessary to know 
about the flow of emigrants. Therefore, migrants would have to report their 
departure from the previous place of residence, which is often not done at 
all.12  
 
Following these arguments, it should be understandable that data on migra-
tion (both stocks and flows), if existing at all, can be very unreliable. Because 
of that, net migration rates are often calculated by means of the basic 
demographic equation as a residuum of the other known components: 
 
I(0,T) – O(0,T) = N(T) - N(0) + B(0,T) - D(0,T)  
 
2.1.2 Demographic Indicators 
Going into details and explain all kinds of demographic indicators would take 
us too far afield. At this point, only the most important and common indica-
tors should be mentioned briefly. However, each indicator used in this thesis 
will be further explained in the coming chapters when (first) mentioned. 
Fertility 
The most common way to measure fertility is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR): 
 
“The period TFR measures the average number of children who  
would be born to a hypothetical cohort of women who survive  
to the end of their reproductive period and who bear children  
at each age at the rate observed during a particular period.”  
PRESTON et al. (2001:95) 
                                               
11 Foreign born or foreign national is another criterion often used to define migrants. This reflects 
the perception of laws of different types of immigration countries and does not simplify the 
comparability of migration statistics (CASTLES & MILLER 2009:xviii).  
12 An example of biased registration (data) of migration flows is the case of Romanian migration to 
Spain. The Romanian Census of 2002 yielded that around 600.000 people were “missing”. Taking a 
closer look, most of these missing Romanians might be found in the Member States of the EU15, 
especially in Spain and Italy. According to the Romanian Statistical Institute (INSSE), the annual 
net out-migration in the period 2000 to 2006 was around or below 10.000 persons each year. In 
contrast, Spanish immigration data reveals that almost half a million Romanian citizens settled in 
Spain between 2000 and 2006. For sure, the Spanish data seems rather trustworthy, as migrants 
gain access to the Spanish social and health system when registering, whereby they may be 
reluctant to report their departure to avoid losing rights related to their presence in Romania (cf. 
VASILE 2004:10; HUGH 2007a; OECD 2009). 
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As mentioned in the definition above, the TFR is a hypothetical measure, 
based on the number of births during a given period (usually a year). This 
can and shall not be misinterpreted as the “mean number of children per 
woman”, a notion that only makes sense under a cohort perspective 
(SOBOTKA & LUTZ 2009:2ff).  
 
In general, demographic indicators can be applied to two different concepts: 
(1) the concept of a cohort (i.e. longitudinal studies) and (2) the concept of a 
period (cross-sectional studies). According to PRESTON et al. (2001:16), a 
cohort is the aggregate of all units (usually people) that experience a particu-
lar demographic event during a specific time interval, e.g. the birth (or 
marriage) cohort of 1969, which refers to all persons born (or married) in the 
calendar year 1969. By contrast, a period measure is limited to events during 
a given time span, e.g. the total number of births of all women during the 
year 2009, regardless of the mother’s actual age. 
 
A clear statement of the completed fertility of a woman (or of a cohort of 
women) can only be done ex-post, when this women (or cohort) reaches the 
end of the reproductive age (i.e. the 50th birthday).13 The problems con-
nected to this indicator will be further discussed in Chapter 3.2.3. However, 
the TFR will still be applied in this thesis, because it is commonly used and it 
is widely understood that a TFR below 2.1 indicates that a population is not 
reproducing itself – an average of exactly two children per woman is not 
sufficient for population replacement, if mortality risks of women before age 
49 and the sex ratio at birth are incorporated into the calculation.14 
 
Another way to measure fertility is the Crude Birth Rate (CBR). Contrary to 
the TFR, the CBR is an empirical measure displaying the actual number of 
births over a given period divided by the total population over that period. It 
is expressed as the number of births per thousand population.15 But also the 
CBR bears some restrictions: It is a “crude” rate, thus it is distorted by the 
actual age structure of a population.16  Because of that, the choice of the 
indicator depends on the actual scope of the measurement. If the focus of 
interest is to measure the fertility per woman, the TFR is the right choice. In 
case the scope is set to the number of births in respect to the overall popula-
tion development in a particular territory, the CBR should be used. 
Mortality 
The most common indicator for mortality is the Life Expectancy (by sex), 
expressed by the average number of years of life expected by a hypothetical 
cohort of individuals who would be subject to the mortality rates of a given 
period throughout their entire life. The life expectancy is usually applied to 
newborns (life expectancy at birth), but can also be used with regard to the  
                                               
13 Statistically speaking, the reproductive period of a woman is assumed by the age 15 to 49 years. 
14 The replacement level in more developed world regions like Europe is 2.06 children per women, 
whereas the additional 0.06 children compensate for the fact that 5% more boy than girl babies are 
born (0.05) and for all women not reaching the age of 50 (0.01). In countries of the developing 
world, the replacement level is often much higher than 2.06, because of higher mortality. In South 
Africa, for instance, the compensation for the risk of mortality of women below age 40 is 0.43 
children, which sets the South African replacement level to 2.48 children per women (cf. HAUB 
2010). 
15 See http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=7 (retrieved 29.12.2009) 
16 Imagine a region with massive out-migration, especially of younger persons (women) in their 
reproductive age, leaving a relatively high share of elderly behind. Even if the TFR (of the remain-
ing women) is relatively high, the CBR might be still lower compared to a region with a low TFR, but 
with a high share of women in the reproductive age (15 to 49 years). 
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remaining life expectancy at a certain age. Just as fertility, also mortality can 
be measured by means of a crude rate; in this case the Crude Death Rate 
(CDR) expresses the number of deaths per thousand population. 
Migration 
Migration flows are usually measured by the number of immigrants and 
emigrants in a particular area during a given period. The Net Migration Rate 
is the number of immigrants minus emigrants, divided by the (total) popula-
tion of the destination country or region over that period – expressed per 
thousand population. The extent of migrant stocks is usually described by the 
share of migrants (by means of the length of stay, place of birth and/or 
citizenship) in relation to the total population. 
Age Structure 
These three main population processes (fertility, mortality and migration) are 
determining the age structure of a population, as well as the quantitative 
population development in general. Population change is the aggregation of 
Natural Population Balance (birth minus deaths) and net migration (immi-
grants minus emigrants) in a given period, as the basic demographic equa-
tion shows. The age structure of a population at a certain date can be best 
displayed by means of an Age Pyramid – the demographers favourite toy.17 
 
“A population pyramid tells us about  
the past, present and future of populations.”  
Carl HAUB (2009)18, Senior Demographer at PRB, Washington DC. 
 
 
Figure 1: Age structure of Europe (UN definition) and EU27 (2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision; Eurostat. 
 
                                               
17 The terms “age pyramid” and “population pyramid” are used synonymously. 
18 Cited after the Carl Haub`s PRB webcast “Deciphering Population Pyramids” (October 2009) – 
http://www.prb.org/Journalists/Webcasts.aspx (retrieved 30.12.2009) 
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Basically, a population pyramid is a bar graph that can be interpreted as a 
kind of a photograph of how a population looks like (cf. HAUB 2009). Figure 1 
shows the population pyramid of (1) Europe (as defined by the UN) and (2) 
those of the EU27 by 2005, signifying the various delimitations of “Europe” 
(cf. Chapter 3.1.1). On the left side is the male and on the right side the 
female population, both depicted by 5-year age groups of birth cohorts. It is 
striking that there are more women than men at older ages. In the case of 
the oldest old (i.e. 80+), this is not only because women live longer than 
men, but also because of non-biological reasons, e.g. the death toll of (male) 
soldiers during World War II. The historical information to be gained from a 
population pyramid is much more detailed when looking at those of individual 
countries or regions. Like reading tree rings, a population pyramid reveals 
the demographic consequences of the preceding century, e.g. war times, 
natural disasters, economic crises, societal changes. 
 
The population pyramids of Europe (shown in Fig. 1) do not look exactly like 
pyramids because of their narrowing bases. The ideal shape for the popula-
tion structure would be a pillar, which narrows only at the very top as people 
die of old age. Especially in the EU27, the youngest age group below five 
years is smaller than the subsequent age group, a pattern that goes on until 
the age group 35 to 39 years, i.e. the last birth cohorts of the so-called baby 
boom generation. What does this tell us about the future? Over time, the 
smaller age groups will move up into the childbearing years. Consequently, 
the number of (potential) parents will decrease and the number of births will 
go down resulting in a shrinking population.19 But also the stronger age 
groups in the middle of the pyramid will move up to the retirement age, 
causing great concern for the social security of those societies affected by 
population ageing (cf. EC 2008d:20; HAUB 2009). 
 
The share and also the ratio of certain age groups are also commonly used 
for demographic indicators. With regard to population ageing (see also 
Chapter 3.2.7 and 4.3.4), the share of the age group 60 years and older 
(and/or 65+, 80+) indicates the extent of the ageing of a society.20 Related 
to demo-economic issues, the Dependency Ratio depicts the (quantitative) 
relation between economically active age groups (15 to 64 years) and the so-
called dependent age groups, i.e. the younger age groups (below 15 years) 
and the age groups in retirement (65+ years).21 In the case of the EU27 the 
dependency ratio is 49 (see Tab. 1), which means that 100 people of working 
age (15-64 years) are opposed to 49 “dependent” persons that are either 
aged less than 15 years or 65 years and more. The dependency ratio alone 
does not say anything about the weighting of the index either to the youth or 
to the elderly. For this reason, the dependency ratio can be divided into a 
Youth Dependency Ratio (aged 0-14 to 15-64 years) and an Old Age De-
pendency Ratio (aged 65+ to 15-64 years), which will be addressed in the 
coming chapters. 
                                               
19 This is another useful illustration of the difference in interpreting TFR and CBR: Even if all future 
mothers would have more children per woman (TFR) compared to their parents generation, the 
total number of births (CBR) would decline. 
20 In this context it is necessary to clarify that a certain age (especially on the individual level) does 
not say anything about the status of ageing of a person. This is very much dependent on life 
expectancies in general and physical and mental health in particular. 
21 In other publications and contexts, age groups used for the dependency ratio may be different, 
e.g. age groups 0-19 / 20-64 / 65+ or 0-14 / 15-59 / 60+ are also commonly used. For this thesis, 
the age group 15 to 64 years represents the potential labour force, because this comes closest to 
the situation in the EU27+4 (i.e. the space of actual interest), where people do not start working 
before age 15 and the official retirement age is around 65 years. 
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Table 1: Selected demographic indicators (2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision; Eurostat. 
 
Many other and often much more refined demographic indicators do exist 
and are applied by scholars in demography. For now, these remarks shall be 
a sufficient overview of basic demographic measures and indicators. 
 
2.2 Demographic Theories & Models 
What are the reasons behind structural differences of populations and 
demographic change per se? Various demographic theories and models try to 
explain differences in fertility behaviour and mortality, as well as the reasons 
and motivations behind migration movements. In the following, only the 
most important theories and models will get a mention. 
 
2.2.1 Early Population Theories 
An import demographic principle is thinking in long-term categories (i.e. 
generations). This basic idea was already known in the ancient world. It 
lasted until the end of the 18th century, when the first general population 
theories were developed in the UK. At that time and under the impression of 
a (formerly unknown) steady population growth, several and often diverging 
assumptions on the consequences of population development were ex-
pressed. By 1761, Robert WALLACE argued that mankind would be destroyed 
by itself due to over-population and suggested to adopt such drastic meas-
ures as castration and executions when reaching a certain age.22 Contrary to 
that, William GODWIN drew a more positive picture in 1793 postulating that 
there is enough space and food in paradise on earth.23  
 
The most famous publication from that time, Thomas MALTHUS’ Essay on the 
Principle of Population (1798/1803) is generally acknowledged as the outset 
of modern demography (BRUIJN 1999:42). The Malthusian view emphasises 
the negative effects of population growth, assuming that population and food 
production (by means of subsistence) increase with different ratios to reach a 
level where no more people can be sustained and any surplus population will 
die of starvation or other so-called “positive checks” like epidemics, wars or 
plagues (MALMBERG & SOMMESTAD 2000:22; LEE 2003:169ff).24 Malthus 
believed that mankind could avoid this fate only through moral restraint in 
order to limit the number of births by postponement of marriage or contra-
                                               
22 In: Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature and Providence (citied after LEBHART 2005). 
23 In: Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (citied after LEBHART 2005). To stick with William 
GOLDWIN for a moment, interestingly enough (although off-topic) his daughter Mary WOLLSTONE-
CRAFT SHALLEY wrote the Gothic horror story Frankenstein, which is somehow in contrast to the 
positive humanistic attitude of her father. See: http://www.online-literature.com/shelley_mary/ 
(retrieved 04.01.2010) 
24 Following the Malthusian idea, the capacity of human populations to reproduce itself is following a 
geometrical (exponential) ratio, while the capacity of food production is limited and increases at 
best in arithmetic (linear) fashion (see BRUIJN 1999:42). 
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ceptives – i.e. so-called “preventive checks”. Although history has proved 
certain assumptions to be too simple or incorrect, terms like “Malthusian”, 
“Anti-Malthusian” and “Neo-Malthusian” are still used in demographic discus-
sions, demonstrating the importance of Malthus’ beliefs in respect to the 
limits of growth of resources and populations (BRUIJN 1999:42f; BÄHR 
2004:230f). 
 
2.2.2 Demographic Transition 
Constant high fertility and mortality levels determined the demography of the 
pre-industrial era. By contrast, the demography of the industrial era shows 
low levels of fertility and mortality. The Demographic Transition is (although 
often referred to as a theory) a model or a narrative describing the way in 
which, from the 18th century onward, fertility and mortality in several Euro-
pean countries declined in response to changes in the economic structure, 
the technology and the culture of those societies.25  
 
“Any society having to face the heavy mortality characteristics  
of the pre-modern era must have high fertility to survive.” 
Dirk J. van de KAA (2008:6) 
 
In the course of demographic transition, first mortality declines due to 
reductions in contagious and infectious diseases, a process that is driven by 
progress in hygiene and public health measures (LEE 2003:170). As fertility 
remains high at first, the excess of births over deaths leads to a period of 
accelerated population growth, as shown schematically in Figure 2.26 This 
unprecedented natural population growth was, to some extent, compensated 
by out-migration (van de KAA 2008:13). Fertility begins to decline when 
couples respond to a greater number of births surviving by voluntarily 
limiting the family size (ibid., p.1). At the end of the demographic transition, 
mortality and fertility are in balance again, resulting in enlarged populations 
within a different demographic regime. Family sizes have become much 
smaller and life expectancy at birth has increased by several decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  
Schematic representation 
of the model of Demo-
graphic Transition  
 
Source:  
BLOOM, CANNING & 
SEVILLA 2002:31 – Fig. 
2.5); own illustration. 
 
 
                                               
25 The concept of the demographic transition is attributed to Frank W. NOTESTEIN (1945). Actually 
three persons developed it independently. Besides Notestein, those were Adolphe LAUNDRY (1929) 
and Warren S. THOMPSON (1934) – see van de KAA 2008:3ff. 
26 According to LEE (2003:170), there are cases in which fertility declined first, notably the USA and 
France. 
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2.2.3 Demographic Dividend 
As a consequence of the demographic transition, a unique baby-boom 
generation (i.e. the last strong birth cohorts, before fertility is decreasing) 
will appear at the basis of the population pyramid. The result is a “bulge” in 
the age structure, similar to a “demographic wave” which works its way up 
towards the peak of the population pyramid over time (BLOOM, CANNING & 
SEVILLA 2002:30). That “bulge” is also evident in the population pyramid of 
the EU27 (by 2005), affecting especially the age group 35 to 44 years, i.e. 
the birth cohorts of the 1960s (see Fig. 1). 
 
“Demography casts a long shadow.”  
Edward HUGH (2007b)27 
 
For a certain period these changes in the age structure can have a positive 
effect on the economy. The so-called Demographic Dividend might be paid 
off, when the baby-boom generation reaches the working age.28 In the 
course of such a demographic setting, the proportion of the economically 
active population increases in relation to the potentially dependent youth and 
elder population, resulting in a lower (youth) dependency ratio (see also 
Chapter 2.2.1). However, the demographic dividend must be seen as a 
potential “window of opportunity”, which is closing when these baby-boomers 
reach the retirement age. By then, the dependency ratio increases again, 
now driven by a higher old-age dependency ratio. Ultimately and structurally 
induced, the setting of a demographic dividend leads to population ageing 
(see Chapter 3.2.7 and 4.3.4). 
 
2.2.4 Theoretical Approaches to Fertility  
But how and why are mortality and fertility declining in response to changes 
in the economic structure, technology and culture as outlined by the model of 
demographic transition? The decline of mortality can easily be explained by 
progress in public health measures and improved personal hygiene, affecting 
not only the mortality at older ages, but also the prevailing high mortality in 
infancy and childhood at that time.29 The increase in life expectancy was 
driven first and foremost by the decrease of mortality at young ages. Mortal-
ity decline must be assumed to be a necessary condition for fertility decline, 
because low fertility is not compatible with high mortality. However, mortality 
is not the sole agent of fertility decline. 
 
“Both mortality and fertility decline are likely to be responses to 
broad changes in society, such as improvements in standard of living, 
increased urbanisation, rising aspirations and so on.” 
Dick van de KAA (2008:19) 
 
 
                                               
27 Edward Hugh is Barcelona based economist of British extraction, see: 
http://demography.matters.googlepages.com/edwardhugh (retrieved 06.01.2010) 
28 It should be pointed out that a demographic dividend only can be distributed, if appropriate 
efforts are made to develop and strengthen the human capital (i.e. education and health), 
especially those of the last strong birth cohorts.   
29 Referring to the demographic transition, the so-called Epidemiological Transition explains the 
shift in mortality patterns from infectious diseases in pre-industrial societies to chronical diseases  
in contemporary higher developed societies (BÄHR 2004:172ff). 
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According to the Neoclassical Theory of Fertility Decline – referable to Gary S. 
BECKER (1960) – the demand for children is subject of a cost-benefit consid-
eration and hence varying with household income. Consequently, the “utility” 
of children can be compared to other “consumer” goods. By maximising that 
utility, parents are rather seeking for quality (education and health) than for 
quantity in regard to their offspring (van de KAA 2008:19). The Easterlin 
Hypothesis (or Synthesis) extended the economical approach by a de-
mand/supply-framework, connecting fertility decisions to the family’s prefer-
ences for consumption (MACUNOVICH 1997:121; van de KAA 2009:20). The 
Wealth Flows Theory of Fertility Decline, developed by John CALDWELL (in 
1976) is based on the direction in which wealth flows within a family. In 
traditional societies, this intergenerational flow goes from children to their 
parents, whereas the direction changes in modern societies. The explanatory 
model for still having a “non-zero fertility” is based on so-called “emotion 
flows” which can best be explained by a culturally induced ideal family size 
(HUSA & WOHLSCHLÄGL 2004:118ff). 
 
These important (economical) theories of fertility decline assume a rational 
behaviour behind fertility intentions. As soon as mortality declines and 
children are not considered anymore as labour force for familial production 
and a pension plan (at least, where public old-age pension schemes exist), it 
would be irrational to maintain large families. Once the social function of the 
family changes, it is likely that fertility behaviour changes as well. According 
to van de KAA (2008:21), extensive research about the value of children has 
found support for the hypothesis that the vanishing economic role of children 
and rising aspirations of people stimulate low levels of fertility. 
 
2.2.5 A Second Demographic Transition? 
The demographic transition (see Chapter 2.2.2) explains the path from high 
to low levels of fertility and mortality. At the beginning and at the end of this 
transitional phase, the growth of population is moderate. It was generally 
accepted that the post-transition stage would achieve a new long-term 
equilibrium, i.e. an approximate balance of birth and death rates (van de KAA 
2008:7). 
 
“Demographers assumed that fertility would settle down at about the 
level required to maintain the population – slightly more than two ba-
bies per woman. The trouble is, nobody told Europe’s women.”  
Fred PEARCE (2010), The Guardian. 
 
However, the demographic transition did not make a soft landing. By the late 
1970s the demographic community agreed that something special was taking 
place in Western Europe. Since the mid 1960s the high levels of fertility – 
generating the so-called baby boom – disappeared as rapidly as snow is 
melting in the sun. It became evident that this downturn of birth rates (below 
replacement level) represented more than a temporary fluctuation. In a joint 
article (in 1986), Ron LESTHAEGE and Dirk van de KAA identified many 
trends and behaviour regarding family foundation and fertility that they 
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posed the question whether one should not speak about a Second Demo-
graphic Transition (van de KAA 2008:9ff)?30 
 
“The first and the second demographic transition are characterised  
by opposite trends in mean ages at marriage, cohabitation and  
illegitimacy.”  
Ron LESTHAEGHE & Karle NEELS (2002:7) 
 
While during the first demographic transition (FDT) the family became a 
stronger institution, van de KAA (2008:11) argues that its weakening can be 
considered characteristic for the second demographic transition (SDT). 
Contrary to the FDT, divorce rates and cohabitation are rising and remar-
riages are declining (in favour of post-marital cohabitation) in the course of 
the SDT. Accelerated postponement of parenthood and rising childlessness in 
unions pushes fertility levels down to record low levels (LESTHAEGHE & 
NEELS 2002:8). 
 
The SDT stresses elements of social and cultural change, highlighting peo-
ple’s views on life, their social philosophy and their ideological orientation on 
the actions they take. People in contemporary Western societies internalised 
post-modern values such as self-fulfilment, personal freedom of choice, 
individual life styles and emancipation (van de KAA 2008:23). On the one 
hand, the expansion of the educational system enables women to invest in 
themselves and thus increasing their desire to be an active member of the 
labour force. On the other hand, it leads to growing conflicts between female 
employment and motherhood (SOBOTKA 2004:14ff). 
 
 
Figure 3: Schematic representation of the First and Second Demographic Transition. 
Source: van de KAA (2008:14 – Fig. 4.1); own illustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30 The article “Two Demographic Transitions?” was originally published in Dutch language, in a 
special issue of the sociological journal Mens en Maatschappij. It is worth mentioning that the 
article’s title contained a question mark (cf. LESTHAEGHE & NEELS 2002; van de KAA 2008). 
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“Transition is usually conceived in an evolutional and  
unidimensional way, with a clear view of the starting  
and finishing points as well as the path.”  
Saul ESTRIN (2009:7)31  
 
Although the SDT constitutes the current mainstream concept among popula-
tion scholars dealing with demographic change in European societies, it 
should be noted that a dividing line between supporters and sceptics of the 
ideas behind the SDT exists in the scientific community.32 However, it is 
indisputable that new values induce new behaviours and new behaviours 
affecting family foundation do have demographic consequences (cf. BILLARI 
& LIEFBROER 2005:1f). In the case of the SDT, these consequences can be 
summarised as follows: Fertility dropped close to or below replacement levels 
and natural population growth rates are becoming negative. As shown in 
Figure 3 and true for large parts of Europe, population numbers are kept 
from falling dramatically only because of the influx of migrants (van de KAA 
2008:14). 
 
2.2.6 Forms and Theories of Migration 
After clarifying the definition of international migrants in Chapter 2.1.1 by 
means of the length of stay (of at least one year), we will now turn the 
attention to the various forms and theories of migration. With respect to 
migration theories, it should be said in advance that migration research must 
be seen as a multidisciplinary field. Although migration is one of the three 
main variables of demography, the process of migration is a topic involving 
as many scientific fields as the term “population studies” captures.33  
 
Forms of Migration 
According to UN definition (UN 2009a:15) “human mobility” is the ability of 
individuals, families or groups of people to choose their place of residence, 
whereas “human movement” is the act of changing the place of residence. 
Correspondingly, the second important key term for the definition of a 
migrant – besides the length of stay – is the act of changing the “place of 
residence”. In this sense, commuting (i.e. travelling) between home and 
work is not a form of migration per se. This thesis will stick to classical forms 
of migration (see Fig. 4), implying the act of changing the place of residence 
for longer than a year. 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31 Saul Estrin is Head of the Department of Management at the London School of Economics. 
32 Some scholars challenge the uniqueness of the SDT, arguing that it is a continuation of the FDT 
and that the empirical validation outside North-western Europe, North America, Australia and New 
Zealand is missing (COLEMAN 2005:11ff). According to BILLARI & LIEFBROER (2005:2), van de 
KAA suggested to replace the term “transition” by “revolution” in order to defuse the topic – see 
also the quote of Saul ESTRIN above. 
33 See (4) 
34 Contrary to short or medium-distance commuting, the more recent concept of Transnational 
Mobility can be classified as migration. Thereby, a secondary place of residence is established in 
order to work at a more distant place beyond a border. Circular Migration starts a regular migration 
(or human movement), but ends with returning to the usual place of residence (cf. FASSMANN 
2008b:21).  
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Figure 4:  
Schematic illustration 
of different forms of 
migration. 
 
Source: FASSMANN 
(2008b:20 – Fig.1); 
own illustration.  
 
 
Migration Theories 
Although it is international migration, which is first and foremost in the public 
eye, the quantity of internal migration is far larger.35 Nevertheless, most 
migration theories are conceptualised with respect to international migration, 
implying different institutional settings of nation states. To shed some light 
on the motivations and structural forces of contemporary migration, the most 
important theories shall be outlined in brief.  
 
Based on the Neoclassical Theory of Economics, the Neoclassical Theory of 
Migration became very popular in the second half of the 20th century. It is 
based on the assumption that regional disparities in labour markets (and 
wages) generate migrant flows, affected by so-called “push and pull fac-
tors”.36 Such flows then equalize wages towards economic equilibrium. In 
terms of the neoclassical theory, migrants act strictly rational – by weighing 
up the costs and benefits of a potential migration decision – and the migra-
tion process works as a compensating mechanism for regional disparities 
(CASTLES & MILLER 2009:21f).  
 
Another economically influenced migration theory is the Dual (or Segmented) 
Labour Market Theory, amplifying the importance of institutional factors, as 
well as race and gender. This theory, developed in the late 1970s, stresses 
that international migration is driven by structural demand for highly and 
lower skilled labour in advanced economies (CASTLES & MILLER 2009:23). In 
terms of labour market bifurcation, the primary sector provides high wages 
and steady jobs (for native workers), while the secondary sector offers low 
wages, little stability and opportunities for advancement (MASSEY 
2002:146). Because natives hardly accept such secondary sector jobs, a 
structural demand for immigrant workers is generated. 
 
 
                                               
35 “Internal migration” means human movement within the borders of a country, usually measured 
across regional, district or municipal boundaries. “International migration” is a human movement 
across international borders, resulting in a change of country of residence (UN 2009:15). 
36 Push factors (demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities, political 
repression, etc.) impell people to leave the areas of origin and pull factors (demand for labour, 
economic opportunities, political freedom, etc.) attract them to certain receiving countries 
(CASTLES & MILLER 2009:22). 
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The New Economics of Labour Migration places special emphasis on social 
groups (families, households and communities), arguing that isolated indi-
viduals do not make migration decisions (CASTLES & MILLER 2009:24). 
Effectively, a family or household diversifies the sources of income through 
migration. Emerged in the early 1990s, this approach specifically implies the 
phenomenon of international remittances flows (MASSEY 2002:145).  
 
Taking today’s accelerated globalisation into account, the World Systems 
Theory is based on the disparities between (economic) centres and peripher-
ies. The existence of so-called “global cities” in less developed countries 
accelerates rural-urban migration associated with growing informal econo-
mies as well as rural change and rapid urbanisation (CASTLES & MILLER 
2009:26).37 Rapid technological improvements in transportation and commu-
nication are important drivers of globalisation. These developments enable 
migrants to maintain close links with their places of origin and facilitate the 
growth of circular and temporary mobility. In this context, the Theory of 
Transnationalism stresses the emergence of “transnational communities” 
when people migrate repeatedly between two or more places where they 
have economic, social or cultural links (ibid.; p. 30f).38 
 
Continuation and amplification of existing migration flows are in the focus of 
the Migration Networks Theory. It is based on the assumption that networks 
supply migrants with information in regard of the destination (e.g. housing, 
job opportunities) and are hence reducing the costs and risks of migration 
decisions. Additionally, networks enable migrants to interact with their family 
and friends who stayed behind in the country of origin (IOM 2003:15). 
 
“Migration is a process which affects every dimension of social exis-
tence, and which develops its own complex dynamics.”  
Stephen CASTLES & Mark J. MILLER (2009:21) 
 
A single theory cannot deliver a comprehensive explanatory model for all 
factors and interactions of contemporary international migration. Therefore, 
one should be aware that every migration theory responds to a specific 
perspective of the phenomenon and thus highlights only certain aspects of 
the complex process of migration. 
 
European Migration Systems 
 
“In the decades following the end of World War II,  
Western Europe became what it had not been 
 for a thousand years: a region of immigration.”  
Paul DEMENY (2003:28)  
According to CASTLES & MILLER (2009:27) a migration system is constituted 
by two or more countries, which exchange migrants with each other. Such a 
system arises from the existence of historic links between sending and 
receiving countries based on colonisation, political influence, trade, invest-
                                               
37 Global Cities are considered as important node points in the global economic system. According 
to Saskia SASSEN (2001:xvii), the analysis of such cities can be described, amongst others, by 
terms like “practices of global control” and the “infrastructure of low wage jobs necessary to serve 
the global economy”. 
38 A much older term for transnational communities is “diaspora”. However, the term diaspora has 
strong emotional connotations, while the notion of a transnational community is more neutral 
(CASTLES & MILLER 2009:31). 
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ment or cultural ties. In this respect, migration systems explain why flows 
from certain countries of origin to particular destinations continue to exist 
(ibid., p. 27f).39 
 
“Immigration is much easier to start than to stop.”  
Douglas MASSEY (2002:152) 
 
Over centuries, Europe was the prime source region of world migration. In 
the course of the second half of the 20th century, all countries of Western 
Europe became destinations of international migration (MÜNZ 2009:5). Since 
the 1950s some countries (like Germany, Austria and Switzerland) actively 
recruited labour migrants.40 Other countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK) experienced the return of settlers and labour 
immigration from their former colonies (FASSMANN & MÜNZ 1996:19; 
CASTLES & MILLER 2009:102). The oil price shock in 1973 – connected with 
the stop of labour recruitment and the simultaneously beginning of family 
reunion and settlement – can be considered as the first break of the ongoing 
influx (FASSMANN & MÜNZ 1996:22f; CASTLES & MILLER 2009:100).  
 
During the Cold War, East-West migration within Europe occurred only in the 
course of political crises.41 However, since 1989 intra East-West migration 
regained momentum. As a result, first Germany and since the late 1990s also 
Spain and Italy – both previously recognised as “classical” out-migration 
countries – became the prime destinations for labour migrants from Central 
and Eastern Europe (MÜNZ 2009:5). 
 
2.3 Population Projections 
As population projections will also be a topic in the coming chapters, this 
concept should not go unmentioned.42 Projections are always based on the 
current age structure and assumptions about future developments of the 
three demographic main variables, operationalised by age- and sex-specific 
rates of births, deaths and net migration (BIRG 2001:88). The best-known 
global population projections are produced by the UN (since the 1950s), but 
also by other institutions like the United States Census Bureau (USCB), the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), and the World 
Bank (cf. O’NEILL et al. 2001:206). Referring to the EU, especially the 
(national and regional) population projections of EUROSTAT must be consid-
ered highly relevant. 
 
                                               
39 For further reading on current European migration systems, see the (German-language) article 
“Das europäische Migrationssystem – Facetten einer neuen Geographie der Migration” by Felicitas 
HILLMANN (2008). 
40 For more information on the (German) Guestworker System, see e.g. CASTLES & MILLER 
(2009:100). 
41 During and after the Hungarian Uprises (1956), the Prague Spring (1968), the Solidarity, 
Freedom and Economical Crisis in Poland (1980-81) and the Yugoslav Wars (in the 1990s), Western 
Europe received hundreds of thousands of refugees from these countries (FASSMANN & MÜNZ, 
1996:24f). 
42 Often, the terms “projection” and “forecast” are used interchangeably. However, in some cases 
demographers differentiate between the terms based on the implied likelihood of the outcome. 
Projections are defined as the numerical consequences of an assumed set of future paths, whereas 
a forecast is defined as the most likely projection (cf. O’NEILL et al. 2001:272). 
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2.3.1 Assumptions & Variants  
Assumptions on European fertility developments differ between UN and 
EUROSTAT. In the case of the UN, all European countries are categorised as 
“low-fertility countries” (i.e. countries with a fertility at or below 2.1). The UN 
assumes that all these low-fertility countries will remain a TFR below 2.1 in 
the course of the next decades, whereas those countries with a current TFR 
below 1.85 will stay below this threshold (UN 2003:12). By contrast, EURO-
STAT recognises that fertility patterns of the EU Member States must be 
characterised by different stages of transition towards late childbearing (see 
also Chapter 3.2.3). On average, the TFR across EU countries is assumed to 
be between 1.4 and 1.9 until 2050 (LANZIERI 2006:7).  
 
“The future is not set in stone.”  
Tadeusz KUGLER & Siddhart SWAMINATHAN (2006:593) 
 
With respect to mortality, both UN and EUROSTAT assume that life expec-
tancy at birth will further increase (by a fixed number of years per decen-
nial), whereas EUROSTAT expects mortality trends in the New Member States 
to converge to EU15 rates (LANZIERI 2006:7; SKRIBEKK et al. 2007:5). 
Contrary to fertility and mortality trends, migration flows – as mentioned 
above – depend on a large range of factors, including short-term policy 
measures. The associated uncertainties make migration assumptions hard to 
predict. This is of particular importance to smaller projection areas like 
regions and municipalities.43 
 
The combination of such assumptions produces different variants, which are 
based on certain scenarios for each demographic component (i.e. “what-if-
models”). These scenarios might vary widely by outcome. However, the most 
common variants are based on “low”, “medium”, “high” and “constant” future 
development paths in regard to fertility, mortality and migration. Figure 5 
demonstrates the different results of the UN projections under four fertility 
assumptions for Europe (by UN definition) and the EU27 until 2050.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  
UN population 
projections for 
Europe & EU27 
under four fertility 
assumptions 
 
Data source: UN 
Population Division 
– World Population 
Prospects: 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
                                               
43 At the global scale, migration does have no effect on population projections. 
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2.3.2 Accuracy of Population Projections 
Several population projection techniques do exist.44 No single model or 
technique is more suitable for all purposes than others, as each has its 
strengths and weaknesses (SKRIBEKK et al. 2007:19). However, a further 
explanation would go beyond the scope of this thesis. In general, all projec-
tions are simplifications and hence are prone to serious errors if extended 
beyond realistic limits (KUGLER & SWAMINATHAN, 2006:582f). 
 
According to O’NEILL et al. (2001:265f) projections have tended to become 
more accurate over time.45 Generally speaking, projections are less accurate 
at the country level than at global levels, and errors grow with the duration 
of the projection (PRB 2001:2). Finally, the quality of a projection’s output is 
strongly dependent on the quality of its input (based on accurate data and 
assumptions). 
Of course … 
A lot more could be said about demographic data, indicators, projections as 
well as theories and models – as implied by this chapter’s inflation of foot-
notes and references. However, these accomplishments should be sufficient 
for understanding the state of the demography of Europe at the beginning of 
the 21st century. 
 
                                               
44 According to SKRIBEKK et al. (2007:8f), population projections are often based on a combination 
of different techniques (e.g. extrapolation, cohort-component method, multi-state projections, 
etc.). 
45 The UN has projected the world population about a dozen times since the 1950s and all but one 
of these projections have been off less than 4% (PRB 2001:2). Projections at the country level 
proved to be less accurate, because errors at the country level tend to cancel each other when 
aggregated to (supranational) regions or to the world (NRC 2000; cited after O’NEILL et al. 
2001:272). 
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3 DEMOGRAPHY OF EUROPE 
After outlining the underlying theoretical aspects of demography in general, 
from now on emphasis will be placed on empirical findings, starting with a 
description of the state of demography in Europe. The status quo will be first 
summarised at the scale of European countries and broader regions (Chapter 
3.2), before also focussing at the regional level perspective of the EU27+4 
(Chapter 3.3). Considering demographic trends on different scales since 
1950, the question will be discussed, whether something like a European 
demographic regime exists, and if the demography of Europe is on a con-
verging or diverging pathway (Chapter 3.4).  
 
3.1 Data sources 
The most recent demographic data for European countries is available for 
2007 (UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision) 
and 2008/09 (Eurostat). Nevertheless, the presented analyses will stick to 
the base year 2005 with good reason. The core of this thesis – i.e. the 
demographic typology of European regions (see Chapter 4) – is based on 
regional data at NUTS 2 level, which was available for 2005 in a reasonable 
consistent form by the time the typology was developed.  
 
Even by today, the year 2005 can be assumed as virtually up-to-date, 
because demographic structures are rather persistent in the short-term; 
contrary to e.g. economic developments. This phenomenon is known as 
“population momentum”, which refers to the demographic dynamics, which 
are inherent to a particular age structure.46 Past and possible future demo-
graphic trends will be made apparent by the period 1950 to 2005 and by 
population projections to 2050. These projections refer to the UN medium 
variant, unless otherwise stated.  
 
Since Eurostat provides national and also regional data especially for EU 
Member States (plus candidate and EFTA countries), it will be used as the 
source for Chapter 3.3 and beyond. The descriptive analysis of European 
countries and broad regions in Chapter 3.2 is mainly based on UN data, 
providing data also for Non-EU countries, complemented with data from 
Eurostat and various other sources. 
 
3.2 The State of Demography in Europe 
Before going into detail on the demography of Europe, it should be made 
clear what is meant by the term Europe. What is Europe? Where does Europe 
end? Just throw this questions into a group of people and you might launch 
an inspired discussion. This question is by far not restricted to academic 
cycles. Thinking of recent discussions on future EU expansions, it is certainly 
also a political topic.47 
 
                                               
46 Take, for example, the young age structure of a considerably increasing population: in a young 
population, even if fertility falls sharply, the numbers of potential mothers will continue to increase 
for another generation when these last strong cohorts get into fertile age (KEYFITZ 1971; cited 
after O’NEILL et al. 2001:258). 
47 Since 1999 Turkey is a pre-accession country of the EU. Nevertheless, European politicians (and 
citizens) are still discussing, if Turkey shall be assumed as part of Europe. 
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“Europe is so well gardened that it resembles a work of art,  
a scientific theory, a neat metaphysical system.  
Man has recreated Europe in his own image.“  
Aldous HUXLEY (1929:128) 
 
To curtail this issue, from the geographical perspective it is beyond question 
that Europe’s boundaries are relative. Delimitations of areas always are social 
constructs. Besides geographical arguments, the question can also be 
discussed by means of historical and cultural arguments (i.e. the “Christian 
Europe”, origin of the Enlightment and subsequently of democracy, market 
economy, as well as humanism, capitalism and socialism) and, last but not 
least, in terms of incorporation and membership of “European” institutions 
(cf. FASSMANN 2007). 
 
3.2.1 Europe of the Nations 
Without digging too deep into the “What is Europe”-topic, it appears reason-
able to stick to the institutional perspective for the coverage of the demo-
graphic status of Europe. For sure, this approach makes sense when covering 
a EU/ESPON project like DEMIFER (see Chapter 1.1). 
 
But even within an institutional framework, many different definitions of 
Europe exist, simply because many institutions cover European perspectives. 
In the following, a short overview of organisations contributing valuable 
(demographic and socio-economic) data on Europe shall be given. Since such 
data will be used throughout this thesis, it should be made clear from the 
beginning, which definitions of Europe are applied by the different data 
suppliers (i.e. institutions). The differences between the two main definitions  
– Europe by UN-definition and EU/EFTA Europe – can be gathered at best and 
in detail from Map 1 and 2. 
 
The United Nations (UN), literally a global organisation, is sub-dividing the 
entire world in several major areas.48 Thereby “UN Europe” is including 48 
countries and territories from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea, further 
divided into four geographical distinguished groups (see Map 1). According to 
the UN definition, Cyprus, Turkey, as well as the Caucasian countries (i.e. 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) are not part of Europe. 
 
Today, the European Union (EU) consists of 27 Member States (see Map 2).49 
In 1957, six nations (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) were laying out the foundation of the modern EU by signing the 
Treaty of Rome. Several countries joined during the 1970s (UK, Ireland and 
Denmark), 1980s (Greece, Spain and Portugal) and 1990s (Austria, Finland 
and Sweden). This Union of 15 members, the so-called EU15, expanded in 
2004 by ten more Member States.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
48 See: http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=5 (retrieved 07.07.2009) 
49 See: http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (retrieved 
07.07.2009) 
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Map 1: Europe by UN definition 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map 2: EU & EFTA countries 
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Besides the two Mediterranean island states of Malta and Cyprus, eight 
former Eastern Bloc countries (Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) joined the EU by 1st May 2004, 
only a decade and a half after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Together with 
Romania and Bulgaria, which entered the EU in 2007, these twelve New 
Member States (NMS) became also known as EU12. At the moment three 
candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of 
Macedonia/FYROM) are queuing up, and the remaining Balkan countries 
(Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Albania and Kos-
ovo) hold the status of potential candidate countries (EUROPÄISCHES PAR-
LAMENT 2008:8ff).  
 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) consists of four countries – 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (see Map 2) – and is closely 
associated with the EU. Switzerland is anyway strongly connected with the 
EU by bilateral agreements. Through the Agreement on the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA), the other three EFTA countries constitute a single internal 
market together with the 27 EU Members.50 Also Iceland is currently aban-
doning its reservations against a EU membership in the aftermath of the 
banking crisis, which shook its economy to the very foundations. Together, 
the 27 EU countries and the four EFTA countries form the ESPON space, also 
referred to as EU27+4 (see Chapter 1.1.1). 
 
In the case of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the definition of Europe is simply depending on the membership of a 
country in this particular organisation – just same as with the EU and EFTA, 
and the Council of Europe (see below). “OECD Europe” comprises the EU15 
countries plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Slova-
kia, Switzerland and Turkey.51 
 
With its 47 member countries (including the Caucasian countries and Tur-
key), the Council of Europe (COE) virtually covers the entire European 
continent, besides Kosovo and Belarus.52 The exclusion of Belarus is related 
to the obvious discrepancies in governance with respect to the common and 
democratic principles of the COE, which are based on the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and other reference texts on the protection of individu-
als. According to the KOSOVO TIMES (2009) the state of Kosovo is already 
planning to apply for COE membership, although it is not yet recognised by 
all (European) nations. 
 
There are several other European institutions drawing different maps of 
Europe, e.g. the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) or the 
European Broadcasting Union (EBU).53 Nevertheless, the above-mentioned 
definitions of Europe (by the UN and especially by the EU/EFTA) will be 
hereafter used as reference spaces, when speaking of Europe. At the same 
time, the EU member Cyprus, as well as the EU candidate Turkey and the 
three Caucasian countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) – all of them 
are COE members – will be included in the coming analysis if appropriate. 
 
                                               
50 See: http://www.efta.int/content/eea/eea-agreement (retrieved 07.07.2009) 
51 See: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1884 (retrieved 07.07.2009) 
52 See: http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (retrieved 07.07.2009) 
53 See: http://www.uefa.com/uefa/index.html and 
http://www.ebu.ch/en/ebu_members/actives/index.php (retrieved 07.07.2009) 
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3.2.2 Population Size 
In 2005, the population of Europe (by UN definition) amounted to 729 million 
people, whereof 490 million lived in the EU27.54 With respect to the global 
scale, DEMENY (2003:4) complains about the demographic marginalisation of 
Europe, as it happened during the 20th century and which will further accel-
erate in the 21st century. Today, Europe accounts for 13.4% of the world’s 
population, whereas half a century ago, the share of Europe was still above 
20%. Since 1950 Europe’s population has been growing by around 180 
million people, and still continues to grow. However, the rest of the world, 
especially Asia and Africa, was and still is growing much faster (see Fig. 6 
and 7).  
 
Population sizes of European countries vary substantially. The Russian 
Federation (2005: 143 million) is the biggest European country (both by 
population and area) while Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino (all be-
tween 30.000 to 35.0000 inhabitants) are the smallest, apart from the Holy 
See (with a resident population of less than 1,000). However, the actual size 
of a population does not constitute a challenge or potential per se – but 
rather its density, which also varies extremely (see Tab. 2). What matters 
more is the population’s structure – characterised by age, sex and further 
characteristics such as educational attainment, skills, health, etc. – and the 
underlying dynamics (i.e. demographic trends). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  
Total population 
 by world region 
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population Division 
– World Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  
Share of the  
global population  
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population Division 
– World Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
                                               
54 The EU27 population exceeded 500 million in the course of the year 2009. 
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Table 2: Population size of Europe’s biggest and smallest countries (2005) 
Source: Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
Population sizes of European countries vary substantially. The Russian 
Federation (2005: 143 million) is the biggest European country (both by 
population and area) while Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino (all be-
tween 30.000 to 35.0000 inhabitants) are the smallest, apart from the Holy 
See (with a resident population of less than 1,000). However, the actual size 
of a population does not constitute a challenge or potential per se – but 
rather its density, which also varies extremely (see Tab. 2). What matters 
more is the population’s structure – characterised by age, sex and further 
characteristics such as educational attainment, skills, health, etc. – and the 
underlying dynamics (i.e. demographic trends). 
Population Growth 
The further elaborations of the state of demography in Europe will concen-
trate mainly on the demographic structure and dynamics. In this respect, the 
first interesting question is: Which European countries are (still) growing and 
to which extent? 
 
Between 2000 and 2005 the whole of Europe (without Cyprus, Turkey and 
the Caucasian countries) was growing on average by 0.08% per year. This 
stagnating trend can be observed since the early 1990s (see also Fig. 6 
above). The dichotomy of countries with increasing and decreasing popula-
tions is illustrated in Map A1.01 (in Annex 1), which is featuring the short-
term trends in population growth between 2000 and 2005 in Europe by 
country. Keeping the UN definition of European regions in mind, more or less 
all Northern, Western and Southern European countries have growing popu-
lations, with the exception of the three Baltic States as well as the former 
Yugoslavian countries Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia.55 By contrast, almost 
all Eastern European countries experienced a population decline in the first 
years of the 21st century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
55 Depending on perspectives and authors, the Baltic and former Yugoslavian countries can be also 
considered as Central and Eastern European (CEE), or Central European (Baltics) and South-
Eastern European (Ex-Yugoslavia) as done by the Council of Europe (cf. KUPISZEWSKI et al. 
2006:9f). 
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Figure 8: Popula-
tion growth rates of 
European regions  
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When looking at the long-term trend in population growth of the four geo-
graphical distinguished European regions (see Fig. 8), it was Eastern Europe, 
which had the strongest population growth rates (around 1.5% per year) in 
the early 1950s. Since then the population growth declined steadily and, as a 
consequence of the political and societal turmoil, became negative since the 
early 1990s. The Republic of Moldova was affected strongest by the shift in 
population growth. During the period 1950 to 1955, it had the highest 
population growth rate of all European countries, reaching annual average 
growth rates of 2.31%.56 Contrary to that, during the period 2000 to 2005 
Moldova had the most negative growth rate (avg. p.a. -1.74%) in Europe 
(see also Fig. 33 in the forthcoming Chapter 3.4.1). 
 
The population growth rates of Northern and Western Europe were increasing 
from 1950 onwards, reaching a peak of 0.8% during the period 1960 to 
1965. In the 1970s and early 1980s the annual average growth rates de-
clined below 0.2%. Since then, growth rates of Northern and during the 
1990s especially those of Western Europe were increasing again, reaching a 
level of around 0.4% by 2005. Among the Northern European countries, the 
Baltic States (of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are the only countries with 
negative growth rates – for the same reasons as the Eastern European 
countries. Ireland, which was the only Northern European country with 
negative growth rate in 1950/55, was exhibiting the strongest population 
growth rate (of nearly 2% p.a.) in Europe during the period 2000 to 2005. All 
Western European countries had a positive population growth in 2000/05, 
whereby Luxembourg was experiencing the strongest growth (1.2% p.a.). 
 
Southern Europe had a constant population growth of around 0.75% per year 
during the period 1950 to 1980, followed by a period of decreasing popula-
tion growth until the end of the 20th century. Since then – in only 5 years – it 
recovered from 0.2% to 0.6% per year, which makes it the strongest grow-
ing region in Europe by 2000/05. Apart from the former Eastern Bloc coun-
tries, also Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina are examples for sudden changes 
in the rate of population growth. In the aftermath of the downfall of Albania’s 
                                               
56 Assuming that the rate would stay constant over time, an average annual growth rate of 2.31% 
means that the population would double within roughly 30 years. 
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communist regime after the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985, the population 
growth rate of the by then absolutely isolated country declined from 2% to  
-1% within 5 years. Even more drastically, the annual average population 
growth rate of Bosnia-Herzegovina declined from around 1% to less than  
-5% in the course of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) – see also Figure 32 in 
Chapter 3.4.1. 
 
Since 1950, the annual average population growth rate of Europe was at no 
time negative, but rather stagnating (-0.02%) during the period 1995 to 
2000. By 2000/05 the population of the European continent was growing by 
0.08% per year. The question, which demographic factors or variables (i.e. 
fertility, mortality and migration) determine the population growth or decline, 
shall be discussed in the coming chapters. 
 
3.2.3 Fertility 
The annual average number of births in Europe declined steadily from 12.4 
million in 1950/55, to around 10 million in 1980/85 and to less than 7.5 
million in 2000/05. That trend is clearly recognisable when looking at the 
population pyramid of Europe, which rather looks like a rugby ball because of 
the decreasing number of births (see Fig. 1 in Chapter 2.1.2).  
Crude Birth Rate (CBR) 
The CBR – expressed as the number of births per thousand population – 
offers the possibility to put these millions of births in a clearly understandable 
relation, e.g. to compare countries or regions of different population sizes 
and numbers of births with each other. Most European countries had a CBR 
below 10 births per 1,000 population in 2000/05 (see Map A1.02). Besides 
Turkey and Azerbaijan, only Ireland has a CBR of more than 15, with Iceland, 
Albania, Montenegro and France close behind. The whole of Europe reaches a 
CBR of just above 10, which is less than half as much as it was in 1950/55. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  
CBR of European 
regions  
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
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As with the population growth rate, it was Eastern Europe, which had the 
highest CBR by the mid 20th century (above 25) and also from 1975 to 1990 
(around 16). Since then the Eastern European CBR fell below 10 (see Fig. 9). 
On the country level, Poland and the Republic of Moldova showed the highest 
CBR of around 30 by 1950/55. Half a century later, Moldova is the only 
Eastern European country with a CBR of more than 10 (see also Fig. 27 in 
Chapter 3.4.1). 
 
From 1950 to 1970, the CBR of Southern Europe was stable at a level of 
around 20. From then on it declined steadily, before levelling at 10 births per 
1,000 population in the period 1995 to 2005. It was the Balkan countries of 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which featured the highest CBR 
(of around 40) in the 1950s. Today, Albania is still responsible for the highest 
Southern European CBR of about 15. By contrast, the CBR of Italy is below 
10 since 1985. The only Southern European country, which strives against 
the stream of declining birth rates, is Montenegro. During decades (and as an 
autonomous republic of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), this tiny 
Balkan country featured the lowest CBR of all European countries. However, 
between 1985/90 and 1990/95 the CBR of Montenegro was rising from 8.2 to 
13.5 (per 1,000). 
 
In Northern and Western Europe, the trend in the CBR followed a similar path 
of a moderate decline. From 1950 to 1970 the CBR of both regions was 
stable at around 17 – by then the lowest level in Europe – and declined (a bit 
stronger in Western Europe) during the 1970s. Today, these two regions 
have the highest birth rates of eleven births per thousand population. While 
the development of the CBR was relatively similar among Western European 
countries (only the Netherlands had substantially higher birth rates in the 
1950s and 1960s), the Northern European birth rates were more heteroge-
neous in the course of the last 55 years. While Ireland and Iceland always 
featured the highest birth rates, the Baltic countries have the lowest CBR 
(below 10). Today, all other Northern European countries have a CBR be-
tween 11 and 15 by 2000/05 (see also Fig. 27 in Chapter 3.4.1). 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)  
The absolute number of children born is strongly depending on a population’s 
actual age structure, i.e. the size of the cohorts of woman of childbearing 
age. In Europe, the cohort size of women aged 15 to 49 years was increasing 
since the mid 20th century, from 151.4 million in 1950, to 172.2 million in 
1980 and 183.9 million in 2005. In this respect, it is obvious that the decline 
in European birth rates cannot be solely explained by a structural effect 
caused by the declining cohort size of woman in childbearing age. To answer 
the question why European women have fewer and fewer babies, the chang-
ing reproductive behaviour must be taken into account. Indications for these 
behavioural changes can be gained from the previously discussed theories of 
fertility decline and the model of demographic transition (see Chapter 2.2). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1.2, the CBR is an appropriate fertility indicator 
when measuring the overall population development in a particular territory. 
Because it is measuring births per thousand population, it is strongly related 
to the actual age structure of a population. For that reason, the CBR might 
deliver a distorted picture when focussing on fertility behaviour at the 
individual level (i.e. births per women). The period TFR of a given year is 
clearly the right choice to quantify the fertility behaviour of women during 
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their reproductive age. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the TFR is a 
hypothetical indicator, based on childbearing probabilities currently observed 
for women of different cohorts, it (cf. EC 2008d:28).57 
 
When looking at the TFR of European countries during the period 2000 to 
2005, only Turkey shows a fertility rate above the replacement level of 2.1 
children per woman. Apart from Turkey, only Iceland, Ireland and Albania – 
all with a TFR of around 2 children per woman – are getting close to this 
“magic number” (see Map A1.03). For European standards, also France, the 
Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, as well as Serbia and Montenegro 
show relatively high fertility rates above 1.7. Nonetheless, 17 out of 43 
countries feature a so-called lowest-low fertility (of 1.3 or less children per 
woman) during the period 2000 to 2005. 
 
Corresponding to the CBR, the lowest total fertility rates by 2000/05 can be 
observed in Eastern and Southern Europe (see Fig. 10), with Ukraine (1.15) 
on the forefront, followed by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Croatia and Italy (all below or close to 1.25) – see Fig. 27 
in Chapter 3.4.1. As CBR and TFR share the same numerator (i.e. children 
born during a certain period), the trend of the TFR is similar to those of the 
CBR (cf. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10). By 1950/55, both Southern and Eastern Europe 
had the highest TFR of 2.8 and 2.6 respectively. The TFR of Eastern Europe 
declined rapidly until 1965 and stayed relatively constant around replace-
ment level until 1990. From then on it declined steeply to below 1.3. By 
contrast, the TFR in Southern European increased to 2.7 until 1965/70, 
before steadily declining to 1.3 in 1995/2000. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  
TFR of European 
regions  
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
57 Per definition (see also Chapter 2.1.2), the period TFR is the mean number of children that would 
be born alive to a woman during her lifetime, if she were to pass through her childbearing years 
conforming to the fertility rates by age of a given year (EC 2008c:28). 
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In Northern and Western Europe, the TFR was increasing between 1950/55 
and 1960/65 from 2.4 to 2.7. These strong birth cohorts from the late 1950s 
and 1960s generated the so-called “baby-boom generation in Northern and 
Western Europe, as birth rates were declining drastically during the 1970s.  
By 2000/05, Northern and Western Europe again featured the highest TFR (of 
1.7 and 1.6 respectively) of all European regions. Overall, the European TFR 
nearly halved from 2.6 in 1950/55 to 1.4 children per woman in 2000/05. 
 
Childlessness 
Voluntary childlessness is one reason for the downturn in European birth 
rates. Logically, this indicator can only be applied to those cohorts of women 
who are at the end or beyond their reproductive age. Data from Italy and the 
Netherlands – two of the few countries with time series on childlessness – 
show that the share of childless women nearly doubled to approximately 20% 
for the birth cohort of 1965, when compared to women born in 1935 (roughly 
13% in both countries).58 Other countries with exceptionally high rates of 
childless women (aged 40 or older) are Austria, Finland, (West) Germany and 
Ireland (SOBOTKA 2005:21).59 According to NIDI (EC 2005a:61f), the 
proportion of childless women born in 1965 was 15.7% in the EU25. How-
ever, this proportion is still very low in certain countries, e.g. Slovenia (9%), 
the Czech Republic (7%), as well as Bulgaria and Portugal (both with 5%).  
 
“By their mid-40s, one in three German women live in a  
childless household, which gives Germany, along with Austria,  
the highest proportion of such households in Europe.” 
Katrin BENNHOLD (2010), The New York Times. 
 
It is fair to say that European women are not getting fewer and fewer babies 
per se, but rather that fewer and fewer European women become mothers. 
This again gives the number of children per women an even higher impor-
tance. Especially the parity of three children and more can determine if the 
overall birth rate is relatively high or low. Ireland, for example, has a very 
high share of childless women, but simultaneously 46% of women born in 
1960 had three or more children. In Austria, on the contrary, only 15% of 
the female birth cohort of 1960 had three or more children (EC 2008d:29). 
 
Mean Age at First Birth 
Another reason for the decreasing number of births in Europe is the change 
in the timing. By 2005, the Mean Age of First Birth (MAFB) for women in the 
EU15 Member States was on average 28 years and hence around three to 
four years higher compared to 1980 (EC 2008d:30). The highest MAFB of 
around 30 years can be found in the UK, Germany, Switzerland and Spain 
and the lowest (with less than 25 years) in most Eastern European countries 
(see Map A1.04).60   
 
There is no lack of explanations for fertility postponement. The SDT model 
offers arguments like self-fulfilment, personal freedom of choice, individual 
life styles, emancipation, as well as the expansion of the higher female 
                                               
58 Data Source: Demography Monitor 2005 (EC 2005a:61f – Tab. 2.4); calculations by NIDI. 
59 Please note: Although beyond the prime age of childbearing, the birth cohort of women of 1965 
(i.e. 40 years in 2005) was still in their reproductive period by 2005. 
60 Unlike other demographic indicators, data on MAFB varies strongly from source to source. The 
UN rather underestimates the MAFB, compared to other data sources (e.g. the Human Fertility 
Database – http://www.humanfertility.org). 
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enrolment rates in tertiary education (cf. Chapter 2.2.5). One can assume 
that the later a woman gives birth to her first child, the less children she will 
have – simply because the postponement of births to higher ages reduces 
the time left before the end of the reproductive life span (EC 2008d:31). 
However, this cannot be the whole truth, as the TFR of European countries 
does not correlate negatively with the MAFB. In fact, by 2005 the TFR is 
often higher in the countries with the highest MAFB (e.g. in Ireland, the UK, 
France and in the Scandinavian countries). In this context, Demographers 
argue that the postponement of childbirths to higher ages makes it more 
difficult to estimate total fertility rates (ibid.; p.33). 
 
Tempo-adjusted TFR 
As already mentioned several times, the period TFR has to be handled with 
care. It is based on the assumption that the probability for a woman to have 
a child when she reaches a certain age will be the same as the probability of 
giving birth for women who are in this age group today. For that reason the 
period TFR is sensitive on changes of the MAFB, because a postponement of 
the first birth, e.g. from 25 to 30 years, means that the probability of giving 
birth at ages 25 to 29 will fall. Such a process is in strong contrast to the 
assumptions behind the TFR and generates a downward bias of the indicator, 
even though women who are postponing may have exactly the same number 
of children at the end of their reproductive life span (EC 2008d:33). 
 
“Postponement (…) depresses the TFR until the process has come to 
an end.”  
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC 2008d:33), 
Demographic Report 2008 
 
Hence it is not merely a behavioural effect (i.e. the actual MAFB), but rather 
a tempo effect (i.e. the speed of postponement), which distort the period 
TFR. In order to avoid tempo effect distortions, the Vienna Institute of 
Demography (VID) developed the Tempo-adjusted TFR (adjusted TFR). 
 
The example of the Czech Republic (Fig. 11) demonstrates that period and 
adjusted TFR has been just around the same level as long as the MAFB 
remained constant. From the early 1990s on, the MAFB was steadily increas-
ing and the period TFR was falling sharply due to the tempo effect caused by 
postponement. By contrast, the adjusted TFR remained on a relatively high 
level, until it declined a few years later (from the mid 1990s on) because of a 
decrease in the actual quantum of births.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  
Fertility trends in the 
Czech Republic 
 
Source:  
European Demographic 
Data Sheet 2008 (VID 
2008 – Fig.1); own 
illustration. 
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“It is likely that some of the lowest TFR values in the EU  
are in fact the result of postponement.”  
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC 2008d:33) 
 
When taking this tempo effect into account (i.e. postponement of births to 
higher ages), the fertility map of Europe looks somehow different (see Map 
A1.05) compared to the map of the period TFR (Map A1.03). Around 2005 
the MAFB was increasing in almost all European countries and was hence 
raising the adjusted TFR in relation to the period TFR. Only the Netherlands 
feature similar values of period and adjusted TFR by 2005, because the 
postponement process already came to a halt in the early 1990s. Especially 
in some Eastern European countries, where the postponement process 
started later compared to Western European countries and was strongly 
progressing during the first years of the new millennium (e.g. in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, as well as Estonia), the adjusted TFR is consid-
erably higher (up to 0.5) than the period TFR. 
 
“Extreme low levels of the period TFR are closely associated with a 
rapid postponement of parenthood towards higher reproductive ages 
and are likely to be temporary.” 
Tomas SOBOTKA (2008:32) 
 
Recent data suggests that the postponement process has been slowing down 
in the course of the last few years in many European countries. In fact, the 
period TFR was resurrecting in almost all lowest-low fertility countries. 
According to the HUMAN FERTILITY DATABASE, the TFR of the Czech Repub-
lic increased from 1.2 in 2004 to 1.5 in 2008.61 However, a clear statement 
of recent fertility behaviour can only be made when today’s women in their 
prime childbearing age (which is roughly equitable with the MAFB) will have 
completed their reproductive time span in about 20 years.   
 
Using the example of Austria, Figure 12 shows how such an ex-post perspec-
tive of the period and completed cohort fertility looks like. For a better 
comparison of the two TFR indicators, the time series of the cohort TFR at 
age 40 (born between 1936 to 1967) is shifted forward by 26 years – and 
thus roughly matching the MAFB – against the period TFR (1962 to 2007).62 
It is striking that the two indictors do not match each other. The baby boom, 
which peaked in the mid 1960s, was accompanied by a decreasing MAFB, 
which started to increase again from the early 1980s on. In a nutshell, the 
hypothetical period TFR is overrated compared to the empirical cohort TFR 
during a period of MAFB decrease, while it is underrated when the MAFB 
increases.  
 
Beyond that, the cohort TFR is less sensitive against short-term trends in 
fertility behaviour induced by policy measures like the introduction or sus-
pension of child benefits. However, both the period TFR as well as the cohort 
TFR delivers informative features, depending on the actual scope of interest.  
 
                                               
61 The Human Fertility Database, launched in October 2009, is a joint project of the Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research and the Vienna Institute of Demography. See: 
http://www.humanfertility.org (retrieved 01.02.2010) 
62 Some women in the birth cohorts (1936 to 1967) may still have been in their reproductive period 
(15 to 49 years). Nevertheless, the cohort TFR at age 40 – which is used in Figure 12 in order to 
extend the time series – can be assumed as representative, as it deviates by less than 0.1 
(children/woman) against the cohort TFR at the end of their reproductive period.   
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Figure 12: Cohort and period fertility (with MAFB) in Austria  
Data source: Human Fertility Database (2009) 
 
Childbearing Intentions 
Finally, the vital point of fertility behaviour on the individual level shall be 
stressed: What is the intended family size of today’s young adults in Europe? 
Again, a cross-country comparison delivers a heterogeneous picture. 
 
“Most women can fulfil a typical desire for a two-child family  
even when they have a first child after age 30.” 
Tomas SOBOTKA (2008:34) 
 
According to TESTA (2006:19), the mean ideal family size in the EU is still 
above two children. A special Eurobarometer 2006 Survey (TESTA 2006:85 – 
Fig. 24) reveals that women (aged 25 to 39 years) in the Nordic countries, as 
well as in Ireland, the UK, France and Cyprus intend to have the biggest 
family sizes of close to and above 2.5 children, while the lowest intentions for 
larger families are found in Romania (1.8) and Austria (1.7). Comparing 
these intentions with values of the actual TFR, it seems that the desired (or 
ideal) family size cannot be realised in any European country by today.  
 
“Today, 48% of German men under 40 agree that you can have 
 a happy life without children. When their fathers were asked  
the same question at the same age, only 15% agreed.” 
Wolfgang LUTZ (2010)63, Leader of IIASA’s World Population Program. 
 
For pro-natalistic policy measures this particular gap between intended and 
actual family size seems to be the appropriate task to tackle. By doing so  – 
which is easier said than done – many European countries could raise the 
TFR by almost one more child per woman. Having said that, the actual TFR of 
                                               
63 Cited after PEARCE (2010). 
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some countries cannot be significantly raised when this gap is virtually non-
existing. In Austria, for example, the difference between actual TFR (of 1.4) 
and intended family size (1.7) was only as high as 0.3 by 2005 (cf. LUTZ 
2008:23). 
 
3.2.4 Mortality 
According to the UN, between 2000 and 2005 around 8.5 million deaths were 
registered in Europe every year, opposed to less than 7.5 million births. That 
means that the population of contemporary Europe is not capable to repro-
duce itself. It has not always been like that. During the 1950s, twice as much 
births (around 12 million) as deaths (roughly 6 million) were recorded every 
year. Since then, the number of births and deaths were following a mirror-
inverted trend. Expressed on a less positive note, everyone has to die – but 
that is not the point. For scholars in population studies – and also for indi-
viduals – it is more important, at which age (when?) and under which 
circumstances (why?) people are dying. 
Crude Death Rate (CDR) 
The CDR – expressed as the number of deaths per thousand population – 
presents a good overview for the number of deaths in relation to the overall 
population and for the comparison of different populations. Showing the 
death rate for all ages, the CDR is strongly dependent on the actual age 
structure and thus provides no indication of how to interpret this indicator.  
 
“The crude death rate is a weighted average of  
age-specific death rates, where the weights are  
supplied by a population’s proportionate age structure.” 
PRESTON et al. (2001:23) 
 
In this respect, it may well be that such (demographically) different countries 
like Sweden and Gabon feature the same CDR of 10 deaths per 1,000 
population per year during the period 2000 to 2005 for both countries. In 
Gabon, around a quarter of all deaths must be attributed to the youngest age 
group below 5 years as well as to the oldest age group 70 years and older. In 
Sweden, by contrast, the age group 0 to 4 years contributes only 0.5% of all 
deaths, while around 80% occurs in the age group 70 years and older. 
 
That does not mean that the CDR is only relevant for funeral businesses. A 
wide variety of deaths rates do exist among European countries by 2000/05 
(see Map A1.06). When comparing the CDR of European countries, some 
important questions become apparent, for instance: Why are 16 out of 1,000 
Russians dying every year, while only 6 out of 1,000 Icelanders do? To 
answer such a question, one would need more sophisticated indicators like 
age-adjusted death rates, which require more detailed raw data. Another way 
to decipher the drivers behind mortality is to look at other meaningful 
measures, e.g. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Life Expectancy at Birth. 
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) 
The IMR is the number of infant deaths (below age 1) per 1,000 live births. 
By 2000/05 the IMR of Europe was as low as 9, corresponding roughly to the 
average IMR of more developed countries in general. By contrast, the global 
IMR was above 50 and those of Africa nearly reached 100, which means that 
every 10th newborn did not survive until the first birthday during that period. 
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Figure 13:  
IMR of European 
regions  
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infant mortality rates of most European countries were very low by 2000/05, 
but not everywhere (see Map A1.07). Eastern European countries have a 
considerably higher IMR, especially Albania, Macedonia, Romania, Moldova 
and Russia (all above 15). Taking the relative high Russian IMR of 17 into 
account (compared to just 3 in Iceland) might contribute to a better under-
standing why the Russian CDR is more than three times higher than the CBR 
of Iceland. 
 
In the course of the last half a century, the European IMR was declining 
dramatically from more than 70 (in 1950/55) to below 10 (see Fig. 13). By 
the mid 20th century, the Eastern European IMR was as high as 91, followed 
by Southern Europe with 76. Only the Northern and Western European IMR 
of 33 and 45 were relatively moderate. Indeed, the IMR substantially de-
clined in all European regions during the second half of the 20th century. 
However, by 2000/05 the IMR in Eastern Europe (14.2) was still three times 
higher than in the rest of Europe, leaving a great potential for improvement 
in the survival rate of infants, which are our most precious resource. Accord-
ing to the Demography Report 2008 (EC 2008d:37), Romania could gain 
about one year of life expectancy by reducing infant mortality to the EU 
average. 
Life Expectancy 
The IMR is directly affecting a population’s average life expectancy at birth, 
simply because the less people die in younger ages, the higher is the life 
expectancy in general. Taking into account the already almost infinitesimally 
small mortality of infants and children in most parts of Europe, further gains 
will have to be achieved by reducing mortality in the second half of the life 
ages – apart from reducing the behavioural induced increased risk of death 
for (male) teens and young adults between 15 and 24 years.64  
 
 
 
 
                                               
64 The higher mortality risk of young men (aged 15 to 24) in more developed countries is related to 
alcohol and drug abuse, traffic accidents and higher suicide rates (cf. KRUGER & NESSE 2004:68). 
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Figure 14:  
Life expectancy 
at birth in 
European regions 
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Across Europe, an obvious East-West divide exists in regard to life expec-
tancy (see Map A1.08). By 2000/05, average life spans were longest in 
Iceland, Sweden, Italy and Switzerland (80 years and more) and shortest in 
Russia (less than 65 years), Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova (less than 70 
years). These low life expectancies are the result of failed health care and 
social reforms during and after the soviet era (LINDNER, 2008:8). 
 
In the last 50 years, European life expectancy increased by nearly a decade, 
from 66 years (1950/55) to 75 years (2000/05). It was steadily rising in all 
European regions besides Eastern Europe, where it was almost constant 
between 1960 and 1990, but decreased during the early 1990s to the level of 
the late 1960s (see Fig. 14). The reduction in life expectancy was strongest 
in the Former Soviet Republics of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic 
countries (see Fig. 30 in Chapter 3.4.1). The strongest increase in life 
expectancy since 1950 can be observed in Southern Europe, from 63.5 to 
78.7 years in 2000/05 – i.e. a gain of more than four month every year. 
 
Gender Gap 
 
“On average, people with lower levels of education, wealth or occupa-
tional status have shorter lives and suffer more often from disease and 
illness than more well-off groups and these gaps are not declining.” 
2008 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion by the 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND COUNCIL (EC 2008d:11) 
 
Notable differences in life expectancy not only exist between social groups, 
but also between men and women. In general, women have a higher life 
expectancy, referable first and foremost to a different behaviour in respect to 
their personal health. This gender (and again the East-West) gap becomes 
obvious when comparing the country-specific life expectancy for men and 
women (see Map A1.09 and A1.10), illustrated at a glance by Map A1.11. 65 
                                               
65 Please note that the legend ranges of Map A1.09 and A1.10 is not identical. The highest live 
expectancy is depicted in dark brown in both cases, whereas this class refers to 75 and more years 
for men and 80 and more years for women. 
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Figure 15:  
Gender Gap in 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth (1950-
2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the European countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), not only life 
expectancy is lowest but also the gender gap is highest. In this respect, it is 
again Russia, which is boasting the highest difference of more than 13 years 
in 2000/05. According to LINDNER (2008:8), the probability for Russian men 
to die between age 15 and 60 is nearly 50% – outperformed only by Afghani-
stan, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe.66 The worst enemy of life expectancy is 
war, as shown by the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Bosnian 
War (1992-1995), the life expectancy for men declined by about 13 years – 
from 69 to 56 years. The gender gap in life expectancy is also relatively high 
in Poland and Hungary (8 years) and is highest for Western Europe in France 
(7 years). It is lowest in Iceland with only 3 years, proving that strong 
gender differences in life expectancy are not solely biologically determined. 
 
Figure 15 attests that the gender gap in life expectancy in the whole of 
Europe was increasing during the last five decades, from 5 to 8.4 years. 
While the differences in life expectancy are diminishing in Northern, Western 
and Southern Europe since the 1990s, it is still increasing in Eastern Europe.  
 
In terms of future advancements in the EU there is scope for reducing 
mortality especially in Eastern Europe and, as far as women are concerned, 
in particular in the Baltic countries and Hungary. Apart from the problem that 
many Eastern European countries face high premature mortality of middle-
aged men, the biggest gains in life expectancy for men seem possible in the 
age between 60 and 70 years (cf. EC 2008d:37ff). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
66 The reason for the high risk of death of adult men in Afghanistan must be attributed to decade-
long wartimes, in Zimbabwe it is the extra-ordinarily high HIV prevalence rate, and in Sierra Leone 
it can be ascribed to both arguments. 
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3.2.5 Migration 
The basics on migration theories, forms, systems, definitions as well as data 
sources and its constraints have already been explained in Chapter 2. At this 
point, the quantitative dimension of international migration flows and stocks 
in Europe shall be outlined in brief. 
 
In a nutshell, the definition of international migrants either follows the 
concept of “citizenship” or “place of birth”; hence international comparisons 
are complicated by the inconsistent data situation alone. Not even the UN 
Population Division – where the here used data on European regions and 
countries were gathered from – is able to harmonise migration data on a 
global level with respect to both attributes. To avoid misinterpretations, the 
here used data is labelled accordingly – see also the remarks on Map A1.12. 
Foreign Population Stock 
According to the International Migration Report 2006 (UN 2009b), around 64 
million migrants were registered in Europe by 2005, corresponding roughly to 
9% of the total population (see Tab. 3). Western and Eastern Europe come 
up for around 22 million migrants each (i.e. 11.9% and 7.5% of the resident 
population), whereby more than 50% of the Eastern European migrant stock 
must be accounted to Russia alone. Mainly ethnical Russians (from the 
successor states of the Former Soviet Union) migrate or repatriate to the 
Russian Federation (CASTLES & MILLER 2009:115). By 2005, the Southern 
European countries were home to around 11 million migrants, constituting a 
share of 7.2%. The share of foreign population in Northern Europe (i.e. 9 
million people) comes up to 9.3%.  
 
Besides Russia, the largest migrant stocks by 2005 were to be found in 
Germany (10.1 million / 12.3%) and the Ukraine (6.8 million / 14.7%). The 
latter is distinguished by a similar migration system like that of Russia. Also 
France, the UK and Spain have quantitatively strong migrants stocks of each 
around 5 million foreigners. When looking at the share of foreigners (Map 
A1.12), it strikes that this share is particularly high in smaller countries like 
Luxembourg (37.4%), Switzerland (22.9%), Latvia (19.5%), Estonia 
(15.2%) or Austria (15.1%). For the Holy See (i.e. Vatican State), the UN 
(2009b) assumes the highest possible share of migrants of 100% – an 
indisputable fact, both in a secular and a sacred perspective. Besides Turkey 
and Azerbaijan, the smallest shares of foreign population in Europe can be 
observed in Romania (0.6%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1.0%), Bulgaria (1.3%), 
Poland (1.8%) and Slovakia (2.3%).67  
 
Table 3: Europe's foreign population stock (2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – International Migration Report (UN 2009b) 
                                               
67 From the countries mentioned in this paragraph, only Germany and Luxembourg are following 
the migrant definition by citizenship. The data for Bosnia-Herzegovina is imputed, all other 
countries refer to the place of birth – see also the explanatory remarks of Map A1.12. 
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According to the MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, the vast majority of the 
foreign population in Latvia and Estonia, as well as in Ukraine and Belarus 
are Russians. In the case of the Republic of Moldova more than 80% are 
Russians and Ukrainians. The relatively high proportion of foreign population 
in Croatia is attributable to ethnical Croatians from other Former Yugoslavian 
Republics, especially from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.68 
Until the early 1970s, Southern European countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece were considered lands of emigration (CASTLES & MILLER 
2009:111). Since then they underwent a migratory transition, whereas their 
role as lands of immigration have become more pronounced. As a result, 
they now share many of the concerns and characteristics of their EU partner 
states in Northern and Western Europe (ibid.).69  
Migration Flows 
Migration stocks are not set in stone. In fact, they are the result of migration 
flows from the past. Hereafter, these migration flows shall be illustrated over 
time by means of the net migration rate of the period 1950 to 2005.  
 
Until the early 1970s the net migration rate of Europe was negative, mainly 
because of the strong out-migration in Southern Europe (see Fig. 16). Since 
then, the overall net migration rate of Europe has been positive and steadily 
rising, strongest in Southern Europe. Contrary to the since 1950 constantly 
positive Western European migration balance, the Northern European net 
migration rate was following a pathway from negative to positive. In the 
transition from Communist rule to democracy and market economies, many 
formally socialist states in Eastern (and Southern) Europe witnessed signifi-
cant outflows (CASTLES & MILLER 2009:113f). Worst affected by emigration 
were the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, as well as Montenegro 
and Albania (see Fig. 32 in Chapter 3.4.1). By 2000/05, the Eastern Euro-
pean net migration rate stagnated around zero, while all other European 
regions had distinct positive net migration rates. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16:  
Net migration 
rate in European 
regions  
(1950-2005) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
68 Data on the origin of foreign population stocks from the Migration Policy Institute refer to 2001. 
See also: http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/comparative.cfm (retrieved 05.02.2010) 
69 By 2010, Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain are also known under the not very complimentary 
acronym PIGS. Financial market experts have coined this new term to sum up troubled eurozone 
states. These four countries all had a long boom, but crashed hardest during the recent financial 
turmoil (cf. GROS 2010). 
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The average annual net migration rate between 2000 and 2005 was positive 
in most of Europe, confirming the status of a continent of immigration (see 
Map A1.13). Besides Turkey and the Caucasian countries, only former 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe (including the Baltic countries) and 
Balkans countries show negative net migration rates. Worst affected by 
emigration is the Republic of Moldova, where the net out-migration affected 
on average 16 out of 1,000 people every year. Strong out-migration can also 
be observed on the Balkans, especially in Serbia, Montenegro and Albania.  
 
From Emigration to Immigration 
When looking at Figure 16, some regularity behind the transformation of 
European countries from emigration to immigration countries can be de-
tected. Based on this perception, FASSMANN (2009:9ff) developed a new 
conceptual explanatory model that goes beyond established migration 
theories (cf. Chapter 2.2.6). This model is deduced from actual migratory 
processes in Germany and Austria and was adjusted to other European 
countries. It assumes that, sooner or later, every EU27 Member State will 
shift from a place of origin of migrants to a destination for migrants. The 
main drivers behind this process are specific European pull-factors and 
especially the demand of labour, which changes over time. This demand is 
connected to other factors like demography and economy, which is reflected 
in the three stages of this cyclical model (ibid.; p.17): 
 
• Stage 1 (initial situation): A young age structure produces excess sup-
ply on the labour market, which leads to unemployment and emigra-
tion. 
• Stage 2 (tipping point): Because of the decrease in birth rates, the 
oversupply of labour is reduced with some demographical induced time 
lag, whereas the labour demand increases due to economical growth. 
As a result, the migratory balance switches from negative to positive. 
• Stage 3 (adaptation): Because of the reduction in labour supply cou-
pled with ongoing economic growth, the positive migratory balance is 
kept constant.   
 
When assigning this model to EU27 countries, FASSMANN (2009:19f)  
distinguishes between four groups: 
 
• Not-yet-immigration countries: Eastern European countries, 
• young immigration countries: the Southern European countries, 
• matured immigration countries: Northern and Western European coun-
tries, as well as 
• former colonial powers: e.g. France and UK. 
 
In the group of former colonial countries, migratory processes seem to follow 
other factors than those described above. However, when comparing the first 
three groups and the three stages with the net migration rates of broader 
European regions (see Fig. 16), this cyclical model seems to be empirically 
grounded.70 
                                               
70 It should be mentioned, that this model is not thought to be a teleological concept, but rather a 
generalising descriptive scheme. As a consequence, stage 3 is not meant to be a final stage, the 
possibility of a further development is within the realms of possibility (cf. FASMMANN 2009:19). 
Such a development might be already on the way. Recent data from Germany shows that also a 
traditional or “matured” immigration country can shift back again – if only temporary – to a country 
of emigration, or to both: a country of immigration and emigration with a relatively balanced net 
migration rate. According to the German Federal Institute for Population Research, Germany’s 
migratory balance of 2008 was negative for the first time in decades, due to stagnating immigration 
and increasing emigration – see:  
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Freedom of Movement in the EU 
It needs to be stressed that today’s EU27 is as an internal market, based on 
the freedom of movement of goods, capital, services, and especially persons 
across political borders (FAVELL 2007:274). In this respect, any EU (and 
EFTA) citizen can move and stay within the EU27 without a visa and to 
commit oneself to becoming a citizen one day (ibid.).  
 
“If one was to go looking for a possible new cosmopolitan or  
transnational society order in our given world of nation–states,  
the EU is one of the best places to look.” 
Adrian FAVELL (2007:275) 
 
EU immigration laws only restrict citizens from so-called third countries in 
movement and settlement, i.e. citizens from outside the EU27 and the four 
EFTA countries. According to the most recent round of the European Labour 
Force Survey of 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008), around two third of the EU’s foreign 
population is still holding a Non-EU27 citizenship. In this context and in view 
of the continued demand of labour, the EU Member States show more 
concerted efforts to regulate international migration and to promote circular 
migration, instead of a permanent settlement of Non-EU citizens.71 
 
3.2.6 Population Development 
Coming back to the first question of this chapter: Which European countries 
are (still) growing and to which extent? As just illustrated, most European 
countries benefit quantitatively from immigration. To get the full picture in 
regard to the extent of population development, one has to complement the 
net migration rate by the natural population balance. The latter is simply the 
difference of birth and deaths (per thousand population).  
 
The natural population balance of European countries, shown in Map A1.14 
for the period 2000 to 2005, looks less positive compared to the migratory 
balance (cf. Map A1.13). A distinct gradient from the West – where natural 
population balances are predominately positive – to the East is obvious. The 
strongest surplus of deaths over births can be observed in Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Hungary and Bulgaria. The natural population 
balance is also negative in other former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, 
as well as in Germany, Italy and Greece. The strongest natural population 
increases between 2000 and 2005 were recorded in Iceland, Ireland, and first 
and foremost in Albania and Turkey. 
 
Based on the Basic Demographic Equation (cf. Chapter 2.1), total population 
change (illustrated in Map A1.15 per thousand population) is the sum of the 
natural population balance and net migration. By the nature of this equation, 
the total population balance is equal to population growth (see Map A1.01).  
 
“Europe (…) badly needs foreign hands to keep its societies and  
economies functioning, and should stop pretending otherwise.”  
Fred PEARCE (2010), The Guardian. 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.bibdemografie.de/cln_090/nn_1645576/DE/DatenundBefunde/02/ 
Abbildungen/a__02__04__wandbilanz__d__1991__2008.html (retrieved 13.04.2010) 
71 These efforts are indicated by many recently published EU papers on circular migration and 
mobility partnerships (e.g. EC 2005b, EC 2005c, EC 2007c, EC 2007d). 
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Since the European natural population balance (i.e. births minus deaths) was 
negative over the period 2000 to 2005, the marginal overall population 
growth in Europe during that time (avg. 0.08% per year) was exclusively 
referable to the overall migration surplus. 
 
3.2.7 Age Structure and the Implications of Population Dynamics 
 
“Population change reflects the interplay  
of fertility, mortality, and migration.”  
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (PRB 2001:2) 
 
This chapter demonstrates the impacts of population dynamics. Current 
trends in fertility, mortality and migration determine the facets of demo-
graphic change by affecting the future age structure. In this respect, the 
timeframe will be extended into the future – or rather into one of many 
possible demographic futures, represented by the medium variant of the UN’s 
population projections (see also Chapter 2.3). 
 
“The most important population change of the 20th century occurred 
through the demographic transition, which, while having an impact  
on population growth rates, also have an impact on age structure (…).”  
Jaypee SEVILLA (2007:4) 
 
Age Structure 
When it comes to the representation and comparison of age structures, 
nothing works better than population pyramids. Figure 17 shows the popula-
tion pyramid of Europe by 2005, overlaid by the pyramids of 1950 (left) as 
well as 2050 (right) – both illustrated in grey. 
 
Figure 17: Age structure of Europe (1950, 2005 and 2050) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision (medium variant) 
 
The significant changes between 1950 and 2005, as well as between 2005 
and 2050, are striking. The 1950’s age structure still had roughly the shape 
of a pyramid, although humped and bumped by the death toll of two world 
wars and the subsequent increases and decreases in birth rates. This is at 
best noticeable by the notch of the age group 30 to 35 years in 1950. The 
pyramid of 2005 differs in many ways. Most eye-catching is the massive 
reduction at the pyramid’s base as well as the increase at the top. The share 
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of the youngest age group (below 5 years) nearly halved since 1950, while 
the older age groups (above age 50) increased considerably. By 2005, the 
age group 40 to 44 years – born at the peak of the baby boom – is still the 
strongest. 
 
If the medium variant of the UN’s population projection proves to be true, 
Europe’s age structure will see further drastically changes in the course of 
the coming decades.72 By 2050, baby boomers will be the oldest-old (80 
years and older) and the share of the elderly (60 years and older) will 
increase tremendously. As a result, the age group 60 to 69 years will be the 
strongest by then, while the share of the youngest will consolidate on the low 
level of 2005. However, Europe’s population will change first and foremost in 
regard to the age structure and not in absolute numbers. Following the 
results of the UN’s medium variant projection, the total population of Europe 
will decrease only moderately (by roughly 5%), from 729.4 million in 2005 to 
around 691 million in 2050. 
  
In relative terms, Northern Europe experienced the most modest fertility 
decline of all European regions since 1950. As a consequence, the reduction 
at the base and the increase at the top of its population pyramid of 2005 are 
rather moderate compared to other European regions (see Fig. 18). The 
pyramid of 2005 clearly uncovers the extent of the baby boom of the 1950s 
and 1960s, which happened to be a pronounced Northern and Western 
European phenomenon. According to the medium variant of the UN, the 
Northern European age structure will evolve towards a stable population. By 
the mid 21st century the pyramid will approach the form of a pillar (or 
rocket), narrowing only at the very top as people die of old age. In doing so, 
the population of Northern Europe will increase by more than 15% between 
2005 (96.4 million) and 2050 (112.5 million). 
 
Eastern Europe’s age structure was already battered by 1950, as this part of 
Europe got hit hardest by the times of unrest during and in between both 
world wars. Even in 2005, the age structure has not yet been recovered. The 
base of the pyramid became very narrow and the same is true for the share 
of men in the older ages – not to mention the extremely weak post World 
War II birth cohorts aged 60 to 64 by 2005. Furthermore, Eastern European 
did not experience a baby boom similar to Northern and Western Europe. In 
fact, it experienced two. The first one peaked in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, when life went back to (some kind of) normal. The second one 
occurred about 25 years later and was, to a large extent, an echo effect of 
the first one. This second baby boom ended abruptly around 1990 with the 
fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. For 2050, the UN medium variant 
assumptions envisage a higher life expectancy for Eastern Europe, rising 
from 68 to 77 years with a stronger increase for men of around 10 more 
years. Although it is assumed that the TFR will also increase, resulting in a 
small widening of the base, considerable population ageing seems to be 
inevitable. In the course of this process, the pyramid will become extremely 
top-heavy and the size of the Eastern European population will decline 
substantially from 297 million (2005) to 240 million (2050).73 
 
 
                                               
72 The UN medium variant assumes that fertility will stay below the replacement level and that life 
expectancy will further increase, while the migration rate will stay constant. 
73 For Eastern Europe, the UN medium variant assumes no significant in-migration until 2050. 
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Figure 18: Age structure of European regions (1950, 2005 and 2050) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision (medium variant) 
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Indeed, by 1950 the Southern European age structure had the shape of a 
pyramid (see Fig. 18), apart from the reduced number of births during and 
after World War I (i.e. the cohorts aged 30 to 34 by 1950) and the associated 
echo effect 25 years later. However, Southern Europe underwent a strong 
demographic transition during the second half of the 20th century. Due to the 
strongest fertility decline compared to other European regions (cf. Fig. 10), 
accompanied by considerable increases in life expectancy (Fig. 14), the base 
of the population pyramid was more than halved by 2005. As a result, the 
population’s “centre of gravity” shifted from young to old. The UN assumes 
that life expectancy will further increase until 2050, while fertility will remain 
below the replacement level. Although the population of Southern European 
will slightly increase (if net migration will continue to be positive), the 
pyramid will become more top-heavy (assuming the shape of a water tower), 
though not necessarily to the same extent as in Eastern Europe. 
 
The Western European population pyramid of 1950 is pretty similar to the 
Northern European, except that the base was already narrower back then. 
Furthermore the world wars left their mark to a greater extent – most 
noticeable when looking at the age group 30 to 35 years by 1950. Because 
Western Europe experienced a stronger fertility decline since the 1960s, the 
baby boom generation – around 40 to 50 years by 2005 – is even more 
pronounced. Compared to 2005, the size of the Western European population 
will stay just around the same by 2050, but further variations in the age 
structure must be anticipated. The strongest age groups will be around age 
60, while younger age groups will be less pronounced, giving the pyramid the 
shape of a classical flower vase. 
 
Figure 19 illustrates the development of three broad age groups (i.e. below 
15 years, 15 to 64 years and 65 years and older) for the period 1950 to 2050 
in Europe. This process seems rather unspectacular, especially when looking 
at the changes in the share of the potential working age population, here 
represented by the age group 15 to 64 years. Over decades, the share of this 
age group was roughly staying at the same level of around 65%, before it 
will start to decrease at last from 2025/30 on. The general shift from young 
to old is more pronounced. On the one hand, the share of young people 
decreased from 1950 to 2005 from 26% to 16%, on the other hand, the 
share of elderly doubled from 8% to 16%, equalling the proportion of the 
young by 2005. The coming years until 2050 will bring a quantitative shift 
from the potential working age population to the elderly. While the first will 
decline significantly for the first time by ten percent points, the latter will 
reach an all time high of more than 27% by 2050.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19:  
Trend in broad 
age groups 
(1950 to 2050) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
(medium variant) 
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Implications of Population Dynamics 
Age structural effects have an intrinsic and deterministic momentum. In the 
course of the life cycle, every birth cohort makes its way from the base to the 
top of the population pyramid. In doing so, these cohorts move like waves 
along the age structure, altering the population’s composition by age and 
initialising further so-called echo-effects. To some extent, Figure 19 demon-
strates the impact of such a “cohort wave”. After passing working age, the 
youth bulge of the 1960s will enter the (open) age group 65+ in the course 
of the 2020s and will thereby amplify the share of the elderly in a readable 
manner.  
 
Demographic Ageing 
The process shown in Figure 19 demonstrates a sequence, which inevitably 
leads to an ageing population. The reasons behind this process, which is 
determined by the specific combination of declining fertility and increasing 
life expectancy, were already explained within the framework of the demo-
graphic transition (see Chapter 2.2.2).  
 
“Demographic ageing can be defined as the process by which older in-
dividuals become a proportionally larger share of the total population.” 
UNITED NATIONS (2002:1) 
 
A population pyramid is a great tool to visualise and compare the full age 
distribution of a population. Additionally, other generic measures enable 
demographers to summarise the age distribution and thus the extent of 
demographic ageing by a single-number (GOLDSTEIN, 2009:8). 
 
Median Age 
A common measure is the median age, dividing the population in two equal 
halves. In this respect, one half is older and the other half younger compared 
to the median. The median age is easy to understand, but does not make a 
clear statement with respect to the actual age distribution. Hungary and the 
Netherlands, for instance, apparently have different age compositions, while 
sharing the same median age (both 39.1 years in 2005). Nevertheless, the 
trend of the median age is a useful first approach to determine the process 
and extent of population ageing. 
 
By 2005, the median age of European countries was spreading from 28.5 
years in Albania (and 26.5 in Turkey) to 42.1 years in Germany (see Map 
A1.16). Because the median age is above 35 years in the majority of coun-
tries, Albania and Turkey must be seen as juvenile outlier. Besides these two 
countries, only Iceland, Ireland, Montenegro, Macedonia and Moldova as well 
as Armenia and Azerbaijan can be assumed as young populations in a 
European sense.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
74 From a global perspective, Uganda features the youngest median age by 2005 (15.3 years) and 
Japan the oldest with 43.1 years. 
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Figure 21:  
Median age in 
European regions 
(1950 to 2050) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision (medium 
variant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The median age of Europe was increasing by 9 years since 1950, reaching 
39.1 years by 2005 and will further increase to around 47 years before 
levelling off from 2040 on (see Fig. 20). In 1950, the median age of Northern 
Europe (33.4 years) was around one year below those of Western Europe 
(34.5 years), whereas 55 years later this gap remained constant, although 
on a higher level of 38.9 and 40.5 years respectively. Nevertheless, this gap 
might widen to more than 4 years in the coming decades. By 2050, the 
Western European median age – driven by strong increases in Germany and 
Austria – will amount to 47.6 years, while the Northern European median age 
will increase to just 43 years.  
 
Eastern and Southern Europe also started at a similar level by 1950 (26.4 
and 27.4 years respectively), and approached the European average not 
much later. Like Western Europe, both the Eastern and the Southern Euro-
pean median age will increase considerably until 2040 before levelling off at 
46 and 49 years. In doing so, Eastern Europe will pass the attribute “lowest 
median age” to Northern Europe around 2020. By the mid 21st century, not 
even Albania or Turkey will have a median age below 40 years, although both 
still will be considered as relatively young in comparison with other European 
populations. A predictive cross-country comparison shows that by 2050 
Bosnia-Herzegovina will have the highest median age of 52.7 years – fol-
lowed by Germany, Poland, Italy and Malta (all above 50 years). 
 
Old and oldest-old 
To determine the actual share of elderly, the proportion of the population 
aged 65+ (or 60+) is commonly used. In the European context, the age limit 
of 65 years seems to be appropriate, marking the structural line between 
working age and retired population. The extent of demographic ageing, 
expressed by the 65+ proportions, varies widely across Europe and ranges 
from 8.7% in Albania (and 5.7% in Turkey) to 19.6% in Italy – with Greece 
and Germany following with more than 18% each). In contemporary Europe, 
the median age is strongly correlating with the share of elderly, aged 65 
years and older. For a visual confirmation, one might simply compare the 
characteristics of Map A1.16, showing the proportion of people aged 65 years 
and older, with the map of the median age (Map A1.17).  
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Figure 22:  
Population aged 
65 years and 
more in 
European regions 
(1950 to 2050) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
(medium variant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The continuous progression of the ageing process in terms of the proportion 
of elderly, illustrated in Figure 21 for European regions, follows a similar 
upwards-path as the median age. As mentioned before when discussing 
broad age groups, the share of people aged 65 years and older in Europe 
doubled between 1950 and 2005 and will further increase until and beyond 
the year 2050. Because of the different age structure, Eastern Europe will 
surpass Northern Europe in regard to the share of the age group 65+ by 
2040, which is 20 years after the Eastern European median age surpassed 
those of Northern Europe (cf. Fig. 20).  
 
By 2000/05, the share of elderly is highest in Southern and Western Europe 
(around 17.5%) and both regions will still have the highest proportions by 
2050 (31.4% and 28.9% respectively), while following different pathways of 
ageing. The strong baby boom generation in Western Europe will start to 
enter the age group 65+ by 2020 and the share of elderly will increase even 
stronger. However, between 2030 and 2035 the last baby boomers will have 
reached retirement age, hence the speed of ageing will be slower from then 
on. The ageing process in Southern Europe, by contrast, is not driven by a 
particular baby boom generation, but is rather determined by a strong 
fertility decline coupled with an increasing life expectancy. This results in a 
prolonged, if not necessarily sustained, increase in the older population (see 
Fig. 21 and also the population pyramids in Fig. 18). 
 
“I recently turned sixty. Practically a third of my life is over.” 
Woody ALLEN (1996)75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
75 In: The Observer Review (10.03.1996), see: http://www.mantex.co.uk/reviews/oxf-cdqs.htm 
(retrieved 30.08.2007). 
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Because of the increasing longevity, the term “older people” – in general 
attributed to all people older than 60 years – comprises an expanding age 
group spreading over more than 40 years.  In this respect researchers in the 
field of demography, bio-demography, gerontology, and sociology attempted 
to define subgroups of the elder population to specify factors linked to the 
heterogeneity of the older population in terms of social participation and 
service needs (SMITH 2000:3). 
 
“Retirement from productive participation in the workforce is usually 
regarded as defining the beginning of the Third Age, there is less 
agreement about the definition of entry to the Fourth Age.” 
Jacqui SMITH (2000:1) 
 
Following the mainstream in population studies, the “fourth age” shall here 
be used for those, whose life can be characterised by an increased need for 
care coupled with decreasing self-dependency. In respect to the average life 
expectancy of contemporary Europeans (i.e. 70 years for men and 78 years 
for women), one can assume that the above mentioned characteristics can be 
attributed to most people aged 80 years and older”.76  
 
When looking at the proportion of the “oldest-old” aged 80 years and older 
(see Map A1.18), it becomes apparent that this indicator does not strongly 
correlate with other already presented ageing indicators like median age and 
share of the population aged 65 years and older. In fact, the spatial distribu-
tion of the “80+ indicator” is rather in accord with the level of life expectancy 
(cf. Map A1.08). Both indicate a distinct East-West-divide. The similarity with 
life expectancy is logical, as nobody can expect a high share of people aged 
80 years and older, if the average life expectancy is below 65 years – as it is 
the case in Russia. However, even in Russia, around 3 million people (roughly 
2% of the population in 2005) are 80 years and older.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: 
Population aged 
80 years and 
more in 
European regions 
(1950 to 2050) 
 
Data source: UN 
Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
(medium variant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
76 When describing the “third age” as an era of personal achievement and fulfilment, as SMITH 
(2000:5) argues, it must be admitted that the boundary to the “fourth age” may be dynamic. 
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On the country level, the highest proportion of the age group 80+ can be 
found in Sweden and Italy (above 5% in 2005), as well as in Germany, 
Switzerland, Norway, France and the UK (all close to 5%). By 2050, this 
share will be highest in Germany (14.1%) and Italy (13.4%), as well as in 
Austria, Switzerland, France, Spain and Portugal (all above 11%). However, 
in Sweden and the UK the share of the oldest old will increase rather moder-
ately from roughly 5% in 2005 to around 9% until 2050, even though it is 
assumed that life expectancy will further increase in both countries, while the 
median age will increase only by a margin. 
 
“Population changes over time. Arrivals come in form of births  
and immigrants. Departures go in form of deaths and emigrants.” 
Joshua R. GOLDSTEIN (2009:10) 
 
Demographic arrivals (births and immigrants) and departures (deaths and 
emigrants) shape a population’s age structure. In Sweden and the UK, for 
example, these arrivals will happen to a large extent below the median age. 
Since births arrive at age zero, they will always make a population younger 
(GOLDSTEIN 2009:10). The fertility rates of Sweden and the UK – although 
slightly below the level required to maintain the population size – are rela-
tively high compared to other European countries (see Fig. 28 in Chapter 
3.4.1). Although migration occurs at all ages, it is concentrated on the 
younger adult years (PRESTON et al. 2001:208; GOLDSTEIN 2009:10). As 
the median age in Sweden and the UK is around 40 years (see Fig. 37 in 
Chapter 3.4.1), it can be assumed that the vast majority of migrants are 
younger than that, at least when they arrive. Beyond that, most immigrants 
are also in the prime age of start a family, so they might further contribute 
with more arrivals in the form of their children.  
 
Sweden and the UK are both immigration countries, showing positive net 
migration rates since decades (see Fig. 32 in Chapter 3.4.1). Hence, these 
arrivals below the median (or mean) age counterbalance the ageing process, 
driven – in the case of Sweden and the UK – by an increasing life expec-
tancy, which contributes to population ageing by delaying demographic 
departures (i.e. deaths) beyond the median age.77 However, in many other 
European countries the main driver of population ageing is the low level of 
fertility, especially when coupled with out-migration.  
 
Alternative Indicators of Age and Population Ageing 
Taking into account that demographic ageing is accompanied by a longer 
lifespan of (most) individuals, the associated negative connotations are 
usually connected to economic deliberations (see also next section of this 
chapter).78 On a personal level, a longer life can never be assumed as a 
disadvantage per se. The question is rather, whether a longer life also means 
better health (ROBINE et al. 2009:14). 
 
 
                                               
77 GOLDSTEIN (2000:10) stresses that additional deaths have an ambiguous effect on the 
population’s mean age. Deaths of the young, e.g. infant mortality, make a population older, while 
deaths of the old make a population younger. With the increases in adult survival, recent mortality 
decline is a contributor to population ageing. 
78 Negative connotations of population ageing are more pronounced in German speaking countries. 
A term like “Überalterung” – loosely and therefor wrongly translated as “over-aged” – is not that 
common in other languages, particularily not in the English-speaking world. 
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The European Health Expectancy Monitor (EHEMU) used the Statistics of 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC) – a data set provided by Eurostat – to 
calculate “Healthy Life Years” (HLY) by gender for the EU25 countries. People 
in Denmark, Poland, Greece and Italy can expect to live longest without 
health limitations (see Map A1.19 and A1.20), if not necessarily longest at 
all. Although this indicator is based on a subjective survey, it gives some 
indication on the ability of the working age population to work until the actual 
age of retirement and from which age on higher health efforts and spending 
can be expected. Cross-country differences in respect to the HLY measure 
(i.e. 20 years for men and 18 years for women) imply that the employment 
rate of older workers cannot be expected to be the same throughout Europe 
(ROBINE et al. 2009:15). 
 
Furthermore, the HLY measure indicates the individual quality of a (longer) 
life, especially in relation to the actual life expectancy at birth (see Map 
A1.21 and A1.22). This ratio of HLY and life expectancy at birth – expressed 
in per cent – is highest in Denmark, Poland, Greece and Italy, where people 
can expect to spend 80% of their life time in healthy condition, and lowest in 
Finland (below 70%). 
 
“Both the biological and social dimension of age are not only a 
 function of time since birth but also of expected time to death.” 
Vienna Institute of Demography (VID 2008) 
 
When comparing demographic ageing by the rate of ageing and by the 
remaining years to live over time, a person of age 60 in the year 1900 can 
hardly be compared to a 60-year-old in the year 2000 (LUTZ et al. 2008:16). 
In this respect, population ageing can also be considered from the perspec-
tive of “remaining life expectancy”. This concept goes back to Norman RYDER 
(1975), who highlighted the relative age of a population by the distance to 
death, rather than how many years passed since birth. This perspective 
enables to treat a population, which has many years to live as a young 
population (GOLDSTEIN 2009:16).  
 
When defining the “oldest-old” population by the remaining life expectancy of 
15 years or less (see Map A1.23), a somehow different picture unfolds 
compared to Map A1.18, which shows the proportion of the population 80 
years and older. In this respect, many former socialist countries like Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Bulgaria, Croatia and especially Serbia can be 
regarded as the oldest, because they feature the highest share (of 15% or 
more) of people with a remaining life expectancy of 15 years or less. 
 
These two alternative ageing indicators demonstrate that age and ageing 
must be assumed as relative dimensions, depending on the health status and 
on the perspective whether the years already lived or those still to come are 
taken into account. Nevertheless, conventional age in terms of “years since 
birth” shall not be neglected by any means, but must not be interpreted in a 
too deterministic way. 
Working Age Population 
Changes in the age structure, especially in connection with demographic 
ageing, affect the quantity of the labour force, which is based on the working 
age population. The so-called working age population is a good example for 
the relativity of the term “age”. On the one hand, the age group 15 to 64 
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years is commonly used to determine the working age population, e.g. for 
the calculation of dependency ratios (see below), on the other hand – and 
especially in more developed world regions – the age group 20 to 64 is 
meant by working age population. The latter considers the increasing enrol-
ment in upper secondary and tertiary education and the associated low 
labour force participation rates below age 20, while the age group 15 to 64 
years describes the potential working age, as many people still start working 
before age 20 – even in more developed economies. On the upper end of this 
age scale, the 65th birthday cannot be assumed as the ultimate endpoint of 
working age. Although it marks the age of retirement in many European 
countries, most people are already inactive before age 65, while others again 
extend their working life beyond that age. One way or another, age limits are 
exemplary and must be seen as an approximate simplification of reality, 
which is often a premise in both qualitative and quantitative studies. 
 
Dependency Ratios 
Dependency ratios depict the quantitative relation between the potentially 
economically active age group 15 to 64 years and the so-called dependent 
younger and older age groups. For reasons of comparability, these common 
age limits will remain unaffected but shall be interpreted with caution in 
terms of the just mentioned premises. The advantage of interpreting de-
pendency ratios is justified in terms of transfer rates and tax rates, especially 
in a pay-as-you-go-pension system, where retirees are paid by taxes on 
current workers (GOLDSTEIN 2009:9). 
 
A first insight into the development of these three broad age groups in 
Europe and its broader regions was already given in Figure 19, demonstrat-
ing how the proportion of the young decreased during the second half of the 
20th century, while the working age population remained more or less con-
stant. During the coming decades, the share of the elder population will 
increase, above all at the expense of the proportion of the working age 
population. 
 
“Both populations that are very young and very old have  
high “dependency” burdens, with a relatively small portion  
of the population in active working ages.” 
Joshua GOLDSTEIN (2009:7) 
 
The concept of dependency ratios is based on the exemplary assumption that 
any economic output is exclusively achieved by the working age population 
(15 to 64 years). Thus it is assumed that the other two age groups – the 
young below 15 years and the elderly of 65 years and older – are economi-
cally inactive and consequently dependent on the working age population (cf. 
WEIL 2006:3).79 In this way, three different dependency ratios can be 
distinguished: 
 
• Old Age Dependency Ratio (OADR) … the ratio of “old” to “active”, 
• Youth Dependency Ratio (YDR) … the ratio of “young” to “active”, and 
• (Total) Dependency Ratio … the sum of OADR and YDR. 
 
 
                                               
79 Although ignored by the assumptions of the dependency ratio, at least three mechanisms exist, 
which can provide material security for economically inactive persons: (a) savings, (b) institutions 
(governmental as well as non-governmental) and (c) the family (WEIL 2006:5f). 
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Figure 23:  
Old age 
dependency ratio 
in European 
Regions  
(1950-2050) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
(medium variant) 
 
 
 
 
 
By 2005, the old age dependency ratio of Europe was 23/100, i.e. 23 elderly 
per 100 persons of working age or four “workers” per “retiree”, when ex-
pressed by the reciprocal. Map A1.26, featuring the old age dependency ratio 
by 2005, delivers a similar picture compared to other (conventional) ageing 
indicators (e.g. 65+). Italy (30/100), as well as Germany, Belgium and 
Sweden (each more than 25/100) have to bear the highest dependency 
“burdens”, while many Eastern European countries, besides Iceland and 
Ireland, seem to be well off with an OADR of less than 20/100 – only Turkey 
had an OADR of less than 10/100 in 2005. 
 
Figure 23 illustrates the shift in the proportion of the elderly in relation to the 
potentially economically active population over time. As already mentioned, 
the OADR was only increased moderately during the second half of the 20th 
century in all European regions, but will increase strongly in the coming 
decades. Like other ageing indicators, the OADR might more than double 
until 2050 except in Northern Europe – if the assumptions of the UN medium 
variant will prove to be true. In this respect, there will be only two or less 
workers per retiree by 2050, while it will be almost 3:1 (or 39/100) in 
Northern Europe. At the country level, the highest OADR’s by 2050 (of 
around 60/100) can be expected for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Italy, Spain and 
Germany (see also Fig. 50 in Chapter 3.4.1). 
 
The youth dependency ratio by 2005 is virtually inverted by proportion 
compared to the old age dependency ratio, with the highest ratios of 40/100 
and higher in Albania and Turkey, and 33/100 in Iceland (see Map A1.27). 
Nevertheless, the proportion is not inverted in every country or region. In 
Russia, but also in Poland, Slovakia and in the Czech Republic, both the YDR 
(less than 20/100) as well as the OADR (less than 25/100) are relatively low.  
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Figure 24:  
Young age 
dependency ratio 
in European 
Regions  
(1950-2050) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
(medium variant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contrary to the OADR, the YDR decreased in the past decades and is pre-
dicted to stay at around the low levels achieved by today in the foreseeable 
future (see Fig. 24). The graph showing the YDR-trend since 1950 reveals 
the extent of different baby booms in different parts of European, especially 
the two booming phases in Eastern Europe. Consequently, those countries 
with a low OADR as well as a low YDR have also the lowest total dependency 
ratio, i.e. Russia, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and also Slovenia (see 
Map A1.28). West of the former system border, which was marked by the 
“Iron Curtain”, only Ireland, Spain, as well as Austria and Switzerland do 
have moderate dependency ratios. In 2005, the highest dependency ratios of 
more than 52/100 can be observed in Sweden, France and in Albania. In the 
case of Albania, the considerably high YDR is the decisive factor for the high 
overall dependency ratio. 
 
In the course of time and while shifting the “centre of gravity” from YDR to 
OADR, the (total) dependency ratio was relatively constant in all European 
regions (see Fig. 25). Around 2005, the dependency ratio is lowest in Eastern 
Europe with 42/100 and is, in fact, lower then it was in 1950. This situation, 
when the proportion of the economically active population is increasing in 
relation to the potentially dependent young and old population, constitutes 
the phenomenon known as Demographic Bonus or Demographic Dividend, 
which was already explained in Chapter 2.2.3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: 
Dependency 
Ratio in 
European 
Regions  
(1950-2050) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
(medium variant) 
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It must be stressed that the model describing the demographic bonus does 
not stipulate the term of a dividend; moreover it predicts an economic 
window of opportunity, based on age structural shifts. This window will close 
again and population ageing will follow. Keeping this in mind, a short analysis 
of the share of the working age population will complete this tour of demo-
graphic indicators of European countries and regions.  
 
The share of the working age population in Europe is usually equated with 
the age group 20 to 64 years, because a majority of the age group 15 to 19 
years is still in education. Even if this age group is not identical with those 
used for the calculation of the dependency ratio (namely 15 to 64 years for 
the economically active population), both groups of indicators can be as-
sumed to be at least roughly comparable. Correspondingly, the share of the 
working age population is high, when the total dependency ratio is low and 
vice versa. This strong negative correlation becomes obvious when compar-
ing the maps depicting the share of the age group 20 to 64 years (Map 
A1.29) and the dependency ratio (Map A1.28). In a nutshell, the share of 
people in working ages is highest in Eastern Europe – especially in Russia, 
Poland, Slovakia, in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia – and lowest in 
Northern Europe. Furthermore, it is relatively high in countries with high net 
migration gains (e.g. Spain, Italy, Ireland and the German speaking coun-
tries). 
 
The trend in the share of the working age population and the speed of 
change is illustrated in Figure 26 for European regions. In respect to the 
whole of Europe, the proportion of the age group 20 to 64 years was rela-
tively constant (at around 57%) until the mid 1970s. From then on the baby 
boom generation reached adulthood and thus the proportion was increasing 
to more than 61% until 2005. After peaking around 2010, it will decrease at 
least until 2050 and will reach a level well below those of 1950. The baby 
boom effect is affecting the share of the working age population strongest in 
Western and Eastern Europe.80 The share of the working age population 
started to decline first in Western Europe during the mid 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: 
Population aged 
20 to 64 years in 
European regions 
(1950-2050) 
 
Data source:  
UN Population 
Division – World 
Population 
Prospects 2008 
Revision 
(medium variant) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
80 In regard to Eastern Europe, it is rather a “baby bust” effect, initialised by the unprecedented 
shortfall in births after 1989. 
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The speed of decline will accelerate in all regions during the 2020s and 
2030s. From 2040 on, when the last baby boomers will have passed through 
working age, the proportion will get more stable again in Northern and 
Western Europe, while Eastern and Southern Europe will experience further 
declines.  
 
Within the scope of the demographic dividend, the window of opportunity – 
i.e. the unique period in the course of the demographic transition, when the 
share of the young is declining, while the share of the elderly is not yet 
increasing – is already closing. Only Eastern Europe is given a short exten-
sion until the mid 2030s, before the share of the working age population will 
fall beyond the level of 60% without any short-term recovery in sight. 
 
3.3 The Regional Perspective 
After discussing the demographic status and trends in Europe at the level of 
nation states and beyond, the smaller scale of European regions below the 
national level will be applied in the following solely for the territory of the 
EU27+4 (i.e. the current 27 EU Member States plus the four EFTA countries – 
see Map 2 in Chapter 3.2.1). In doing so, the spatial scope will zoom to the 
area of interest of this thesis, i.e. the territory of the EU27+4 (or ESPON 
space), excluding those countries which are neither member of the EU nor 
the EFTA. A regional analysis including non-EU and non-EFTA countries would 
be a rather fruitless attempt, because of missing comparable regional data 
or, to put it in another way, because of the missing comparability of regions. 
The availability of these two essential preconditions can be assumed at the 
EU27+4 level. 
 
3.3.1 Europe of the Regions 
Nowadays much emphasise is laid at the regional level aspects of Europe. 
According to BORRÁS-ALOMAR et al. (1994:27ff) the term “Europe of the 
Regions” has almost become a commonplace, since first coined by Denis de 
Rougemont. But what exactly is a region? 
 
“We have long had mechanisms for recognizing the existence  
of nations, but below the national level, unstable and abstract  
though it is, we take regions and localities as we find them  
and as we need them.“  
Celia APPLEGATE (1999) 
 
Are regions really only arbitrary constructs? For some, regions are ethnic and 
cultural units, for others, economic or geographical ones, and for yet others, 
they are simply political subdivisions of the nation state (cf. APPLEGATE 
1999). What a terminological mess! To put things straight and shortcutting a 
potentially extensive discussion about society, identity and territory, the 
conceptual meaning shall be restricted to the appropriate use within the 
(here relevant) disciplines of Geography, Spatial Research and Spatial 
Planning.  
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The typology of Martin BOESCH (1989:72) differentiates three types of 
regions: (1) homogenous, (2) functional and (3) normative regions. 
Homogenous (or structural) regions are defined by the similarity of a certain 
attribute, e.g. wine-growing regions or demographically ageing regions; 
functional regions feature linkages based on interactions, e.g. commuter 
relations; normative regions constitute political-administrative territories (cf. 
BOESCH 1989:70f; WEICHHART 2005). 
 
The EU holds the regional concept in high esteem. First and foremost, the EU 
regional policy is a vehicle to reduce structural disparities between regions by 
means of a variety of financing operations. The Union’s regional policy is the 
second largest budget item with an allocation of €348 billion over the period 
2007 to 2013 (EC 2008c:2). Since the implementation of the Maastricht 
Treaty (in 1993), regions have an institutional representation by the Commit-
tee of the Regions (COR), the EU's assembly of regional and local representa-
tives. This political representation involves regional and local authorities in 
the European decision-making process. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon  
(ratified in December 2009) will bring a better differentiation of the rights 
and duties of the regions, member states and the EU-level. (WEIDENFELD & 
WESSELS 2007:137ff; COR 2009:1).81 Corresponding to the EU concept of 
“Europe of the Regions”, i.e. politically participating and structurally profiting 
EU regions, there is a need for comparable and well-elaborated regions.  
NUTS Classification 
Coherent regions of normative character – the so-called NUTS regions 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) – were first determined 
during the 1970s by Eurostat for the production of regional statistics for the 
EU.82 The structure behind the NUTS classification allows authorities to take 
administrative, budgetary or policy decisions for the area within the legal and 
institutional framework of the country and of the EU. Ideally, administrative 
regions require boundaries, which are appropriate in terms of homogeneity of 
the unit and suitability of its size and at the same time stable to permit data 
collection over an extended time frame (EC 2009a:3).  
 
Even under a strictly statistical point of view, our world is not an ideal place 
and not immune against changes at all. In this respect, Eurostat is regularly 
updating the NUTS classification. The most recent NUTS revision was con-
ducted in 2006 and was coming into force on 1st January 2008. The next 
NUTS revision is foreseen for 2010 and will come into force on 1st January 
2012 (ibid., p.8f). For that reason the currently valid NUTS 2006 classifica-
tion is used for the coming analyses elaborated in this thesis. 
 
 
Table 4:  
Population thresholds of  
average size of NUTS levels. 
 
Data source: EC (2009:5) 
 
                                               
81 The Lisbon Treaty followed the originally initialised, but failed European Constitution. 
82 For more details on the NUTS classification (definition, principles, changes, etc.), see Eurostat's 
Metadata Server at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/home_regions_en.html (retrieved 
21.07.2009) 
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Map 3: NUTS (2006) levels 
Source: Eurostat 
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The NUTS classification is not assembled by means of the area’s size, instead 
minimum and maximum population thresholds (see Tab. 4) are used for the 
average size of NUTS regions, which are illustrated in Map 3. NUTS is a 
hierarchical classification of three levels. Based on the administrative struc-
ture of the Member States, the level of NUTS 1 corresponds to “Länder” in 
Germany, NUTS 2 is equal to “régions” in France (or “Bundesländer” in 
Austria) and NUTS 3 can be conceived as “provincias” in Spain (EC 
2009a:5).83 
  
At the local scale, i.e. below NUTS regions, two more levels – the so-called 
Local Area Units (LAU) – have been defined in accordance with NUTS princi-
ples, but only the smallest of these (i.e. LAU level 2, which is usually corre-
sponding to municipalities) has been set for all Member States (EC 2009a:7). 
 
The normative administrative character of the NUTS classification matches 
the European territorial structures on which regional policy is applied. There-
fore NUTS regions are also adopted by national statistical systems as the 
most appropriate units for data collection, processing and dissemination (EC 
2009a:4f). This implicates that comparable regional statistics on EU level are 
only available at NUTS level. The disadvantage of normative regions with 
respect to quantitative analyses is grounded within its strict boundaries. 
From the analytical point of view, functional regions that incorporate eco-
nomic, social and also geographic criteria would be preferable (ibid.). How-
ever, the day when available data can be applied across spatial units of 
different dimension and character (e.g. structural, functional and normative 
regions) has yet to come. Meanwhile, one has to stay pragmatic and has to 
accept the drawbacks of regional data based on normative regions. Keeping 
this in mind, the NUTS classification is way better than no classification at all. 
 
3.3.2 Demographic Indicators at the Regional Scale 
The NUTS 2 level (Map 3) will be within the scope when analysing “Europe of 
the Regions”, as well as when discussing the development of the regional 
classification (in Chapter 4). The NUTS 2 classification of 2006 comprises 287 
regions in 31 countries of the EU27+4. Considering this territory a puzzle 
containing 287 instead of 31 parts might be unfamiliar at first sight, but 
enables the viewer to overcome the geography of nation states. This analysis 
will try to find out, if the patterns revealed at the country level will sustain 
when changing to the regional scale of NUTS 2. 
 
“Areal distributions are essentially impermanent. Even while we are,  
so to speak, photographing it, the picture changes.” 
George H. T. KIMBLE (1951), Canadian Geographer.84 
 
In this chapter, exemplary demographic indicators on fertility, mortality, 
migration, population development and age structure will be presented at 
NUTS 2 level. For reasons of data availability, it is not possible to trace 
regional demographic trends over time, as done at country level. Because of 
that, the regional demographic situation will be presented only for the year 
2005 and for the short time trends prior to that. Even though this point in 
time is only a temporal snapshot without consideration of long-term trends in 
                                               
83 To display the different NUTS levels country by country, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/overview_maps_en.cfm (retrieved 21.07.2009) 
84 As citied in HÄGERSTRAND (1967:1) 
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population dynamics, the current status should be absolutely sufficient for a 
comparison of the different scales. 
Fertility 
When taking the TFR into account, national patterns also persist at the 
regional level (cf. Map A1.03 and Map A2.06). The highest regional fertility 
can be observed in the Scandinavian countries (including Finland and Ice-
land), as well as in the UK, Ireland, France and the Benelux countries. All in 
all, during the period 2002 to 2004 not even every tenths European region 
had a TFR of 2 or higher (ESPON 2009:29). It seems that fertility behaviour 
is strongly influenced by national particularities. It is indisputable that 
uniform national systems of taxation and family welfare affect fertility 
behaviour (cf. COLEMAN 2002:323). This argumentation is well in accordance 
with the framework of theoretical approaches to fertility decline (discussed in 
Chapter 2.2.4).  
 
Nevertheless, noticeable regional differences can be observed within a few 
European countries. In Finland, for example, fertility is following a North-
South gradient, with the highest regional TFR of 2.2 in the sparsely populated 
and most Northern region of Pohjois-Suomi (FI1A), and the lowest with 1.7 – 
still clearly surpassing the European average – in the Southern region of 
Etelä-Suomi (FI18) which covers the Greater Helsinki area. Contrary to 
Finland, in Metropolitan France – i.e. France excluding Overseas Departments 
and Territories like Guyane (with a TFR of close to 4 in 2005) – the highest 
rates of fertility of more than two children per woman are recorded in the 
capital region Ile de France (FR10), as well as in Picardie (FR22) just north of 
Paris, and in Pays de la Loire (FR51) with Nantes. Corsica (FR 83) shows the 
lowest French TFR of still 1.6 children per woman. Besides that, considerable 
regional fertility differences can be observed also in the Netherlands. Aside 
from the fact that such regional fertility contrasts only appear in countries 
with anyhow relatively high rates of fertility, these differences become less 
pronounced when contrasting the map of the TFR (Map A2.06) with the one 
of the CBR (Map A2.07), which is influenced by the actual age structure.  
Mortality / Life Expectancy 
Also regional patterns of life expectancy (Map A2.08) follow those drawn at 
the country level (cf. Map A1.08). However, the spatial distribution of longev-
ity does not show as much respect of national boundaries as the TFR does. 
On the supra-national dimension, the Southern European “olive oil belt” 
becomes clearly evident with respect to its higher life expectancy at birth – 
besides the obvious European East-West divide. There are also considerable 
differences within countries. In the UK and in Sweden, for instance, life 
expectancy is higher in the South, compared to the more peripheral and rural 
North. Similar disparities in life expectancy can also be observed in Austria, 
where life expectancy is higher in the Western regions.  
 
Considering life expectancy by gender (Map A2.09 and A2.10), the numerical 
and geographical differences are much bigger for men than for women. While 
female life expectancy is even more homogeneous than the combined life 
expectancy for both sexes, those of men show stronger deviations, amplify-
ing the just mentioned regional differences (e.g. in the UK). Additional 
differences become apparent at the regional scale, e.g. disparities between 
East and West Germany as well as between North and South France. The 
highest life expectancy at birth for both sexes combined of more than 82 
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years is recorded on the Finnish island Åland (FI20). Women become oldest 
(more than 85 years) in the Spanish region Foral de Navarra (ES22) and men 
can expect to live longest (more than 79 years) in Iceland and Åland. 
Migration 
Looking at international migration, the concentration of migrant stocks is 
quite selective. Map A4.05 reveals that some urban regions and not particular 
countries feature the highest proportions of foreign population of close to 
10% or even more (e.g. London, Paris, Berlin, Hamburg, the Rhine-Ruhr 
area, the Vienna region, Stockholm, Oslo, Athens, Madrid, Barcelona and 
Valencia).85 Also Cyprus and the Spanish islands show high proportions of 
foreign citizens. The high share of foreign nationals in Estonia is due to the 
large number of ethnical Russians, which became foreigners without moving 
after the Baltic Republics regained independence in 1991. Besides that, no 
significant stocks of foreign population can be found in regions of the former 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
 
The net migration rate (shown in Map A2.04) refers to the annual average 
during the period 2001 and 2005 and thus represents the short-term trend at 
the beginning of the 21st century. Contrary to foreign population stocks, 
which result from long-term migration flows, recent positive net migration 
rates cannot be related exclusively to urban areas. Besides the “new growth 
regions” of Ireland, Cyprus, Eastern Spain and Northern Italy, also many 
Eastern European regions (e.g. Közép-Magyarország/HU10 with Budapest 
and Stredny Cechy/CZ02, i.e. the surrounding region of Prague) show a high 
net migration surplus. Even in these former socialist countries, considerable 
negative net migration rates do not spread all over Eastern Europe, as the 
country-level perspective would suggest (cf. Map A1.13).  
 
Extreme out-migration concerns certain regions, especially in Bulgaria, 
Poland and Eastern Germany. The high net in-migration rates of the Dutch 
region of Flevoland (NL23) and some rural areas in the UK are eye-catching. 
Flevoland is literally a new land, which was wrested from the North Sea 
during the 1950s and 1960s and was ready for settlement from 1968 on. 
Since then nearly 400.000 people moved to this new province. According to 
KRÖHNERT et al. (2008:138), Flevoland is still attracting more people and is 
ranked among the top growing regions in Europe. The strong net migration in 
some rural regions in the UK – for instance Lincolnshire (UKF3), which has 
the third lowest population density of England, but undergoes the strongest 
population growth in the UK – must be contributed to the wave of immigra-
tion from the new EU countries in Eastern Europe, as well as from Portugal 
(KRÖHNERT et al. 2008:97; TIVIG 2009:46). 
Population Development 
The overall population development (or growth) is an aggregate of the net 
migration balance (i.e. immigrants minus emigrants) and the natural popula-
tion balance (i.e. births minus deaths) – see also Chapter 3.2.6. Like the net 
migration rate, the natural population increase among NUTS 2 regions is 
                                               
85 Map A4.05 is based on data retrieved from the most recent Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS 2007). 
However, the EU-LFS data set does not include Iceland, Switzerland and Malta. Although the LFS’ 
spatial aggregation is based at NUTS 2 level, data for the UK, Germany and Austria are available 
for NUTS 1 regions and the Netherlands are aggregated on the nation level (i.e. NUTS 0). Migration 
data of Ireland is inconsistent and therefore not included. 
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distinctly heterogeneous. In terms of spatial characteristics, the natural 
population balance (Map A2.03) varies strongly from the net migration rate.  
 
Natural population increase seems to be rather unimpressed by national 
borders. Strong disparities within countries can be observed, apart from 
those countries that consist of only one or two NUTS 2 regions (e.g. the 
Baltic States). Only a few countries with more than two NUTS 2 regions have 
a solely positive or negative natural population balance at the regional level. 
These exceptions are Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic, where the 
overall population development is negative. Exclusively positive natural 
population increases at the regional level can only be observed in the Nether-
lands (besides those countries with only one or two NUTS regions like Ice-
land, Ireland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Malta and Cyprus). Even in coun-
tries with a considerable surplus of births over deaths (see Map A1.14), 
regional differences are often distinctive. In Sweden, for instance, only a few 
regions feature a positive natural population balance. The same is true in the 
UK, Spain and Portugal. However, these naturally growing regions are often 
identical with the most populous regions.  
 
In most countries with an overall negative natural population balance like 
Germany, Italy, Greece, as well as Poland and Romania, at least a few 
regions show a positive balance. Contrary to the Eastern European countries 
of Poland and Romania, where these are first and foremost peripheral 
regions, positive natural population balances in Germany (e.g. Ober-
bayern/DE21 with Munich) or Greece (Attiki/GR30 with Athens and Kentriki 
Makedonia/GR12 with Thessaloniki) are often found in economically dynamic 
and urban regions. 
 
The interplay of the three demographic main events (births, deaths and 
mobility) decides whether a population is growing or shrinking. Combining 
net migration balance with natural population balance results in total popula-
tion development. The annual average population change over the period 
2001 to 2005 at NUTS 2 level delivers a diversified demographic image of the 
“Europe of the Regions”. Map A2.05 reveals that not necessarily those 
regions with a double positive balance (i.e. positive natural population 
balance as well as positive net migration) also have the strongest overall 
population increases. This can be explained by the different impacts of both 
components of population growth. At least since the early 1990s, European 
population growth has been mainly caused by international migration and 
some 80% of recent overall population growth results from migration (ESPON 
2009:22).86 
 
In fact, those regions with the highest net migration rates and at least 
moderate natural population increases feature the highest population growth. 
Apart from Guyane (FR93), the top 10 NUTS 2 regions with respect to 
population growth are primarily driven by a strong net migration surplus of 
close to 2% (i.e. 20 per 1,000 population) or more per year.87 Out of these 
                                               
86 A simple correlation exercise of 284 European NUTS 2 regions yields that, of course, both 
components of population growth are strongly correlating with the total population balance. 
However, based on the annual average of the period 2001 to 2005, the correlation coefficient of net 
migration and total population increase (0.867) is considerably stronger compared to the coefficient 
of natural population increase and total population increase (0.622). 
87 Guyane (FR93), which is located in South America, is a French overseas department, and 
therefore also a European NUTS 2 region. So much on the topic of “what is Europe?” (see Chapter 
3.2.1). 
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ten regions only two – Flevoland (NL23) and Southern and Eastern Ireland 
(IE02) – feature considerable natural population increases close to 1% per 
year. From those 33 regions with a total population increase of 10 per 1,000 
or more, five regions even have a negative natural population balance (i.e. 
Algarve/PT15, Ioni Nisia/GR22, Lincolnshire/UKF3, Emilia-Romagna/ITD5 and 
Umbria/ITE2). Conversely, regions with the strongest total population 
decreases have to bear strong out-migration. Only a few of these shrinking 
regions have a positive natural population balance (e.g. Warminsko-
Mazurskie/PL62 in north-eastern Poland). 
 
“Low fertility in Europe (…) is a regional problem that has 
most serious consequences in parts of Europe recording a  
troubling mix of low fertility, emigration and, in some countries,  
also a relatively high mortality.” 
Tomas SOBOTKA (2008:61) 
 
On the contrary, regions affected worst by depopulation (i.e. most Bulgarian 
regions, as well as Sachsen-Anhalt/DEE0 and Chemnitz/DED1 in Eastern 
Germany) can be labelled “double negative”, featuring negative natural 
population balances as well as negative net migration rates.  
 
The components of population development will be further discussed in 
Chapter 4.3.1 with a special emphasis on different types of regions. Thereby, 
the typology of demographic status will be compared with the previously 
developed ESPON typology of population development. 
Age Structure 
An analysis of the share of the elderly, as well as of the old age dependency 
ratio and the proportion of working age population shall be sufficient to 
emphasise the regional differences of the age structure across the EU27+4. 
 
The share of elderly – be it the old (65+) or oldest-old (80+), whereas the 
latter constitutes a subset of the age group 65 years and older – also shows 
regional variations. Concentrating first on the countries with the highest 
shares, the proportion of the elderly in Germany and Greece is quite equally 
distributed, while the regional differences in Italy and Sweden (as well as in 
Spain, France and the UK) are more pronounced (see Map A2.02 and A2.13). 
Countries with a relatively small proportion of elderly, to be found first and 
foremost in Eastern Europe, do not show strong regional variations. Except 
for Bulgaria, where the Northern regions of Severozapaden (BG31) and 
Severen tsentralen (BG32) feature proportions of close to 20% and more of 
people aged 65 years and older, which is clearly above the national average.  
 
Regions with a high share of elderly are simultaneously often regions with a 
negative natural balance, but do not necessarily show the highest life expec-
tancies.88 In the majority of regions, an overproportional share of elderly is 
referable to distortions in the age structure, often triggered by strong out-
migration of young adults and amplified by low rates of fertility. This combi-
nation of factors is applicable for the above-mentioned Bulgarian regions.  
 
                                                                                                                   
 
88 The correlation between the share of the age group 65+ and the natural population balance is 
pronounced negative (-0.684), implicating that the higher the share of elderly, the lower the 
natural population increase. 
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When measuring demographic ageing by the share of elderly, the oldest 
region overall is Liguria (ITC3) with a share of more than 26% of the popula-
tion aged 65+ and 7% of oldest olds (80+). Not far behind are other Italian 
regions, namely Toscana (ITE3) and Umbria (ITE2) with around 23% and 
6.5% respectively. Compared to that, Guyane/FR93 (with less than 4% aged 
65 or older) and Reunion/FR94 are the youngest European regions, although 
both are French Overseas Departments and thus not even located in conti-
nental Europe. Apart from those, Flevoland/NL23 and Inner London/UKI1 are 
the only regions with a share of elderly of less than 10% in 2005. 
 
The old age dependency ratio (OADR) – i.e. the ratio of the “older or retired 
population” and the “economically active” population (aged 15 to 64 years) – 
is quite balanced at the regional level. Almost 70% of all NUTS 2 regions had 
an OADR between 20/100 and 30/100 by 2005. Only Liguria is bearing an 
OADR of more than 40/100, while the ratio is below 20/100 in Flevoland, 
Inner London, in both Irish NUTS 2 regions and in Iceland, as well as in many 
Eastern European regions of Poland, Slovakia and Romania (see Map A2.16) 
– aside from the French Overseas Departments, which must be assumed as 
demographic (and geographic) outlier in the European sense. However, those 
regions with a high proportion of elderly also have a relatively high OADR. 
 
Working Age 
The regional distribution of the proportion of the working age population 
between 20 to 64 years (see Map A2.21) is quite selective and not compara-
ble with the country level (cf. Map A1.26). Only throughout Eastern Europe 
the share of the working age population is relatively even distributed and 
relatively high, reaching 60% and more by 2005. In the rest of the EU27+4, 
high shares of the population in working ages can be found predominately in 
urban areas and economically dynamic regions, which is where the jobs are. 
In this respect, the share of the working age population in 2005 was highest 
(65% and more) in Inner London (UKI1), Bratislava (SK01), Prague (CZ01), 
and Bucharest (RO32), on the Canaries (ES70) and in Berlin (DE30). 
 
The share of working age population was still increasing between 2001 and 
2005 in the vast majority of regions. The strongest annual average increases 
of 3% and more were recorded in the Spanish regions of Valencia (ES52), 
Murcia (ES62) and the Balearic Islands (ES53), as well as in Cyprus and in 
the Borders, Midland and Western region (IE01) of Ireland.89 It is striking 
that those 15 regions that show the strongest decreases (of more than -
0.5%) are all in Germany and Bulgaria. In Bulgarian regions and also in some 
parts of Eastern Germany, the decrease in the share of the working age 
population is the result of massive out-migration. In other German regions, 
the decline of the working age population is referable to demographic ageing. 
In the most notably affected Bulgarian regions (Yuzhen tsentralen/BG22, 
Severozapaden/BG31 and Severen tsentralen/BG32) the share of the 
younger active population (i.e. the age group 15 to 34 years) will halve in the 
course of the next 25 years (cf. TIVIG et al. 2009:242ff).   
 
Apart from that, decreases in the working age population can be observed in 
peripheral regions of Scandinavia and Scotland, as well as in Estonia, Latvia, 
some regions of Poland, Romania, Greece, Italy and in the Danish Capital 
                                               
89 In Guyane, the annual increase was also above 3%, albeit driven solely by the extremely young 
age structure, which is atypical in comparison with any region in continental European. 
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region Hovedstaden (DK01) with Copenhagen (see Map A2.23). The latter 
must be filed under “exceptional case”, because of the strong and increasing 
linkage of the Copenhagen region with Southern Sweden. Since the opening 
of the Oresund Bridge in 2000, more and more Danish citizens live in the 
region Sydsverige (SE22) because of lower housing costs, while commuting 
to Copenhagen on a daily basis. 
 
3.4 Is there a European Demographic Regime? 
Before summarising the demographic status and trends of Europe, which was 
discussed at different scales in the previous chapters, the question of conver-
gence or divergence of demographic characteristics across Europe shall be 
addressed by means of the well-acquainted demographic indicators. Due to 
the inappropriate data availability at the regional level of NUTS 2 (over time), 
this analysis is restricted to the scale of nation states 
 
3.4.1 Convergence & Divergence of Demographic Developments 
According to WordNet – a lexical database run by the Princeton University – 
the term convergence, by its basic meaning, describes “the occurrence of two 
or more things coming together“.90 For sure, more and more detailed defini-
tions of convergence – and its contrary “divergence” – exist, especially in the 
field of economics. However, the above-mentioned definition is absolutely 
appropriate for the here-discussed demographic trends. A complete workup 
of this topic in terms of a separate research question goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis and would require an extended statistical exercise. In the 
following, the question of demographic convergence or divergence will be 
exclusively discussed by the demographic variables of fertility, mortality, 
migration and the resultant population dynamics. Furthermore, the trends 
will be discussed exclusively on the country level, due to the lack of corre-
sponding time series at the regional level of NUTS 2. 
 
The idea or ideal of socio-economic convergence is a well-known concept. In 
Marxism, convergence is a more or less inevitable process, while neo-
classical economic theory is assuming that free markets lead to economic 
convergence (cf. COLEMAN 2002:320). Moreover, EU principles and policies 
are orientated on social and regional convergence, implicating common 
economic and social structures (ibid., p.319). 
 
“The end-point of demographic transition is often assumed  
to be convergence to a new stable post-transitional regime.” 
David A. COLEMAN (2002:319) 
 
Even in demography, convergence seems to be an important concept. The 
assumption of convergence can be referred to both, the first and the second 
demographic transition, although the SDT is rather relating to the diffusion of 
post-modern values, while the FDT stresses the conformation to low levels of 
births and deaths rates (see Chapter 2.2.2 and 2.2.5). Furthermore, most 
underlying scenarios of population projections are based on the convergence 
of (one or more) demographic indicators (see Chapter 2.3.1). The following 
examination of demographic trends in Europe since 1950 – a somehow 
                                               
90 See: http://wordnet.princeton.edu/ (retrieved 18.02.2010) 
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eclectic starting date, but still describing the development since the end of 
World War II – might enable a general view, whether demographic conver-
gence or divergence is characterising the European demographic regime. 
  
Fertility 
Figure 26 and 27 display the trend in CBR and TFR by European countries 
grouped by geographical regions (according to UN definition) show that 
fertility declined in every European country since 1950. By the mid 20th 
century the European CBR was considerably above 15 births (per 1,000 
population), with the lowest values of just below 15 in Luxembourg and 
Austria and the highest in Albania (39.3 per 1,000). By 2005, the CBR of 
European countries was around or beneath that minimum mark of 1950, 
spanning from 8.8 in Germany to 15.2 in Ireland. The same trend of fertility 
decline can be read off the TFR, which was around or above the replacement 
level of 2.1children per woman in almost every country by 1950, ranging 
from 1.98 in Luxembourg to 5.6 in Albania. Fifty-five years later, not a single 
European country reached this “line of maintenance”. The TFR was lowest in 
Ukraine (1.15) and highest in Ireland, Iceland and Albania (just below 2.0). 
For sure, the TFR is the better choice when measuring the fertility behaviour 
(per woman), because the CBR is distorted by the age structure of the total 
population (cf. Chapter 2.1.2). The trend of both indicators is clearly pointing 
into the same direction, namely downwards. 
 
 
Figure 27: Crude birth rate in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
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Figure 28: Total fertility rate in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
Fertility decline did not follow the same pathway in every country or geo-
graphical region. Developments in the Western European sub-group were 
relatively homogeneous, with a peaking “baby boom” in all countries around 
1965 and a subsequent decline. Since 1990, the Western European trend in 
fertility was actually rather diverging (see Fig. 28). In other geographical 
distinguished groups of countries, the picture is different. Even when sub-
suming the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in one 
group (not illustrated in the figures above), the trend does not become as 
smooth as might be imagined. While the Baltic Republics of Estonia and 
Latvia were relatively constant over time, other countries like Romania 
experienced considerable ups and downs.91 In respect to the former Eastern 
Bloc, the only similarity is the unprecedented “baby bust” after 1989. 
 
Consistent time series on (voluntarily) childlessness and mean age at first 
birth, both essential indicators when analysing the SDT, are not available for 
all European countries, therefore these indicators are not included in this 
brief analyses.  
                                               
91 In the Romanian case, these up and down swings in fertility are the result of a brutal pro-
natalistic population policy during the Ceausescu regime (see BERELSON 1979; BACHMAN 1989; 
MEADOWS 1990; LATAIANU 2001). 
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Mortality 
The trend of the IMR, describing the mortality of the youngest (below one 
year), suggests a nearly completed convergence (see Fig. 29). The IMR 
declined dramatically in all European countries, which truly is a great 
achievement. In 1950, mortality rates of 10% (i.e. 100 infant deaths per 
1,000 live births) were widespread, especially in Eastern Europe and also in 
some Balkan states like Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, 
all over Europe the IMR is below 2% (i.e. 20 per 1,000).  
 
While the IMR values of 1950 spread from 20 infant deaths per 1,000 live 
births (in Sweden) to 145 in Albania, the spectrum tightened considerably 
until 2005, ranging from 3 (per 1,000) in Iceland to 19 in Macedonia. How-
ever, 19 infant deaths per 1,000 births is still a very high death toll, consid-
ering the medical progress of the past 55 years. Aside from absolute values, 
the ratio between lowest and highest IMR was only declining from a factor of 
around 7 (by 1950) to a factor of 6 (by 2005).  
 
Figure 29: Infant mortality rate in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
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Figure 30: Life expectancy at birth in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
Although life expectancy at birth increased considerably in most countries 
since 1950, at least two different pathways can be observed. Increases in live 
expectancy in Eastern Europe and on the Balkans were levelling off since the 
early 1960s and were even decreasing after 1989, while Northern, Western 
and Southern European countries experienced a steady increase from 1950 
onwards (see Fig. 30). This negative trend affected the former Eastern Bloc 
countries more than the Balkan countries. Nevertheless, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
experienced the worst decrease in life expectancy in post-World War II 
Europe, caused by years of war between 1992 and 1995. 
 
Letting the figures speak for themselves, in 1950 life expectancy at birth was 
spanning from 43.8 years in Bosnia-Herzegovina to more than 72 years in 
the Netherlands, Iceland and Norway. By 2005, the lowest life expectancy 
was observed in Russia (64.8 years, which is only 0.3 years above 1950/55) 
and the highest in Iceland (81 years). 
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Figure 31: Gender gap in life expectancy in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
Considering gender differences in life expectancy (see Fig. 31), no conver-
gence can be detected. On the contrary, an increasing divergence must be 
discerned, which was even amplified after 1989. By 1950, there was no 
gender gap at all in Macedonia, while the gap was about 9 years in Belarus. 
Fifty-five years later the smallest gap was to be observed in Iceland (3.4 
years) and the widest in Russia (13.3 years).92 However, the range of 
existing gender gaps across European countries by 2005 would be considera-
bly smaller – around 4 years instead of nearly 10 years – if the Eastern 
European and Balkan countries would be excluded from the analysis.  
Migration 
Trends in migration, the third component of population development, can be 
best described on the basis of net migration rates; admittedly, not because it 
is the best indicator, but rather because it is often the only available measure 
of migratory trends (cf. Chapter 2.1.1).  
 
                                               
92 No gender gap in life expectancy at all, as it was recorded in Macedonia in 1950, is an excep-
tional phenomenon. Without questioning the figures provided by the UN, it could be attributable to 
a statistical artefact, especially when taking into account that Macedonia did not become independ-
ent before 1991 and was an autonomous republic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1950. 
However, evidence for higher life expectancies of men exists, if mainly in the historical perspective. 
In India, for example, female life expectancy was below those of men until 1990. In this case, it 
was due to a strong culturally induced male preference, which also affected the female health care 
negatively. In China, with an equally strong prevalence for men, by 1950 the IMR for girls was 
more than 50% higher than those for boys, before levelling in the course of the 1970s.  
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Figure 32: Net migration rate in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
In visual and hence superficial terms, the graphs of the net migration rates 
(1950 to 2005) do not provide any evidence for convergence. They rather 
look like displaying nervous stock markets than a steady demographic 
pathway. In fact, migration – the most volatile demographic variable – is 
often influenced by economics and political, rather than by demographic 
logic. Although there is no distinct trend over time, there are at least a few 
similarities across countries.  
 
Generally speaking, the vast majority of European countries featured a 
relatively balanced net migration over time, resulting in an annual average 
net migration rate of around 2 (per 1,000 population). Nevertheless, there 
are many exceptions and outlier. Sticking to similarities for a moment, in the 
course of the second half of the 20th century more regions turned from 
emigration to immigration countries instead the other way round (as already 
discussed in Chapter 2.2.6). The most noticeable similarity is the wave of 
out-migration from Eastern European countries after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain. Before 1989, citizens of the former socialist countries had no oppor-
tunity to emigrate legally, while the few exceptions were usually not on a 
voluntary basis. After 1989, they had the opportunity to do so, and they did. 
Since the mid-1990s, the process of massive emigration is slowly levelling off 
and some Eastern, or rather Central European countries like Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia became destination countries of international 
migration – just like their western neighbours. Southern European countries 
like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, which constituted the pool of labour 
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supply for Western and Northern European countries for a long time, trans-
formed to immigration countries since the late 1970s. The same is true for 
Ireland since the 1990s. By contrast, all Balkan countries are (still) countries 
of emigration. The extreme emigration from Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 
early 1990s is, of course, due to the Bosnian War, which triggered an un-
precedented flow of refugees in post-World War II Europe. 
 
Back to crude numbers, by 1950 the net migration rate was spanning from  
-18 (per 1,000 population) in Malta to +8 in Moldova. Half a century later, 
Moldova featured the most negative net migration rates of –16 (per 1,000), 
while Spain and Ireland had the most positive balance of around +12 (per 
1,000). Insofar, the migration history of Moldova is absolutely inverted 
compared to the general European trend – i.e. from a negative to a positive 
migration balance.93 
Population Development 
The alerted reader may have noticed, that population growth – based on the 
basic demographic equation (see Chapter 2.1) – is simply the aggregate of 
trends in fertility, mortality and migration. 
 
In a global context, population growth of European countries was relatively 
moderate during the second half of the 20th century, hovering in the just 
positive range of up to 2% per year. Only some countries had higher annual 
population growth rates during certain periods, e.g. Moldova and Switzerland 
(until 1965), Iceland (in the 1950s), as well as Albania (until 1990) and 
Ireland (since 2000). Only the former socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc 
drop out from this trend of steady and moderate growth. Most of these 
Eastern European countries are facing negative rates since the 1990s, while 
they were showing the highest growth rates until the early 1960s. As exten-
sively discussed, the drivers of growth changed over time and from country 
to country.  
 
By 1950/55, Ireland had a negative annual population growth of -0.6%, 
while Albania experienced the strongest rates of population growth with more 
than 3% per year. During the period 2000/05, Moldova’s population was 
shrinking by 1.75% every year, while the population of Ireland was growing 
by nearly 2% per year. Compared to 1950, the diversity of population growth 
rates across European countries did not change at all. 
 
 
                                               
93 According to FEDOR (1995), ethnic Russians and Ukrainians moved to the newly formed 
Moldavian SSR to alleviate the post-World War II labour shortage, while since the early 1990s, 
there was significant emigration from the republic, primarily from urban areas and by Romanian 
minorities. 
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Figure 33: Population growth rate in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
Age Structure 
Finally, the age structure of populations, determined by trends in fertility, 
mortality and migration, will be briefly examined by means of the develop-
ment of broad age groups and the consequent median age. 
  
The young population, represented by the age group below 15 years, was 
declining dramatically without exception. Southern Europe saw a relatively 
steady decline since the 1970s, while more or less distinctive swings – 
triggered by diverse baby booms and busts – characterised the general 
downward movement in other European countries and regions. By 2005, the 
share of the younger population ranged from 13.7% in Bulgaria to 26.5% in 
Albania, while the range of 1950 was spanning from 19.9% in Luxembourg to 
38.9% in Albania. This can be interpreted as a convergence on a lower level. 
 
The age group 15 to 64 years – representing the adult population – was 
slightly increasing since the 1960s and early 1970s in all European countries, 
after decreasing in many countries during the 1950s. Since the dawn of the 
new millennium, the proportion of adults is already declining again, especially 
in Southern and – even more pronounced – Western European countries. 
Around 1950, the share of the adult population ranged from 54% in Albania 
to 70% in Luxembourg. In 2005, the lowest proportions of 65% were to be 
found in Albania and the highest in Slovenia with 70%. Indeed, these figures 
were “coming together” and thus constituting a convergence.  
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Figure 34: Age group below 15 years in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
Figure 35: Age group 15 to 64 years in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
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Figure 36: Age group 65 years and more in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
In regard to the elder population ages 65 years and older, a clear upwards 
trend in all countries since 1950 is recognisable, whereas the increase is 
already starting to level off – at least temporarily – in a few countries like 
Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, as well as Luxembourg. By 
1950, the share of the elderly was lowest in Bosnia-Herzegovina (4%) and 
highest in Belgium, France and Latvia with more than 11%. By 2005, the 
lowest shares can be observed in Albania (7.4%) and the highest in Italy 
(19.6%). Although all European countries are following the same trend in 
ageing, the outcome results in a wider range then ever before, which is – by 
definition – a clear divergence. 
 
Based on the developments of broad age groups, the median age – a crude 
but meaningful indicator for demographic ageing – was increasing in every 
single country since 1950. While the range of the median age amounted to 
15.7 years by 1950 – spanning from 20 years in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 35.7 
years in Austria, the range was slightly narrowing to 13.6 years by 2005 – 
spreading from 28.5 years in Albania to 42.1 years in Germany. This means 
that the median age is neither converging nor diverging, but rather rising. 
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Figure 37: Median age in European countries (1950-2005) 
Data source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects 2008 Revision 
 
3.4.2 Population Dynamics in Europe - A brief Summary  
Before concentrating on the development and outcome of a regional demo-
graphic classification of NUTS 2 regions in the coming sections of this thesis, 
a short summary of the previously discussed state of demography in Europe 
shall be given. 
 
“(…) the twentieth century saw so many upheavals  
that its outcome is beyond the reach of theory.” 
David A. COLEMAN (2002:341) 
 
Trends of Convergence and Divergence 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, for the most part demographic 
developments of European countries follow the same trends, if only by 
direction and not necessarily in respect to particular pathways and similar 
outcomes. Compared with 1950, demographic variables by 2005 still show a 
strong variety.  
 
Fertility has been considerably declining since the 1970s across Europe, 
except of Eastern Europe, where fertility started to decline not before the 
early 1990s. Assuming the demographic replacement level of a TFR of 2.1 as 
a potential yardstick for convergence (at the lower end), every European 
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country converged beyond this level already before 2005. Even the closing 
gap in absolute values imposes convergence in fertility behaviour. While the 
bandwidth of the TFR in European countries amounted to 3.6 in 1950, it was 
only 0.8 by 2005. However, most recent developments in the TFR – sup-
ported by new evidence of the process of fertility postponement – suggest 
that the low point of lowest-low fertility has been already overcome in some 
countries. This might lead to a new divergence below (or around) the thresh-
old of replacement.94 With respect to social divergences, not all social groups 
have postponed parenthood to the same extent. Women with tertiary educa-
tion have frequently shifted birth of their first child beyond the age of 30, 
whereas women with low qualification usually give birth to their first child at 
an early age, often as teenagers (SOBOTKA 2008:35). 
 
Today, the state of mortality, both at young ages (measured by the IMR) as 
well as at older ages (expressed by the life expectancy at birth), is much 
better than anyone might have imagined in 1950. The IMR was steadily 
declining since 1950 and reached an all time low by 2005 everywhere across 
Europe. Even the span of minimum to maximum IMR among European 
countries by 2005 (i.e. 16 infant deaths per 1,000 live births) seems to be 
infinitesimal small compared to 125 in 1950. Nevertheless, the remaining 
bandwidth is an indication for an incomplete conversion of (reproductive) 
health systems across Europe. Simultaneously to the decline of mortality 
rates of the youngest, longevity reached an extent, which was unforeseeable 
a few decades ago. Today, life expectancy at birth across Europe is much 
higher than it was in 1950, except for Russia and other European countries of 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Despite the positive developments during the 
second half of the 20th century, several disparities are undeniable. Geo-
graphically, an enormous gap between Eastern Europe and the rest of Europe 
must be ascertained. Furthermore, the EU Demography Report 2008 (EC 
2008d:40) stresses the strong disparities in mortality between social 
groups.95 Mortality of the lowest socio-economic categories is 30% to 60% 
higher than for the highest socio-economic categories, whereas the difference 
for men is even larger than for women (ibid.). The gender gap in life expec-
tancy is not only large when differentiating between social groups, as sup-
ported by the findings in respect to the HLY indicator. In general, the gap 
between male and female life expectancy at birth has been increasing since 
1950, while differences in life expectancy (of both sexes) has been decreas-
ing considerably among European countries since 1950. The gender gap in 
longevity widened especially in Eastern European countries, where many 
countries are facing premature mortality of middle-aged men (ibid., p.39). 
Although mortality is in general more concentrated in the older ages then it 
was by 1950, a clear convergence in mortality cannot be discerned.  
 
In respect to migration flows – measured by the net migration rate – conver-
gence is only detectable in terms of direction. Taking the zero line of net 
migration as the yardstick of convergence, most of those countries, which 
were sources of emigration by 1950 (especially Southern European countries 
like Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece), became destinations for migrants in 
the course of the late 20th century. Anyway, there is no convergence detect-
                                               
94 Extreme low fertility in Europe is linked to the rapid postponement of childbearing, which is likely 
to be temporary (SOBOTKA 2008:30). 
95 In this context, socio-economic status was measured by means of the educational attainment 
level, manual versus professional levels of occupation or housing quality. 
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able across European countries with respect to migration rates. Since 1990, 
Eastern European countries took over the role of the Southern European 
countries, spreading their citizens all over Northern, Western and Southern 
Europe and beyond. Although the strong negative net migration balance is 
gradually cooling off, many former socialist countries in Eastern Europe as 
well as from the Balkans must still be considered as places of emigration. 
Statistically, the span from minimum to maximum net migration rate did not 
change at all between the starting and the end point of this analysis. In 
1950, the net migration rate across European countries had a range of 26 
(per 1,000), while it was 28 by 2005. 
 
The impact of these partially ambivalent trends of demographic processes 
results in an ambivalent picture when it comes to population growth of 
European countries. The difference between minimum and maximum growth 
by 1950 was 3.7%; by 2005 it is still (or again) 3.7%. Compared to 2005, 
the initial situation of 1950 was a different one in many countries. In general, 
population growth decreased in most parts of Europe, while some countries 
like Ireland followed the opposite path, which again resulted in the same 
overall range. Only when neglecting migration, a trend of convergence is 
noticeable with respect to population development. The natural population 
balance converges towards the threshold of natural population growth and 
decline, approaching the zero-line in most countries of Europe by now. This 
development emphasise the (even) growing importance of migration as the 
driver of population gain or loss throughout Europe.  
 
Although migration is not the solution for all demographical challenges in 
Western societies, it mitigates the speed of demographic ageing and can be 
rated, to some extent, as a substitute for the shrinking (endogenous) work-
ing age population (cf. UN 2001). When it comes to population ageing – 
measured by conventional indicators like the share of elderly – every Euro-
pean country is ageing compared to 1950, when this phenomenon was not 
on the demographical agenda at all. Today, European countries are ageing at 
different speeds and are affected differently by the underlying factors of 
fertility decline, increases in life expectancy and migration flows. Looking at 
relevant indicators like the share of elderly it is obvious that “things are not 
coming together”, as supposed by the definition of convergence. Even if 
alternative indicators of population ageing (e.g. remaining life expectancy) 
would be already established in the mainstream of population research, one 
must assume that Europe is ageing on divergent pathways. However, the 
application of such alternative measures makes more sense, when the 
retirement age is linked to changes in life expectancy, as already imple-
mented in a few European countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Poland, 
Slovakia or Hungary (cf. WHITEHOUSE 2007:31f). Flexible retirement 
schemes would also loosen the definition of the working age population, 
which is in Europe commonly assumed to be the age group 20 to 64 years.  
 
During the first decades of the 21st century (i.e. now), the share of the age 
group 20 to 64 years is peaking all over Europe. Looking back over the past 
five decades, a convergence in the proportion of the working age population 
was most likely achieved during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since then, 
the share of this particular age group is rather drifting apart, when looking at 
different European countries and regions. During the coming decades, the 
size of the working age population will decrease all over Europe and hence 
the OADR will further increase. To compensate the associated negative 
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economic effects, European societies will have to target higher labour force 
participations (especially of women, older workers and under-employed 
persons) and an increase in productivity (GOLDSTEIN 2009:10). It would be 
most reasonable to do this in conjunction with the introduction of a flexible 
retirement age – even if that means to breach a societal taboo. 
 
When aiming for a satisfying answer, the question of convergence and 
divergence of demographic developments must be considered more in-depth. 
This brief analysis of demographic trends since 1950 did not even consider 
such important factors like: rural and urban disparities or changes in house-
hold types; or in a more qualitative approach, the topics of education, gender 
equality, and changes in values and family types. In general, all these factors 
do have a strong influence on European societies, not only on the demo-
graphic behaviour. 
Regional Heterogeneity 
Chapter 3.3 presented the regional demography of NUTS 2 regions by 2005, 
enabling a less common view on the state of demography across the 
EU27+4. 
 
“While the European Union may have a relatively stable or  
slightly rising population and stagnating labour force size, different 
European regions may be set on widely diverging pathways.” 
Tomas SOBOTKA (2008:61) 
 
At the regional level, it becomes obvious that fertility behaviour (expressed 
by the TFR) is strongly influenced by national systems of family welfare. 
Regional pockets of higher fertility (close to the replacement level) are 
sparsely represented on the map of Europe. In general, differences in fertility 
are still stronger between countries than within countries. Contrary to 
fertility, spatial patterns in life expectancy at birth are much less bound to 
national border. East-West disparities on the European scale were already 
mentioned, as well as social and gender gaps. However, also considerable 
regional differences exist, e.g. in France and the UK. 
 
Besides rural regions with a strong demand for agricultural workers (e.g. in 
Spain or in the UK), major stocks of foreign citizens are concentrated in a few 
regions, which are predominately urban or feature dynamic economies. No 
considerable stocks of migrant populations can be found in Eastern European 
regions (yet). In respect to migration flows, extreme out-migration is also 
concentrated in some regions, generally in Eastern Europe and especially in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Eastern Germany. Aside from that, modest out-
migration is pervasive all over Eastern Europe, as well as in peripheral 
regions in Scandinavia, North-eastern France and in southern Italy. 
 
Natural population balance is predominately negative in Eastern Europe, with 
only a few exceptions in some Polish regions and in North-eastern Romania. 
For the rest of Europe, some strong regional differences within national 
borders are striking, e.g. in the UK, Spain, Italy and in Scandinavia. A 
predominately positive natural population increase at the regional level is 
observable only in France and in the Netherlands, while it is negative in 
nearly all regions of Germany, besides a few exceptions in the South. As 
already mentioned, migration is the driver of population development in 
Europe. Most regions experience a net migration surplus; therefore they also 
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feature a positive (total) population increase. This is true for most regions in 
the EU27+4, except for the Eastern European part, where even regions with 
a positive natural population balance are lose population due to out-
migration. Disparities within countries are strongest in Germany, where the 
East is shrinking, while the population development of West German regions 
is predominately positive. In general, the strongest growing regions are 
those with strong net migration surpluses, as it is the case in the “new 
growth regions” of Ireland, South-eastern Spain and Northern Italy. Besides 
that, large parts of the UK, France, of the Benelux countries, Switzerland, 
Austria and of the southern regions of Scandinavia feature considerable 
population growth. In a nutshell, due to the strong effect of positive net 
migration rates, the overall population replacement rates are close to the 
threshold necessary for a stable or increasing population in most European 
regions (cf. SOBOTKA 2008:30). 
 
When taking the share of elder population into account, demographic ageing 
is most progressed and widespread in countries like Germany and Greece, 
whereas pronounced regional differences can be found in the UK, France, 
Spain and in Bulgaria. By contrast, all over Eastern Europe as well as in the 
Netherlands and in Ireland, the process of demographic ageing is regionally 
rather balanced and modest by extent. Regions with a high share of working 
age population are most common in the Eastern European part of the 
EU27+4, where the age group 20 to 64 years is not only strong in general, 
but also evenly distributed among NUTS 2 regions. Besides that, high propor-
tions of working age populations are concentrated in urban regions and in 
some northern regions of Italy, as well as in Sardinia, in the Mediterranean 
regions of Spain, and on the Canaries. Because of the concentration of 
working age population in urban regions, OADR’s are highest in rural and 
peripheral regions of Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, the UK, Sweden 
and Germany. The latter, especially East Germany is most affected by the 
strongest increases in the OADR of more than 4% per year between 2001 
and 2005. 
State of Confusion 
In summary it can be stated, that some demographic developments across 
European countries are following the same trends since 1950, e.g. declining 
fertility or increasing life expectancy, while others again, e.g. net migration 
rates or population growth rates, do not show any convergence at all. In 
general, the developments of particular indicators are heading in similar 
directions, rather than converging. The process of convergence assumes a 
“coming together of things”, which is not the case for many demographic 
indicators (e.g. gender differences in life expectancy or net migration rates). 
Beyond that, a considerable heterogeneity across countries, and even more 
pronounced at the regional level of NUTS 2, must be ascertained in respect to 
demographic characteristics by 2005.  
 
“While some regions are likely to experience considerable  
and long-lasting population decline, other regions may  
see continuing population increase (…).” 
Tomas SOBOTKA (2008:30) 
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It seems that the spectre of population decline is a regional problem rather 
than a threat for Europe as a whole (cf. SOBOTKA 2008:30). However, weak 
trends of demographic convergence across Europe, coupled with regional 
heterogeneity, cause a state of confusion. Different countries and regions are 
affected differently by different demographic trends. How can policy meas-
ures address such significant challenges like the (spatial) impacts of demo-
graphical change, on the basis of such a vague statement?  
 
“(…) if population issues are to be addressed properly by  
policy measures, they require a prior spatial assessment.” 
David A. COLEMAN (2002:232) 
 
A first step to put things straight might be the development of a demographic 
classification of European regions. The making of such a typology, which is 
based on the demographic status of NUTS 2 regions by 2005, will be pre-
sented in the following chapters. 
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4 A NEW DEMOGRAPHIC TYPOLOGY 
This Chapter marks the start of the centrepiece of this thesis, focussing on 
the development of the demographic typology (Chapter 4.1), the presenta-
tion of the result (Chapter 4.2) and its further illustration (Chapter 4.3), 
before linking the typology to socio-economic variables obtained from the 
most recent European Labour Force Survey (Chapter 5).  
 
4.1 Data & Methodology 
Before finally presenting the result of the principal aim of this thesis, i.e. the 
typology of European regions based on demographic variables, a few more 
preliminary remarks will address the DEMIFER project requirements in regard 
to the regional classification (4.1.1), the topic of data sources and availability 
(Chapter 4.1.2), as well as the development of the demographic typology. 
namely the spatial and temporal principles, the choice of the input variables 
and the applied methodology with regard to cluster analysis (Chapter 4.1.3). 
 
4.1.1 DEMIFER Requirements 
The ESPON project DEMIFER (see also Chapter 1.1) is the decisive factor for 
the development of a typology of regions based on demographic variables. 
Without repeating from the top, only the specific project requirements and 
the envisaged applications of the typology within DEMIFER shall be briefly 
explained at this point. 
 
As a matter of fact, regions are affected differently by the ongoing demo-
graphic changes with an ageing European population, in addition to migration 
(ESPON 2009:21ff). The research and policy questions DEMIFER is aiming to 
address (see Chapter 1.1.2) involve, among others, the effects of future 
demographic developments (i.e. natural development of population as well as 
migration and the changing age structure) and the so related changes in the 
labour force in different kind of regions. Therefore, it is necessary to identify 
types of territories, regions and cities that share common development 
challenges and are affected most (positively or negatively) by the identified 
structures, trends and perspectives. 
 
A demographic typology that includes indicators of population development, 
especially of the working age population as well as population ageing shall be 
developed in order to assess the impact of demographic and migration 
developments on social and economic cohesion. The typology shall enable to 
examine the relationship between demographic differences and social, 
economic and territorial differences for each type of region. 
Envisaged Applications of the Typology within DEMIFER 
The final classification of European regions (see Chapter 4.2) will serve as the 
basis for models, projections and case studies, which will be elaborated by 
several transnational project partners as specified in the DEMIFER Inception 
Report (ESPON 2008b).  
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Coordinated by researchers of the School of Geography at the University of 
Leeds, scenarios with a scope on the development of the labour force will be 
developed (based on scenarios of the ESPON 2006 Programme). These 
scenarios will be linked to demographic developments by specifying alterna-
tive futures for fertility, mortality, intra-EU/ESPON and extra- EU/ESPON 
migrations at the regional scale along the dimensions of long-term growth 
versus limited growth and competitiveness versus social cohesion. The 
demographic typology will be used to analyse the future demographic and 
economic development of different types of regions. 
 
IOM/CEFMR is coordinating the development of multinational and multire-
gional population projections with a focus on the regional dimension of 
population processes. The underlying model will track internal EU/ESPON, 
intra-EU/ESPON and extra-EU/ESPON migration and regional population 
dynamics in the ESPON countries. It will enable scenarios to be run based on 
assumptions about changes of demographic and labour force related vari-
ables, which are related to socio-economic developments. Besides the level 
of nation states and NUTS 2 regions, the types of regions of the demographic 
typology will be used as input and output areas for the projections. 
 
Since detailed data, especially on internal and international migration, is not 
available for all regions, case studies – prepared under the coordination of 
CNR – will provide in-depth analyses for specific regions. The demographic 
typology is providing the basis for the choice of a broad variety of different 
types of regions for these case studies.   
 
4.1.2 Data sources & Availability 
ESPON maintains a series of quantitative research projects, generating a big 
demand for all kinds of data at different regional levels.96 Therefore ESPON is 
establishing its own “ESPON 2013 Database” to integrate data from different 
scales, which is constantly collected from a combination of heterogeneous 
sources.97 The establishment of this database – constituting a major project 
by itself – was not completed by the time the final typology was produced 
(i.e. by mid-2009). For this reason, primarily data from EUROSTAT and 
National Statistical Institutes (NSI), as well as from other (previously com-
pleted) ESPON projects has been used for the DEMIFER project. 
 
“Spatial demography (…) is only viable due to the availability of data 
that contain geographical information (location).” 
Marcia CALDAS DE CASTRO (2007:11) 
 
Cluster analysis (see also Chapter 4.1.3), the tool to construct the demo-
graphic typology, requires a complete set of data. Gaps will result in cluster-
ing “no data regions”; hence the provided data set must at least allow 
interpolations in order to fill the gaps. Missing data of a single region for any 
point in time compels either an exclusion of the region in question or the 
fallback to the next higher regional aggregation where data is available (e.g. 
from NUTS 2 to NUTS 1), which is far from being desirable. 
                                               
96 See: http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/ (retrieved 02.03.2010) 
97 See: 
http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_ScientificPlatform/espondatabase2013.html 
(retrieved 02.03.2010) 
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Table 5:  
Raw demographic 
data to be used in 
DEMIFER 
 
Source:  
ESPON (2008b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The demographic data necessary for the project was already specified in the 
DEMIFER Inception Report (ESPON, 2008b:49), shown by variable and 
availability in Table 5. Besides the applicable data by July 2009, more (and 
as consistent as possible) data at the level of NUTS regions – e.g. internal 
and external migration (with respect to the ESPON space) by sex and age, 
and population by citizenship, country of birth and educational attainment – 
would have been preferable for the development of an even more refined 
demographic typology. Nevertheless, the existing data for NUTS 2 regions 
was certainly appropriate to work with. Relating to the area and population 
covered by today’s EU27, such a spatially inclusive and comprehensive 
classification would have been not feasible just a few years ago, before the 
accession of 12 more EU Member States. 
 
“Not everything that counts can be counted,  
and not everything that can be counted counts.”  
Albert EINSTEIN98 
 
When it comes to socio-economic data necessary for the construction of a 
combined demographic and socio-economic typology, available data on 
employment (economically active population, employment rates, etc.) and on 
economic performance (GDP per capita) is showing even more regional and 
temporal gaps, compared to demographic data. To gather more valuable 
data, the most recent European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) of 2007 was 
used as an additional source for socio-economic variables (see Chapter 5). 
 
4.1.3 Developing a Regional Classification 
When developing a typology, some basic principles as well as the methodol-
ogy should be clarified before starting with any statistical exercise. Aiming to 
reduce the large number of 287 NUTS 2 regions into a small number of 
types, the methodology to be applied is obviously cluster analysis. Like factor 
analysis, cluster analysis is a statistical technique to reduce data, whereas 
the first is looking for similar variables and the latter’s objective is the 
grouping together of similar observations (ROGERSON 2006:263). Generally 
speaking, a cluster analysis is grouping cases of data based on the similarity 
                                               
98 It is not revealed whether or not this quote is actually a statement of Albert Einstein. For sure, it 
was on a sign hanging in Einstein's office at Princeton. See: 
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:Albert_Einstein (retrieved 07.07.2009) 
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of various variables. In the case of a geodemographic classification, it is 
necessary to clarify the spatial and temporal principles first, before choosing 
the appropriate input variables for the cluster analysis. 
Spatial & Temporal Principles 
According to the DEMIFER project requirements (ESPON 2008b:31ff), NUTS 2 
(see Map 3) is the prior regional scale for constructing the classification. On 
the one hand, NUTS 3 (Map 3/bottom right) would be preferable from the 
analytical point of view, especially when smaller functional areas (e.g. urban 
regions) shall be analysed. Due to the given data situation it appeared to be 
realistic to elaborate the final classification at NUTS 2 level. On the other 
hand, the fact of using NUTS 2 will bear the advantage of a direct compatibil-
ity with all other research activities within the DEMIFER project, as they are 
also working at the regional level of NUTS 2. 
 
Because of the temporal restriction of the available data the timeframe to be 
analysed is embedded within the period 1990/2000 to 2008 (latest). This 
period enables an accurate analysis of the current status and the so con-
nected short-term trends. It seems realistic to target the year 2005 for an 
up-to-date statistical analysis, while the period 2001 to 2005 is used to cover 
the short-term on which the current status (i.e. the year 2005) is based on. 
By the nature of demographic developments long-term analyses are crucial 
to shed more light on the background of current population dynamics. 
However, due to the lack of sufficient data these long-term developments will 
not be included in the construction of the typology. 
Input Variables 
The available data restricted the choice of demographic variables to popula-
tion by age and sex and the components of population development (births, 
deaths and net migration).99 Even then a wide range of possible variables is 
unfolding, simply by figuring out one or more convenient age groups. To 
include a minimum number of variables, it was feasible to compare them by 
means of a simple correlation matrix as shown in Table 6. 
 
On the one hand, strong correlations within a data set are undesirable for 
cluster analysis, because they represent data redundancy. On the other 
hand, highly correlating variables imply a predictive and descriptive power, 
which is advantageous for a classification. In this respect highly correlated 
variables – at least those who do not share the same denominator – shall not 
be dropped automatically, but judged on the individual merits of each 
variable against every other variable (cf. VICKERS et al. 2005:8ff). Following 
this principle, the choice of input variables was made after testing a whole 
set of different indicators for the cluster analysis (see Chapter 4.2.2). 
 
 
                                               
99 Data updates until July 2009 were considered for the elaboration of the demographic typology. 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix of potential input variables 
 
On the one hand, strong correlations within a data set are undesirable for 
cluster analysis, because they represent data redundancy. On the other 
hand, highly correlating variables imply a predictive and descriptive power, 
which is advantageous for a classification. In this respect highly correlated 
variables – at least those who do not share the same denominator – shall not 
be dropped automatically, but judged on the individual merits of each 
variable against every other variable (cf. VICKERS et al. 2005:8ff). Following 
this principle, the choice of input variables was made after testing a whole 
set of different indicators for the cluster analysis (see Chapter 4.2.2). 
 
The number of variables used should be as small as possible to ensure a 
satisfactory representation of the intended main dimensions of the classifica-
tion (VICKERS 2006a:117). In order to avoid a weighing of the variables, 
which would further complicate the interpretation of the achieved classifica-
tion result, the process of choosing the right variables should be distinctly 
selective (ibid., p. 132).   
The Application of Cluster Analysis 
The variables used as input for a cluster analysis might be differing by scale, 
e.g. shares of age groups ranging from 0% to 100%, demographic rates that 
can be positive and negative, or live expectancies in years with a theoreti-
cally open interval to the top. To ensure that each variable has the same 
weighting in the classification, the variables need to be standardised over the 
same range (VICKERS et al. 2005:28). The here applied and most common 
form of standardisation is to create z-scores. This method expresses the 
difference of the values to the mean by standard deviations, whereas the 
mean of z-scores is always 0 and the standard deviation is 1 (JANSSEN & 
LAATZ 2005:218).  
 
When clustering a set of data points into non-overlapping groups of points 
(i.e. clusters), the points in a cluster are more similar to one another than to 
points in other clusters (FABER 1994:138). By doing so, every cluster can be 
characterised by a single reference point, usually an average of the points in 
the cluster, i.e. the cluster centre (ibid., p. 139). Several clustering methods 
exist, whereas Ward’s hierarchical method and the non-hierarchical k-Means 
approach are the most widely used.  
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Figure 38: Schematic illustration of the agglomeration process of hierarchical cluster analyses.  
  
Ward’s method is following a bottom up approach starting with n groups of 
one case each. At the first stage of agglomeration, two of these cases will be 
combined to form a cluster. At the next step of agglomeration, either a third 
case is added to the cluster or two other cases are merged into a new 
cluster; and so on, until all cases belong to one cluster (see Fig. 38). How-
ever, once a cluster is formed, it cannot be split (VICKERS 2006b). 
 
Contrary to hierarchical methods, the non-hierarchical k-Means approach is 
top-down orientated and requires the number of clusters to be specified in 
advance. By means of an iterative relocation algorithm, the cases are moved 
from one cluster to another (see Fig. 38) – allowing already formed clusters 
to be split again – until the greatest improvement in the sum of squares 
within each cluster is obtained (cf. VICKERS 2006b). Generally speaking, a 
“good” clustering result is achieved, when the within-cluster sum-of-squares, 
signifying the proximity of cases within a cluster, is as small as possible and 
the between-cluster sum-of-squares, expressing the distance of clusters to 
each other, is as high as possible.  
 
The clustering technique to be applied for the development of the demo-
graphic typology was already determined in the DEMIFER Inception Report 
(ESPON 2008b:25):  
 
“The method used for constructing a typology will be hierarchical 
cluster analyses to gain an overview about the similarity structure 
of the regional units and to extract a starting configuration of  
cluster centres which will be improved by a non-hierarchical cluster 
procedure (see e.g. VICKERS et al. 2005). The combination of a  
hierarchical and a non-hierarchical cluster procedure delivers  
the most reliable outcome.”  
 
 
Figure 39: Schematic illustration of the iteration process of k-Means clustering algorithm 
Source: FABER (1994:142 – Fig. 3); own illustration. 
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Taking this into account, the result of the hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward’s 
method) was refined by a non-hierarchical cluster analysis (k-Means). The 
cluster centres generated by the Ward method were used as initial cluster 
centres for the k-Means cluster analysis (cf. JANSSEN & LAATZ 2007:454). 
Before doing so, the number of clusters must be designated by means of 
hierarchical cluster analyses. 
 
The optimal number of types of regions (i.e. clusters) to be achieved was 
roughly set to the range of 4 to 10, because cluster groups of around six in 
number enable a good visualisation and ensure descriptive names. Therefore, 
clusters from 2 to 12 were produced to see how the average within-cluster 
distance changes (cf. VICKERS et al. 2005:35ff). There is no distinctive rule 
determining an ideal number of clusters. According to VICKERS et al. 
(2005:34), the following issues should be considered when choosing the 
number of clusters: 
 
• Analysis of average distance from cluster centre for each cluster num-
ber option. The ideal solution would be the number of clusters, which 
gives smallest average distance from the cluster centre across all clus-
ters. 
• Analysis of cluster size homogeneity for each cluster number option. It 
would be useful, where possible, to have clusters of as similar size as 
possible in terms of the number of members within each cluster. This 
makes the clusters more comparable with each other. 
• The number of clusters produced should be as close to the perceived 
ideal as possible. This means that the number of clusters needs to be 
of a size that is useful for further analysis. 
 
According to BACKHAUS et al. (2007:430f), the so-called “elbow-criteria” – 
describing a significant difference in the increase in the average distance 
from the cluster centre (i.e. the increase of the error sum of squares) – can 
be seen as a rule-of-thumb when deciding the number of clusters. Figure 39 
(left) shows the increase of the error sum of squares, respectively the 
increase at each cluster number (2 to 12). This increase was then plotted for 
a visual identification of the relevant “jump” – the so-called “elbow” – in the 
development of the heterogeneity in relation to each cluster number (cf. 
BACKHAUS et al. 2007:430f). In this case, the “elbow” was clearly evident at 
the cluster number seven (see Figure 39/right). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Increase of the error sum of squares (Ward method) 
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Table 7: Cluster membership (Ward & k-Means Method) 
 
Once the number of clusters has been decided and initial cluster centres were 
set by the Ward method, the k-Means approach can be applied, aiming to 
deliver the optimum assignment of objects to the clusters in an iterative 
process (cf. JANSSEN & LAATZ 2007:454). Table 7 demonstrates the changes 
in the cluster membership (by cases) between the Ward and the k-Means 
method in the specified number of clusters (in this case 7). The number of 
cases changed in total and per type due to the integration of some outlier 
regions from Type 7 to the other 6 types of the classification. For details of 
the adaption and aggregation of outlier regions, see Annex 6. 
  
4.2 Demographic Typology of European Regions 
At last, the different types of regions resulting from the demographic typol-
ogy of European (NUTS 2) regions are presented in Chapter 4.2.3. In order 
to establish a connection between this newly developed typology and previ-
ously elaborated demographic classifications under the ESPON banner, a brief 
compilation of existing ESPON typologies will be presented right at the outset 
of this section (4.2.1). In another brief section the final input variables of the 
classification will be described (4.2.2).  
  
4.2.1 Previously developed ESPON Typologies 
Since 2002, ESPON – the European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
(see Chapter 1.1.1) – is conducting projects at the European national and 
regional level with respect to territorial trends and impacts. In the course of 
these projects a large variety of different typologies were already developed. 
By far not all of them are demographic typologies, but rather deal with other 
spatial phenomena and purposes. Table 8 offers an overview of previously 
developed ESPON typologies. Specific demographic typologies (highlighted in 
Tab. 8) were mainly produced in the course of the ESPON project 1.1.4 “The 
Spatial Effects of Demographic Change and Migration” (ESPON 2005) and for 
the ESPON Territorial Observation No. 1 “Territorial dynamics in Europe: 
Trends in population development“ (ESPON 2008c). 
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Table 8: Previously developed ESPON typologies (demographic typologies are highlighted) 
 
The main objective of the already completed ESPON project 1.1.4 was to 
describe and analyse the variety of demographic situations in different parts 
of Europe. In order to classify the regions with respect to the total population 
development, natural population development and migration, a base typology 
covering the period 1996 to 1999 and consisting of six different combinations 
was constructed (ESPON 2005:11f). Sharp thresholds of either positive or 
negative balances with respect to the three main categories determine the 
six individual characteristics. This meaningful regional classification was later 
updated for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Map 4) and published in the ESPON 
Territorial Observation No. 1 (ESPON 2008c). Because of the focus on 
population development, which also plays a prominent role in the analyses 
DEMIFER is conducting, this particular typology will be further explained and 
also linked to the newly developed demographic typology. 
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Map 4: Population development by components, 2001-2005 
Source:  ESPON (2008c:5 – Map 1) 
 
 
Another typology developed by the ESPON 1.1.4 TPG is based on age and 
migration profiles (Map 5) and illustrates which kinds of (functional and 
geographic) regions are attractive for which age group of migrants.  
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Map 5: Typology of migratory balances by age classes, 1995-2000  
Source: ESPON (2005:105 – Map 3.12) 
 
 
A third demographic typology taken from ESPON 1.1.4 is analysing the level 
of mobility based on a combination of mobility and migration (see Map 6). In 
this case, mobility was measured as the sum of inflow and outflow of people 
in relation to the population size, while migratory movements were split into 
two categories: net in-migration and net out-migration. The objective of this 
typology is to distinguish between attractive regions with many movements 
or other regions with only a few movements (ESPON 2005:106f). 
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Map 6: Typology crossing mobility and migratory balances, 1995-
2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ESPON (2005:107 – Map 3.13) 
 
 
Finally, the ESPON 1.1.4 project group also constructed a “first sketch or 
idea” of a typology that highlights the different forms of depopulation. Map 7 
displays all combinations of total population change and the contributions 
(negative or positive) by the two main components of change (migratory 
balance and natural population change) for regions with population decline 
(ESPON 2005:157). 
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Map 7: Typology of depopulation, 1996-1999  
Source: ESPON (2005:156 – Map 4.1) 
 
All these typologies refer to some kind of population change, be it naturally 
induced or by migration. The temporal scope of these classifications is set to 
the second half of the 1990s, apart from the later updated typology of 
population development (see Map 4). Because of a revision of the NUTS 
classification in 2006, a direct comparability cannot be assumed. This makes 
it difficult to link these valuable concepts to recent regional data and to the 
newly developed demographic typology, too. However, an attempt to link the 
typology of population development to the demographic typology was 
conducted and produced interesting and corroborative results (see Chapter 
4.1.3). 
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4.2.2 Input Variables & Output Names 
The typology claims to match the demographic status of European regions in 
2005. The result should be easy to overview and to understand. Therefore 
the right choice of variables is a vitally important criterion for the quality of 
the classification’s outcome. With respect to an unambiguous understanding 
of the result, the naming of the types of regions resulting from the classifica-
tion is another important task. 
Final Cluster Variables 
The variables used for the construction of the typology represent specific 
demographic characteristics, which describe the age structure of the popula-
tion and the components of population change. 
 
Age Groups 
Two of the four variables included in the classification deal with proportions 
of meaningful age groups (by 2005). These age groups – 20 to 39 years and 
65 years and older – do not only represent the young adults and the elder 
population, but also meet the peak ages of mobility.  
 
“Migration often occurs in conjunction with some transition in the life 
course, such as entry in the college, a change of job, or retirement. 
Since these underlying transitions are more frequent at certain ages 
then at other, pronounced age selectivity can be expected with re-
spect to migration too. Adult migration rates often peak in the young 
adult ages. A second lesser peak around retirement age has also be-
come apparent in the more developed countries. Migration rates dur-
ing childhood reflect parents’ migration.”  
(PRESTON et al. 2001:208) 
 
Furthermore, the age groups 20 to 39 years and 65+ roughly reflect a 
generation step, whereas the age group 20 to 39 years matches the prime 
reproductive age and the share of the age group 65 years and older is an 
indicator for the stage of ageing.  
 
A high share of elderly is connected with additional expenditures and less 
revenues for the social system, because of a higher share of economically 
inactive people. Looking beyond a strictly demographic point of view, the age 
group 20 to 39 years characterises each region in terms of the younger 
working age population. In general, a high proportion of young adults ensure 
that the labour force does not lack any supplies. However, if not enough 
appropriate jobs are available, regions with high proportions of people in 
their 20s and 30s constitute a pool of potential emigrants, who could be 
heading to those regions where labour force is scarce. From a strictly demo-
graphic standpoint, a high share of young adults means a high share of 
potential parents. On the contrary, a low share of young adults means a lack 
of potential parents and could lead to labour market shortages, especially in 
economically dynamic regions based on labour-intensive sectors. With 
respect to the challenges associated with population ageing, high proportions 
of young adults are a reasonable precaution against eventually unbearable 
costs for the social system, which is in turn a threat for social equity.  
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Components of Population Development 
The other two variables used in the cluster analysis – i.e. the natural popula-
tion balance and the net migration rate – represent the population develop-
ment by components. The natural population balance (per 1,000 population) 
indicates the extent of the population increase or decrease based solely on 
the difference between births and deaths and, by implication, the crude 
trends in fertility and mortality too. The net migration rate (per 1,000) 
indicates the gain or loss of population due to migration. The aggregate of 
both variables – i.e. the total population change – decides whether a popula-
tion increases or decreases by size. 
 
Measured by the annual average over the period 2001 to 2005, these vari-
ables are indicating the short-term trend prior to the base year 2005. Using 
the average of a five-year period has the additional advantage of being less 
sensible for selective fluctuations caused by political measures, e.g. changes 
in family policy, or exogenous factors like a global financial crises, which 
affect the demographic or migratory behaviour. 
 
Other potential Input Variables 
Apart from these four variables, a whole array of other indicators was consid-
ered as potential input variables for the classification, e.g. the share or the 
growth rate of other particular age groups, and other demographic indicators 
like TFR, life expectancy or dependency ratios. All these other variables were 
extensively discussed within the DEMIFER project group and a number of 
different cluster analyses were carried out. The results either did not exhibit 
a strong enough explanatory power, or the classifications achieved were not 
as suitable as the result of the elaborated demographic typology (see Chap-
ter 4.2.3). Nevertheless, most of these potential input variables are used to 
illustrate the demographic characteristics of the final classification (see 
Chapter 4.3).  
 
Especially the choice of the indicator representing demographic ageing – be it 
the old (65+), the oldest old (75+/80+) or the life expectancy (at birth) – 
caused long discussions, fuelled by various arguments. The age group 65+ 
might be mainly important for pension schemes, which are more nationally 
determined, while the demand for elderly care, which has a stronger regional 
component, is more influenced by the share of the oldest old. Finally, the 
share of the age group 65+ became prevalent, because it is a broad age 
group including also the oldest old. Furthermore, data used in a cluster 
analysis should not only be consistent, but should also have the same 
meaning with respect to all regions included. This does not hold true with 
respect to the oldest old.100 Furthermore, data used in a cluster analysis 
should not only be consistent, but should also have the same meaning with 
respect to all regions included. This does not hold true with respect to the 
oldest old. Life expectancy varies between 65 years and 82 years across 
European regions. The broad range distorts the meaning of age 75+ or 80+. 
Indeed, it would have been interesting to apply the concept of “prospective 
age”, but a “remaining life years”-indicator (cf. Chapter 3.2.4) could not be 
applied because it requires a data set of 1-year age groups. However, such a 
data set was not available at NUTS 2 level by the time the classification was 
produced. 
                                               
100 At the level of NUTS 2 regions, the age groups 65+ and 75+ are highly correlating (0.93). 
Further on, the variance of the indicator 75+/80+ is relatively low, which results in a low explana-
tory power when used in a cluster analysis. 
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Other potential indicators did not produce suitable results when used as input 
variables. The TFR, for instance, shows a very low variance at the regional 
level. The “fertility factor” and also the “mortality factor” are represented by 
the natural population balance, which can be read as the aggregation of CBR 
and CDR. In contrast to TFR and life expectancy at birth, these crude rates 
are distorted by the actual age structure of a population (cf. Chapter 2.1.2 
and 3.2.3). In fact, this particular distortion is definitely desirable, when 
developing a classification that aims to address the territorial effects of 
demographic developments. Such crude rates – i.e. births and deaths per 
1,000 population – highlight demographic effects with respect to particular 
regions.  
 
Why not more? 
The reason why not more input variables were used for the construction of 
the classification is connected to the availability of a sole indicator for migra-
tion: the net migration. If more variables would had been used, the process 
of migration as the main driver of population development in Europe would 
have been underrepresented in the classification in regard to the weight of 
each input variable. In any case, the number of variables used should be as 
small as possible with respect to a satisfactory representation of the intended 
main dimensions of this classification (see Chapter 4.1.1). 
Naming the Clusters 
The outcome of the final classification results in seven types of regions, each 
type further subdivided into two to four sub-clusters. Only the seven main 
types are named, while the sub-clusters – produced for an additional quanti-
tative differentiation – have no particular titles. Although naming seven types 
of regions does not sound like a complicated task, it is far from being trivial. 
It needed some rounds of considerations and extensive discussions with 
several colleagues to figure out which titles represent the clusters appropri-
ately. In doing so, it was important to keep two general principles in mind 
(VICKERS 2006a:153): 
 
“The titles (…) must not offend residents and they must not contra-
dict other official classifications or use already established names.”  
 
After some rounds of discussion, the impression evolved that it might not be 
possible to find titles, which would perfectly please everyone involved. 
Accepting this fact, the process of naming the types of regions focused on 
short titles, transporting a clear impression of the particular demographic 
status. Therefore, the target was to strive after demographic (and geo-
graphic) connotations that focus on challenges and potentials affecting the 
different types of regions. 
 
4.2.3 Types of Regions 
The result is a classification of European regions based on the demographic 
status (2005) and short-term trends (2001 to 2005). The spatial scope 
covers the entire ESPON space (EU 27+4), i.e. the present 27 EU Member 
States and the four EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland. At the regional level, NUTS 2 is the focus of this spatial analysis. 
The only exception is London with two NUTS 2 regions (Inner London/UKI1 
and Outer London/UKI2). In the course of the adaption of outlier regions, it 
proved to be necessary to aggregate these two regions to one NUTS 1 region 
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(London/UKI). Therefore, the typology comprises 286 regions in total (285 
NUTS 2 regions and one NUTS 1 region). For more details on the assignment 
process of outlier regions, see Annex 6 – “Assignment of Outlier Regions”.  
 
Map 8 presents the achieved demographic classification based on four 
variables: the share of the age groups 20 to 39 years and 65 years and older 
in 2005, as well as the natural population increase and the net migration rate 
as the annual average of the period 2001-2005. The legend of the map is a 
table revealing the minimum, maximum and average values of these four 
variables with respect to each type of region, as well as the number of cases 
(regions) and the population size in absolute and relative numbers. For an 
overall comparison the table also includes the respective values of the entire 
EU27+4 (i.e. ESPON space). 
 
Explanatory Notes 
Two to four sub-clusters (i.e. sub-types) of each type of region were pro-
duced for a better quantitative differentiation of the seven main types, except 
for Type 7 consisting of only five regions. The same methodology was applied 
as already used for the elaboration of the main typology (cf. Chapter 4.1.3). 
The characteristics of the sub-types are explained in the course of the 
description of the respective main types. Maps of these subtypes (see Annex 
3) provide insight into the distribution of these even more homogenous 
regions. 
 
In the following description of the typology, two different kinds of charts are 
used to characterise the classification’s result. First, the cluster profiles are 
portrayed by means of radar charts (Fig. 41), featuring the standardised 
values of each variable used in the cluster analysis. This chart type enables 
to identify the deviation of each type from the overall average of the entire 
EU27+4, which is depicted as the mean of the standardised values and is 
visualised by the grey shaded area delimited by the zero-line. In this respect, 
0 marks the EU27+4 mean and a standard deviation is 1 (see also Chapter 
4.3.1).  
 
Second, a bar (or candlestick) chart depicting all types simultaneously is 
used to illustrate the characteristics of the cluster variables and external 
variables (see e.g. Fig. 42). This kind of chart represents the range of a 
certain indicator, featuring the minimum and maximum value (bar) and 
including the particular mean of each type of region (short blue line inside 
the bar). The black horizontal line across the chart area indicates the overall 
average with respect to the EU27+4. Beyond that, a summary of the differ-
ent indicators characterising the different types of regions can be found in 
Table A5.01 (in Annex 5). 
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Map 8: Typology of the demographic status in 2005 
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Type 1 – Euro Standard 
Type 1 – Euro Standard comprises around 28% of all NUTS regions included 
in the typology (79 from 286) and has a total population of nearly 128 million 
people, which is more than 25% of the population of the EU27+4. The title 
“Euro Standard” seems to be adequate, because all four cluster-indicators 
display values close to the EU27+4 average – the variable characteristics per 
type of region can be gathered at best from the cluster profiles (see Fig. 41). 
Only the age group 20 to 39 years (avg. 25.68%) is slightly below the overall 
average (27.82%). Although the annual natural population balance is just 
positive (avg. +0.01 per 1,000), the total population increases due to a 
predominately positive migratory balance (avg. p.a. 3.43 per 1,000). 
 
Geographical distribution 
Except for Sicily, this type is a distinct Western and Northern European type, 
to be found in Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries, 
Southern and Western France, some western parts of Germany and also in 
Switzerland, Northern Italy and in the South East of Austria. 
 
Subtypes 
The subdivision of Type 1 – Euro Standard resulted in four subtypes (Type 11 
to 14) with no distinct geographical pattern (see Map A3.01). In terms of a 
quantitative differentiation, Type 12 and 13 show the highest annual average 
net migration rates (5.18 and 4.56 per 1,000), whereby Type 12 has a 
younger age structure with respect to the share of the two age groups used 
for the cluster analysis. Furthermore, the annual average natural population 
balance of Type 12 is just positive (0.72 per 1,000), contrary to Type 13  
(-1.31 per 1,000). In Type 14, both components of the total population 
development – the natural population increase and the migratory balance – 
are not very pronounced, but still positive. Type 11 – covering the South of 
Germany and Austria, some parts of West Germany, Belgium, the UK as well 
as Sicily – gets closest to this type and also to the overall EU27+4 average 
and can thus be characterised as the “standard of Euro Standard”. 
Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force 
Compared to the EU27+4 average, this type consisting of 61 regions with a 
population of 116.7 million people (23.20% of the EU27+4) features a 
relatively young age structure due to higher shares of the population in the 
20 to 39 age group (avg. 30.43%), and slightly lower shares of the age 
group 65+ (avg. 14.51%). Although the annual average migratory balance is 
just positive (+0.08 per 1,000), the total population growth is stagnating, 
respectively declining on a low level due to a weak natural population de-
crease (avg. p.a. -0.78 per 1,000). The spectrum of this type includes 
regions with both positive and negative natural population and migration 
balance. 
 
Geographical distribution 
The title “Challenge of Labour Force” takes the remarkable high share of 
young adults into account, which is connected to the relative high fertility 
before 1990 in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, where this 
type of region is prevalent. However, these high rates of fertility were turned 
upside down to a low fertility regime after 1989. The demographic effect of 
this abrupt change in fertility behaviour resulted in a bulge in the age struc-
ture, induced by young adults born before 1989 and aged 15 to 34 years by 
2005 (see also Fig. 44 in Chapter 4.3.1). 
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Figure 41: Cluster profiles 
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As mentioned above, this type can be found most notably in the New EU 
Member States (NMS) of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the so-called 
transition countries.101  Besides that, regions in Western Greece, Southern 
Italy, on the Iberian Peninsula as well as on the Portuguese islands of Ma-
deira and the Azores, and also some distinctly urban regions in Germany and 
Denmark (Berlin, Hamburg and Copenhagen) belong to this category. 
 
Subtypes 
Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force is split just into two subtypes, each 
representing more than 10% of the total population of the entire EU27+4. 
Type 21 can be differentiated from Type 22 in regard to its lower share of 
elderly people: on average 13.11% and 16.05% respectively. The annual 
average natural population balance is slightly positive in Type 21 and nega-
tive in Type 22 (-1.83 per 1,000). Looking at the annual average migration 
balance, the situation is just the other way round and therefore negative in 
Type 21 (-1.56 per 1,000) and positive in Type 22 (1.89 per 1,000).  
 
Type 21 can be found in large parts of Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania 
and Slovakia, but also in the North of Portugal, on some Greek islands as well 
as in the Danish capitol region with Copenhagen. Type 22 – featuring a 
positive migration balance – covers central Poland, the south-western parts 
of the Czech Republic, the South of Romania – in each case including the 
capital region, as well as Berlin, Hamburg, Slovenia, large parts of Hungary 
(with Budapest) and Greece (including Athens) and some regions in Spain 
and in the South of Italy (see Map A3.02). 
 
Figure 42: Cluster variables per type of region 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
 
 
                                               
101 The term “transition countries” refers first and foremost to changes of the political and economic 
system after 1989, but can also be applied to the interconnected and ongoing demographic 
changes since then. 
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Type 3 – Family Potentials 
Around 20% of the population of the EU27+4 or 104.5 million people live in 
the 55 regions of this type of region. The demographic characteristics are 
also very close to the EU27+4 average, but can be clearly distinguished from 
Type 1 – Euro Standard due to its younger age structure and the strictly 
positive natural population increase (see Fig. 5). The title “Family Potentials” 
is attributed to the combination of these two factors. Compared to the overall 
average, the age group 20 to 39 years (avg. 28.15%) shows higher and the 
age group 65+ (avg. 14.75%) lower values. The annual natural population 
increase (avg. 3.72 per 1,000) is the highest overall, besides Type 7 – 
Overseas. The migratory balance within Type 3 varies, but is still positive in 
most regions (avg. p.a. 2.12 per 1,000), which results in a noticeable in-
crease of the total population of Type 3 between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Geographical distribution 
Apart from a few occurrences in the South of Europe (in the southern parts of 
Italy, Malta and the Lisbon region) and the island of Martinique, this type 
shows a similar geographical distribution compared to Type 1 – Euro Stan-
dard and can also be found mainly in Western and Northern Europe: in 
Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries, northern and 
eastern parts of France, Switzerland and Western Austria. 
 
Subtypes 
One of the three subtypes of Type 3 – Family Potentials (Type 31 to 33), 
Type 33 includes only two regions: London and Ile de France (Paris). These 
two regions, both originally outlier regions (see Annex 6) because of their 
extraordinary high share of population in the age group 20 to 39 years (avg. 
33.35%), can be further distinguished from other Family Potential subtypes 
by the significantly positive annual average natural population increase (8.15 
per 1,000) and the low share of elderly people (avg. 12.23%).  
 
The net migration indicator is the most meaningful when differentiating the 
two other subtypes. Type 31 – to be found in Norway, Finland, in the north-
ern parts of France, the Netherlands, in the UK (Northern Ireland and around 
London), as well as in parts of Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Southern 
Italy – has a positive but weak annual net migration rate (avg. 0.40 per 
1,000). By contrast, Type 32 – including Iceland, Luxembourg, the urban 
regions of Oslo, Stockholm and Amsterdam, as well as Western Austria, 
eastern regions of France, parts of Switzerland and the UK (see Map A3.03) –
features a strictly positive annual net migration balance (4.92 per 1,000). 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing 
This type consists of 33 regions with a population of 63.8 million people 
(12.68% of the population of the EU27+4). The title “Challenge of Ageing” is 
self-explaining and is, indeed, inspired by the high share of elder population 
(avg. 20.83%), which clearly surpasses the EU27+4 average (see Fig. 3). 
Albeit the high share of 65+, the proportion of the population aged 20 to 39 
years (avg. 26.87%) is still relatively high. Despite this reasonable share of 
young adults in reproductive age, the natural population balance shows an 
annual average decrease of -1.74 per 1,000 – a value, which is significantly 
below the overall average. Adding the higher share of elderly people and the 
thus resulting higher numbers of deaths, the population of this type of region 
would be already decreasing, if there was not such a significant positive 
annual average net migration rate of +9.42 (per 1,000). 
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Geographical distribution 
This type of region can be found nearly exclusively in the South of Europe: in 
Greek regions (along the Albanian border), Northern Italy, in the northern 
and eastern parts of Spain, in Portugal and also in the South of France. 
Besides that, this kind of regions can also be found in the south-eastern 
regions of England (e.g. Lincolnshire/UKF3). 
 
Subtypes 
Looking at the geographical distribution of the three subtypes, Type 43 – 
including those just mentioned south-eastern regions in England and some 
regions in the South of France – features the highest net migration rate (avg. 
10.52 per 1,000), but also the lowest share of young adults (avg. 23.79%). 
The other two subtypes are located exclusively in Europe’s South (see Map 
A3.04). Type 41 comes very close to the previously described Type 43, but 
can be distinguished by the relatively high share of people between 20 and 
39 years (avg. 28.69%). Among all Challenge of Ageing subtypes, Type 42 
has the highest share of 65+ (avg. 22.87%). Apart from that, the natural 
population balance (avg. -3.39 per 1,000) is negative in all regions. 
Type 5 – Challenge of Decline 
These 38 regions, with a population of around 50.2 million people (nearly 
10% of the EU27+4 population), face severe demographic challenges. In 
fact, the depopulation regions of the EU27+4 are concentrated within this 
type. This is attributable to a negative natural population balance (avg. p.a.  
-3.39 per 1,000) and a negative migration balance (avg. p.a. -1.20 per 
1,000). In addition, this type is confronted with the second highest share 
(next to Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing) of elderly people aged 65 and older 
(avg. 19.49%). 
 
Geographical distribution 
Besides East Germany, this type also includes peripheral regions of Scandi-
navia and some parts of West Germany, Southern Italy and Greece and 
covers Central and Eastern European regions in Bulgaria, Hungary as well as 
Latvia and Estonia. 
 
Subtypes 
Challenge of Decline regions can be subdivided into four subtypes (51 to 54), 
whereas Type 53 and 54 can be found exclusively in Bulgaria (see Map 
A3.05). Severozapaden (BG31) in the Northwest of Bulgaria is the sole Type 
54 region and features a considerable population decline due to a distinctly 
negative development of both components of population change: a natural 
population decrease of -10.35 per 1,000 and a negative annual net migration 
rate of -11.25 per 1,000. Furthermore the proportion of elderly people 
(21.37%) is clearly above the EU27+4 average (16.63%) and the share of 
the age group 20 to 39 (23.93%) is one of the lowest in the EU27+4. The 
other three Bulgarian Type 5 regions (i.e. Type 53) also have a negative 
annual average natural population and migratory balance, but to a lesser 
extent (-5.44 and -9.37 per 1,000). Most notably for Type 53, the share of 
people aged 65+ (avg. 17.14%) is just half a percentage point above the 
overall average, and hence relatively low compared to the other Type 5 
subtypes. 
 
Together, Type 51 (nearly 30 million people) and Type 52 (15.7 million 
people) represent around 11% of the EU27+4 population. Type 51 covers the 
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entire East of Germany except for Berlin (DE30) and Leipzig (DED3), as well 
as parts of West Germany and peripheral regions of Sweden and Finland. 
Type 52 is also affected by population decline, due to negative average 
values for both components of population development (an average natural 
population decrease of -5.44 per 1,000 and a negative migratory balance of  
-1.20 per 1,000). Furthermore, the share of the age group 20 to 39 (avg. 
24.69%) is relatively low, even compared to the already low Type 5 average 
(26.32%). The age structure of Type 53 – to be found in Estonia, Latvia, 
parts of West and East Germany (Leipzig), Hungary, Southern Italy and large 
parts of Greece – is very close to the overall average of Type 5. Although the 
natural population balance is negative in all 17 regions of Type 53, the total 
population development of this type is just slightly negative, due to a positive 
average net migration rate of 0.83 (per 1,000). 
Type 6 – Young Potentials  
The 15 regions of this type represent 7.66% of the EU27+4 population and 
can be characterised by a relatively young age structure and a consistently 
positive population development of both components: a positive natural 
population development and a positive net migration balance. The age 
groups 20 to 39 years (avg. 32.26%) and 65+ (avg. 14.45%) clearly show 
higher respectively lower proportions compared to the EU27+4 average (see 
Fig. 41 as well as Map A1.01 and Map A1.02). The prevailing population 
increase of this type of region is driven by an above average annual natural 
population increase (avg. 3.61 per 1,000) and the strongest overall net 
migration gains (avg. p.a. 17.10 per 1,000) – see also Figure 41. 
 
Geographical distribution 
Apart from the Republic of Ireland, Cyprus, Vienna (AT13) and Flevoland 
(NL23), this type can be found on the Spanish mainland and islands (Canar-
ies/ES70 and Baleares/ES53). 
 
Subtypes 
Type 6 comprises three subtypes (Type 61 to 63 – see Map A3.06), whereby 
Type 63 (Ireland, Flevoland and Cyprus) shows the lowest share of the 
population 65+ (avg. 10.90%) and the highest annual average natural 
population increase (7.14 per 1,000). Type 62 contains only Spanish regions 
(Madrid/ES30, the islands and two more regions at the East Coast) and 
features the highest share of the age group 20 to 39 (avg. 34.39%) and the 
strongest net migration gains (avg. p.a. 22.24 per 1,000) within Type 6. The 
third subtype (61), including the remaining Spanish Type 6 regions as well as 
Vienna, can be distinguished from other subtypes by the relatively high share 
of people aged 65+ (avg. 17.09%, which is just above the EU27+4 average) 
and a relative low natural population increase (avg. p.a. 1.15 per 1,000). 
Type 7 – Overseas 
This special type of five regions (the French overseas departments of Guy-
ane/FR93, Guadeloupe/FR91 and Réunion/FR94, as well as the Spanish 
exclaves of Ceuta/ES63 and Melilla/ES64) summarises the regions outside of 
the European mainland (continent) – with the exception of Martinique/FR92 
(which belongs to Type 3 – Family Potentials), the Portuguese islands of 
Madeira (PT30) and the Azores/PT20 (Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force) as 
well as the Canaries (Type 6 – Young Potentials). Compared to the other six 
types of regions, this category features significantly different and hardly 
comparable demographic characteristics with very low shares of elderly 
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people (i.e. an average of only 9.04% people aged 65+) as well as a very 
strong annual average natural population increase (13.56 per 1,000). In 
quantitative terms, this type of only 1.5 million people (i.e. 0.31% of the 
EU27+4 population) is almost negligible.  
 
A further quantitative differentiation within Type 7 makes no sense, because 
of the relatively small population size, the demographic heterogeneity within 
this type and, above all, the small amount of cases (five regions). Therefore, 
no subtypes were elaborated for Type 7 – Overseas. 
 
4.2.4 Geographical Patterns 
Referring to the map of the typology of the demographic status (Map 8), 
some geographical patterns can be revealed. The regions of Type 1 – Euro 
Standard and Type 3 – Family Potentials, both featuring values close to the 
overall average in respect to the cluster variables, are concentrated in the 
northern and central-western parts of the EU27+4 territory. These two types 
of regions constitute the demographic “centre of gravity” by means of the 
combined population size of 46% of the EU27+4 population. Both types of 
regions experience a total population increase, driven by a positive migratory 
balance, especially in the case of Type 1 – Euro Standard.  
 
Apart from that, two distinctive Eastern European types, including a third of 
the EU27+4 population, can be distinguished: Type 2 – Challenge of Labour 
Force (also appearing in Southern Europe and covering some urban regions 
like Berlin/DE30, Hamburg/DE60 and Copenhagen/DK01) and Type 5 – 
Challenge of Decline, which also includes peripheral regions of Sweden, 
Finland and large parts of Greece. Distinguishing these two types of regions, 
Type 2 rather allegorises regions that feature a younger age structure and a 
stagnating population development, whereas Type 5 is characterised by an 
older than average age structure and a pronounced population decrease, 
resulting in regions challenged by depopulation. 
 
The regions covered by Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 6 – Young 
Potentials (together around 20% of the EU27+4 population) are mainly 
situated in the south-western parts of Europe (on the Iberian Peninsula, 
Southern France, Northern Italy, as well as Ireland, some parts of England, 
Flevoland/NL23, Vienna/AT13, Cyprus and the Greek Ipeiros region/GR21). 
Both types show a strong positive net migration balance and overall popula-
tion increases, which constitutes these regions as “demographic growth 
regions”. As the name of the type suggests, a high share of elderly people 
coins Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing. By contrast, Type 6 – Young Potentials 
features a pronounced young age structure. 
 
Focussing on the European core and periphery, the “European Pentagon 
area” stretches mainly across regions of Type 1 – Euro Standard and Type 3 
– Family Potentials, but also covers Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing regions 
(Lombardia/ITC4) and even some Type 5 – Challenge of Decline regions (in 
central-western Germany).102 The geographical periphery of Europe stretches 
                                               
102 The “European Pentagon” is a spatial term, describing the larger geographical 
zone of global economic integration defined by the metropolises of London, Paris, Milan, Munich and 
Hamburg. This zone offers strong global economic functions and services, which enable a high-
income level and a well-developed infrastructure (EC 1999:20). 
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over Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force (in Eastern Europe and at the 
southern edges of the EU27+4 territory) and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline 
regions (peripheral regions of Scandinavia and the Baltic States). 
 
Any spatial pattern depends on the scale. Acknowledging the fact that the 
scale of this analysis is the NUTS 2 level, the resolution is clearly too low to 
detect smaller scaled spatial patterns like urban areas or coastal regions. 
Focussing on a wider scale, the demographic patterns drawn at the level of 
nation states (cf. Chapter 3.2) are also roughly reflected at NUTS 2 level. 
Indeed, demographic behaviour and thus demographic characteristics are 
strongly affected by the political, social and economic systems of nation 
states. However, as the analysis of regional demographic indicators in 
Chapter 3.3 revealed, and as confirmed by the regional demographic classifi-
cation, a regional heterogeneity of demographic characteristics cannot be 
questioned.  
 
4.2.5 The Classification reveals … 
The typology of 286 European NUTS 2 regions reveals seven types of regions 
of distinctive demographic characteristics. Type 1 “Euro Standard” is rela-
tively close to the EU27+4 average in respect to the variables used for this 
classification. The demographic profile shows a stagnation of the natural 
population increase, but a positive net migration balance. The second type 
“Challenge of Labour Force” can be characterised by its high share of young 
adults, which generates a challenge to bring and establish these young 
people into the labour force. The title of Type 3 “Family Potentials” refers to 
the relatively young age structure and the strong natural population increase 
between 2001 and 2005. Type 4 “Challenge of Ageing” can be distinguished 
from the other types of regions by its high proportion of elderly people (aged 
65 years and older). It also features a slightly negative natural population 
balance (albeit a high share of young adults in the reproductive age) and a 
strong in-migration surplus. The title of Type 5 “Challenge of Decline” refers 
to the negative population development, driven by a negative natural popula-
tion balance as well as a negative net migration rate. Together this leads to a 
significant population decrease coupled with population ageing. Type 6 
“Young Potentials” can be characterised by its young age structure and a 
strictly positive population development of both components: a positive 
natural increase and a positive net migration. The title of Type 7 “Overseas” 
reflects the geographical position of these five regions, which are all located 
outside of the European mainland. 
 
Furthermore, the typology reveals spatial patterns with respect to the 
geographical distribution of the different types of regions, i.e. distinctive 
Northern and Western European types (Type 1 and 3), Eastern European 
types (Type 2 and 5) and Southern European types (Type 4 and 6) as well as 
a non-European mainland type (Type 7). Beyond that, the classification 
demonstrates that national borders, although strongly affecting, do not 
ultimately determine demographic characteristics. Demographic behaviour is 
obviously affected by people’s view of live (as discussed in Chapter 2.2.5), 
which in turn is influenced by a bundle of political, social, economic and, last 
but not least, individual factors. And all of these factors do have a strong 
regional impact.  
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4.3 Demographic Illustration of the Classification 
For a further illustration of the just presented demographic typology, the 
resulting types of regions will be explained by external demographic indica-
tors – i.e. variables that are not directly included into the cluster analysis. 
First of all, these indicators refer to the typology by addressing the two 
components of the classification: on the one hand, the various paths of 
population development and, on the other hand, the variations in the age 
structure of the different kinds of regions. Furthermore, this demographic 
analysis responds to the three main processes in demography (fertility, 
mortality and migration) and highlights the demographic challenges with 
respect to low fertility, population ageing and the size of the labour force. 
 
Additionally, an extensive collection of maps (see Annex 1-4) and an over-
view-table of the demographic indicators per type (Tab. A5.01 in Annex 5) 
shall provide visual and quantitative support for the understanding of this 
extended demographic illustration of the typology. 
 
4.3.1 Population Development 
Both components of population development, the natural population increase 
and the net migration rate, were used as input variables for the cluster 
analysis (see Chapter 4.2.2). The resultant aggregated indicator “total 
population development” will be examined with respect to the demographic 
typology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43:  
Total population 
development per 
type of region 
(2001-2005) 
 
Data source: 
ESPON 2013 
Database 
 
The total population development during the period 2001 to 2005 in all 286 
regions included in the cluster analysis (see also Map A2.05) results in an 
average annual increase of 3.49 (per 1,000) – indicated by the horizontal line 
in Figure 42. The average annual population increase of Type 1 – Euro 
Standard (3.44 per 1,000) comes very close to the overall average. During 
this period the population size of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force was 
slightly declining (avg. p.a. -0.71 per 1,000). 
 
Both, Type 3 – Family Potentials and Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing, were 
experiencing an average annual population increase of 5.84 and 7.67 (per 
1,000) between 2001 and 2005, which is clearly above the EU27+4 average. 
In the case of Type 3 – Family Potentials, a natural population increase and a 
positive migratory balance drive the prevailing population increase. Type 4 – 
Challenge of Ageing, by contrast, is featuring a negative natural population 
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balance and the total population increase is hence the result of a strong 
positive net migration rate. 
 
In the course of the period 2001 to 2005, the population of Type 5 – Chal-
lenge of Decline was, literally, declining by -4.59 per 1,000 every year. The 
figures of Type 5 regions range from -21.60 per 1,000 (in the Bulgarian 
region of Severozapaden/BG32 – i.e. Subtype 54) to 0.69 per 1,000 in 
Bremen (DE50). Type 6 – Young Potentials presents the opposite picture, 
featuring the strongest average increase of the total population (avg. p.a. 
20.71 per 1,000), next to the rather atypical Type 7 – Overseas. 
Typology of Population Development 
As mentioned in Chapter 4.2.1, a typology of the components of population 
development for the period 1996 to 1999 was already developed for the 
ESPON 1.1.4 project “The Spatial Effects of Demographic Change and Migra-
tion” (ESPON 2005:66 – Map 3.2) and was recently updated for the period 
2001 to 2005 (ESPON 2008c:7 – Map 1). This typology distinguishes six 
types of regions (at NUTS 3 level) depending on the question, whether the 
total population growth, the natural growth (births minus deaths) and the net 
migration (in-migration minus out-migration) were positive or negative. 
 
Taking advantage of both, the straightforward expressiveness and applicabil-
ity of this demographic classification, the typology of population development 
was adapted to NUTS 2 for the period 2001 to 2005 (see Map 9) in order to 
link it with the newly developed typology of the demographic status. 
 
When comparing both typologies (see Tab. 9), nearly half of all Type 1 - Euro 
Standard regions (39 from 79) match the “double positive” category 1 of the 
typology of population development, i.e. regions with population growth 
through both positive natural population and migration development (see 
Map 9). Another 33 Euro Standard regions (Type 1) can be assigned to 
category 2 of population development – i.e. population growth by means of a 
positive migratory balance, although the natural population is decreasing. 
Only 7 of 79 Euro Standard regions (Type 1) match the negative population 
development categories 4 to 6 and have to bear a decline of the total popula-
tion.  
 
Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force appears to be a very heterogeneous type 
when it comes to the components of population development. Type 2 regions 
sprawl over all six categories of the classification of population development, 
albeit a third (20 of 61 regions) are in line with the “double negative” popula-
tion development type – i.e. negative natural population and migratory 
balance. Apart from that, more than 40% of all Challenge of Labour Force 
regions (i.e. 26) have population increases, and 10 of these regions even 
match the “double positive” type.  
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Map 9: Typology of population development, 2001-2005 
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Table 9: 
Crosstabulation 
of typologies 
(demographic 
status & 
population 
development) 
 
 
 
Family Potential regions (Type 3) offer a more distinctive picture, with all but 
two regions featuring a population increase. The picture becomes even 
clearer when realising that more than two thirds of the regions (40 out of 55) 
can be declared as “double positive”. Just like Type 3, all but one Type 4 – 
Challenge of Ageing regions experience a population increase, driven by a 
clearly positive net migration rate. It is not too amazing that 24 of 33 Chal-
lenge of Ageing regions match category 2 of the population development 
typology – i.e. population increase with positive migratory and negative 
natural population balance. Compared with Type 3 and 4 of the demographic 
typology, Type 5 – Challenge of Decline is showing the opposite characteris-
tics when it comes to the components of population development with 36 of 
38 regions facing population decline. In fact, 17 of these regions match the 
“double negative” population development category 6. 
 
Young Potentials regions (Type 6) are nearly entirely absorbed by the “dou-
ble positive” category 1 of the population development typology. Only one 
Type 6 region (Vienna/AT13) has a slightly negative natural population 
balance, relegating this region to category 2 within the typology of population 
development – i.e. population increase with positive migratory and negative 
natural population balance. Two of the five Overseas regions (of Type 7) can 
be classified as “double positive” with respect to total population increase. 
Although the three other Type 7 regions do feature a negative migratory 
balance, their populations still increase due to pronounced positive natural 
population balances. 
 
In a nutshell, five of seven types of regions emerging from the demographic 
typology can be roughly assigned to the positive categories of the typology of 
population development. Only Type 5 – Challenge of Decline had a predomi-
nately negative population development during the period 2001 to 2005. The 
regions of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force must be rated as ambivalent 
with respect to the components of population development. Generally 
speaking, the vast majority of all regions (205 of 286) feature a positive 
population development, whereas 113 regions are so-called “double positive” 
with respect to both components population development. All together, only 
39 regions – i.e. not even 15% of all NUTS 2 regions – are “double negative” 
and thus affected by a natural population decrease as well as a negative net 
migration balance. All but two of these “double negative” regions must be 
ascribed to the two distinctive Eastern European types of regions: Challenge 
of Labour Force (Type 2) and Challenge of Decline (Type 5). 
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4.3.2 Age Structure 
Apart from the components of population development, the age structure of a 
population – expressed by two significant age groups: 20 to 39 years and 65 
years and older – constitutes the second pillar of input variables for the 
demographic typology (see Chapter 4.2.2). Consequently, the entire age 
structure of all seven types of regions shall be also discussed by means of 5-
year groups. 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 2.1.2, the most common way of represent-
ing an age structure is a “population pyramid”. Because the typology of the 
demographic status does not explicitly distinguish between male and female 
population as population pyramid’s do, hereafter a slightly modified form will 
be used to represent the age structure. Figure 43 portrays the age structures 
of the seven types of regions in comparison with the age structure of the 
entire EU27+4 (i.e. ESPON space) – depicted by light grey bars – by showing 
the share of all 5-year age groups up to 85 years and older.  
 
In order to stress the demographic model of a stable population – i.e. a 
population with an invariable age structure and a fixed rate of natural in-
crease – the shape of a corresponding population pyramid would look like a 
pillar.103  In the case of the representation in Figure 44, a stable population 
would appear as a flat horizontal line reaching from the outer left edge of the 
chart (i.e. from the youngest age group) to an age of around 60 years and 
would be narrowing only at the very right side as people die of old age (EC 
2008d:9). 
 
The age structure of the entire EU27+4 (or ESPON space) population (Fig. 
44; bottom right) can be read as a bow with the apex at the age group 35 to 
44 years, which represents the baby boom cohorts of the 1950s and 60s in 
Northern and Western Europe. This feature makes it directly comparable to 
the population pyramid of the EU27 by 2005 positioned (see Fig. 1 in Chapter 
2.1.2), only cut in half (aggregating both sexes) and horizontal positioned (to 
be read from left to right instead from the bottom to the top). Comparing the 
EU27+4 age structure with the age structure of Type 1 – Euro Standard, the 
baby boom bulge of Type 1 is even more pronounced due to the weaker 
succeeding cohorts (aged 20 to 34 years). Besides that, Type 1 – Euro 
Standard features an age structure very similar to that of the entire EU27+4 
population. 
 
                                               
103 Cited after the INED online glossary, online at: 
http://www.ined.fr/en/lexicon/bdd/mot/Stable+population/motid/81/  
(retrieved 28.08.2009) 
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Figure 44: Age structure per type of region (2005) 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
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The age structure of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force clearly differs from 
that of the EU27+4 (or ESPON space), because of the lower proportion of the 
young (10 years and younger) and older population (55 years and older). 
This distinctive Central and Eastern European type features age groups 
between age 45 and 54 (i.e. the cohorts born after World War II) and 15 to 
34 years (i.e. the last strong birth cohorts before the fall of the Iron Curtain), 
which are clearly stronger than the corresponding age groups of the EU27+4 
population. However, the age groups in between (35 to 44 years) are less 
pronounced. This could be either explained by the demographic echo effect 
caused by the weaker cohorts of their parents (55 years and older), or by 
strong out-migration of these selective age groups – or by a combination of 
both. 
 
Type 3 – Family Potentials comes closest to the age structure of a stable 
population. Only the age groups 30 to 49 years (including the baby boomers) 
rises above the virtual horizontal line, which would mark a perfectly stable 
population. However, this type’s age structure closely matches the structure 
of the EU27+4 population aged 20 to 59 years (i.e. the prime age of the 
labour force). Younger and older age groups below 20 and above 60 years 
reveal a favourable weighting, as the younger population’s proportion is 
above the overall average, while the share of elderly people is well below. By 
contrast, Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing shows an inverted age distribution. 
The share of the younger population below 30 years is clearly underrepre-
sented, while the proportion of the older age groups (55 years and older) is 
significantly higher compared to the EU27+4 age structure. 
 
A very diversified age structure can be observed for Type 5 – Challenge of 
Decline, a type of region that can be mainly found in former Eastern Bloc 
regions and peripheral regions of Northern and Southern Europe. Compared 
to the EU27+4 age structure, the age groups 15 years and younger (i.e. 
those born after 1989) and 25 to 34 years are clearly underrepresented. 
Taking this type’s strictly negative migratory balance into account (cf. 
Chapter 4.2.3), one could assume that these young adults are missing 
because of emigration. The only age group of this type of region, which is 
overrepresented with respect to the age distribution of the EU27+4 popula-
tion, are elderly people (60 years and older). 
 
Type 6 – Young Potentials shows considerable high shares of people aged 20 
to 44 years and below 5 years. Contrary to Type 2 and Type 5, this bulge of 
young adults (or young workforce) seems to be the result of significant 
immigration to this type of region (see also Chapter 4.2.3). The high share of 
children below 5 years could be interpreted as the demographic echo of the 
high proportion of young adults, i.e. their offspring.  
 
The age structure of Type 7 – Overseas is completely different in regard to 
the “continental” types of regions (Type 1 to 6). Driven by a strong natural 
population increase, the youngest age group (below 5 years) shows the 
highest proportions. Indeed, each age group is stronger compared to the 
subsequent age groups of higher age, apart from the very mobile age group 
20 to 34 years. This results in a very low share of people older then 45 years. 
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4.3.3 Demographic Indicators 
After discussing the population development by components as well as the 
age structure by type of region, the next step of this analysis focuses on the 
three main population processes (fertility, mortality and migration), which 
determine the previously discussed age structure (Chapter 4.3.2), as well as 
the population development in general (Chapter 4.3.1). 
Fertility  
Again, two indicators are considered for the analysis of fertility characteristics 
of the different types of regions: the total fertility rate (TFR) in 2005 and the 
crude birth rate (CBR) over the period 2001 to 2005 (avg. p.a.) – see Figure 
44 and the Maps A2.06 and A2.07.  
 
As already discussed at some detail, the CBR is an empirical measure ex-
pressed as the number of births (per 1,000 population), whereas the TFR is a 
hypothetical indicator weighted per woman and thus indicates the number of 
children per women aged 15 to 49 years (cf. Chapter 2.1.2 and 3.2.3). In 
this respect, the TFR is more responsive to changes in the fertility behaviour 
(e.g. postponements of births). Both indicators have pros and cons, so the 
question which measure should be taken into account depends on the actual 
scope of the analysis. When analysing the spatial impact of fertility in the 
context of population development, the CBR has a stronger explanatory 
power, although or precisely because it is influenced by the age structure of 
the total population. 
 
The average TFR of the 286 regions included in this analysis was 1.53 
(children per woman) by 2005, which is clearly below the replacement level 
of roughly 2.1. The average annual CBR during the period 2001 to 2005 was 
10.32 births (per 1,000). When looking at Figure 45, the black horizontal 
lines illustrate the average values with respect to all regions of the EU27+4. 
 
In 2005, regions of Type 1 – Euro Standard had an average TFR of 1.64, 
which is clearly above the overall average. However, the average CBR of 
10.18 per 1,000 is actually slightly below the EU27+4 average. The explana-
tion for the contrasting direction with respect to the overall mean of these 
two fertility indicators can be explained by the underlying age structure. The 
age structure of Type 1 is “older” compared the overall average. Conse-
quently, the proportion of the rather younger age group in the main repro-
ductive age is also below average. The TFR confirms, that an average “Type 
1 woman” in fertile years bears more children compared to the average 
“EU27+4 woman”. Because the cohorts of potential mothers between 15 and 
49 years are quantitatively weaker than the EU27+4 average, the ratio of 
births (per 1,000) is suppressed, resulting in a relatively low CBR. 
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Figure 45: Fertility Indicators (I) per type of region:  
Total fertility rate (TFR) 2005 and crude birth rate (CBR) avg. p.a. 2001-2005 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database, NIDI 
 
Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force regions clearly is a low fertility type, with 
both fertility indicators showing below EU27+4 average values (avg. TFR: 
1.29; avg. CBR: 9.62 per 1,000). These fertility figures must be interpreted 
as a very reduced desire for having children when taking the relatively 
favourable age structure of Type 2 into account: the average share of young 
adults aged 20 to 39 years in the prime age of childbearing is clearly above 
the EU27+4 average, while the share of elderly people is relatively low. As 
the title of Type 3 “Family Potentials” implies, both fertility measures of this 
type of region are relatively high (i.e. clearly above the overall average), 
featuring an average TFR of 1.75 and an average CBR of 12.18 (per 1,000). 
 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline have very 
similar characteristics in regard to the average TFR (1.41 and 1.36) and CBR 
(9.14 and 8.34). Both fertility indicators are below EU27+4 average in both 
types of regions. It should be mentioned that the CBR of both types is even 
below the CBR of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force, although the TFR is 
higher in Type 4 and Type 5 compared to Type 2. Again, the age structure 
effect is obvious and attributable to the younger age structure of Type 2 
(Challenge of Labour Force) compared to the age structure of Type 4 (Chal-
lenge of Ageing) and Type 5 (Challenge of Decline).  
 
This same age structural effect can also be observed for Type 6 – Young 
Potentials, a type with a pronounced young age structure. In the case of 
Type 6 the TFR of 1.50 is slightly below the EU27+4 average, while the CBR 
(11.71 per 1,000) is above average. Due to this relatively high CBR (and a 
low CDR – see below), regions of Type 6 experience a relatively strong 
natural population increase (see also Chapter 4.2.3), which is not clearly 
reflected by the TFR. Finally, the rather atypical Type 7 – Overseas has the 
highest fertility by far, both in terms of TFR and CBR. 
Mortality 
As with fertility, again, we consider two indicators for the discussion of 
mortality characteristics in respect to the different types of regions: (a) life 
expectancy at birth (of both sexes combined) during the period 2002 to 2004 
and (b) the crude death rate (CDR) for the period 2001 to 2005 – see  
Figure 46 and the Maps A2.08 to A2.11.104   
 
 
 
 
                                               
104 Besides the combined life expectancy of both sexes (Map A2.08), the Maps A2.09 and A2.10 
portray the often very divergent life expectancies of men and women separately (see also Chapter 
3.2.4 and 3.3.2). 
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Figure 46: Mortality indicators per type of region:  
Life expectancy at birth 2002-2004 and crude death rate (CDR) avg. p.a. 2001-2005 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database, NIDI 
 
The accuracy of the life expectancy indicator can only be verified ex-post, 
when the last member of the particular cohort has experienced that certain 
and, in this case, inevitable demographic event. By contrast, the CDR can be 
interpreted the same way as the CBR, only taking the number of deaths 
instead of births into account. Like the CBR, also the CDR is distorted by the 
age structure of a population. In the EU27+4, where mortality rates at 
younger ages are relatively low, the CDR strongly responds to the proportion 
of older people. In any case, the higher the proportion of people in age 
groups around the actual life expectancy, the higher is the 
 
During the period 2002 to 2004, the average life expectancy at birth in all 
EU27+4 regions was 78.14 years, whereas the average life expectancy of 
women (81.12 years) was six years higher then those of men (75.10 years). 
The annual average CDR across EU27+4 regions amounted to 10.02 (deaths 
per 1,000). 
 
In regions of Type 1 – Euro Standard, the average live expectancy at birth 
(79.10 years) is higher than the EU27+4 average, while the CDR (avg. p.a. 
10.17 per 1,000) is just about average. Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force 
has nearly the same CDR (avg. p.a. 10.41 per 1,000) as Type 1, but the life 
expectancy in Type 2 (75.13 years) is the lowest of all types or regions, 
except of Type 7. Although the share of older people is much higher in Type 
1 (see also Chapter 4.2.3), the number of deaths in Type 2 exceeds Type 1 
due to a lower life expectancy whilst the share of elderly (65+) is about the 
same (see Fig. 36 in Chapter 3.3.2). 
 
Type 3 – Family Potentials displays an above average life expectancy (79.36 
years) and a below average CDR (8.56 per 1,000) with regard to the overall 
average. Again, this discrepancy can be explained by the relatively young 
age structure of Type 3 (see Chapter 4.2.3), which results in fewer deaths 
per 1,000 population, as long as people die first and foremost in older ages 
(as the vast majority of Europeans do). The other rather “young” type of 
region “Type 6 – Young Potentials” features similar values in regard to life 
expectancy (79.76 years) and CDR (8.10 per 1,000). 
 
The “older” types of regions, Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 5 – 
Challenge of Decline, both have a CDR (10.88 and 11.73 per 1,000) above 
the EU27+4 average. Although the share of older people is higher in Type 4 
compared to Type 5, the CDR of Type 4 is below the CDR of Type 5. Again, 
the reason is the lower life expectancy of Type 5 (77.28 years, i.e. lower than 
the overall average) compared to the highest life expectancy of all types of 
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regions achieved in Type 4 (80.18 years). The average share of elderly aged 
65 years and older is around 20% in both types. 
 
Although Type 7 – Overseas features the lowest life expectancy of all types of 
regions (74.94 years), it shows the lowest CDR (avg. p.a. 5.85 per 1,000) 
because of its pronounced young age structure (see Fig. 44). These examples 
demonstrate that a young age structure has a positive effect on the natural 
population development by implicating a low CDR and a high CBR (see  
Type 3, Type 6 and Type 7); and vice versa, as demonstrated by Type 4 and 
Type 5. 
Migration 
The only available migratory indicator – the net migration rate – has to 
illustrate the complex process of migration. This rate is simply a residual of 
the difference between the total population change and the natural popula-
tion change. Because the net migration rate (see also Map A2.04) was used 
as an input variable for the cluster analysis and was therefore already 
explained (see Chapter 4.2.2). At this point the characteristics of this indica-
tor with respect to the different types of regions will be only summarised in 
brief – the stock of foreign population by type of region will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.2.2 by means of the European Labour Force Survey data set. 
 
The strongest annual average net migration gains occur in Type 6 – Young 
Potentials (17.10 per 1,000) and Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (9.42 per 
1,000). Type 1 – Euro Standard (3.43 per 1,000) and Type 3 – Family 
Potentials (2.12 per 1,000) feature positive net migration rates around the 
EU27+4 average (0.33 per 1,000). Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force has a 
rather balanced net migration rate of 0.08 per 1,000. The only types of 
regions with negative net migration rates are Type 5 – Challenge of Decline 
(avg. p.a. -4.59 per 1,000) and Type 7 – Overseas (avg. p.a. -1.78 per 
1,000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47:  
Net migration 
rate per type of 
region, average 
p.a. 2001-2005 
 
Data source: 
ESPON 2013 
Database 
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4.3.4 Demographic Challenges and Potentials 
According to the DEMIFER Interim Report (ESPON 2009:21ff), the biggest 
demographic challenges the European population are facing are threefold: 
 
• A low level of fertility – leading to a reduced contribution of natural 
growth to population growth. 
• Population Ageing – due to low fertility levels and the increase in life 
expectancy in most countries and regions. 
• The size of the working age population – a persistently low level of 
fertility and the so connected population ageing is slowing the growth 
of the working age population. 
 
The DEMIFER Interim Report (ESPON 2009a:25) further clarifies that, due to 
the decrease in fertility levels and the increase in international migration, 
migration has become the main driver of European population growth. About 
80% of the overall population growth in the European Union is caused by 
migration (EC 2008a:25). Although high in-migration cannot compensate all 
possible demographic challenges, those kinds of regions with positive net 
migration rates hold the highest potentials in approaching these challenges. 
In regard to the demographic typology, those types of regions with positive 
average net migration rates are Type 1 – Euro Standard, Type 3 – Family 
Potentials and especially Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 6 – Young 
Potentials. Just the opposite can be said for the distinctive Eastern European 
types of regions. The regions of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force show 
rather ambivalent net migration rates, while out-migration is prevailing in 
regions of Type 5 – Challenge of Decline. Hence, these two types, especially 
Type 5, might be facing the biggest demographic challenges ahead. 
Low Fertility 
The topic of fertility was already discussed in the previous chapter by means 
of the total fertility rate (TFR) and the crude birth rate (CBR). At this point, 
the nearly perfect positive correlation between the share of children below 5 
years and the CBR shall be demonstrated (see Fig. 48). This relation is once 
more highlighting the (sometimes underestimated) explanatory power of the 
CBR – the higher the CBR, the higher the share of children (below 5 years) – 
with respect to the spatial impacts of (natural) population development in a 
particular area.105 
 
Figure 48: Fertility indicators (II) per type of region:  
Age Group below 5 years (2005) and crude birth rate (CBR) average p.a. 2001-2005. 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
 
 
                                               
105 At the level of NUTS 2 regions, the correlation coefficient of the proportion of the age group 
below 5 years (by 2005) and the CBR (avg. p.a. 2001-2005) is 0.984: The higher the CBR, the 
higher the share of children (below 5 years). 
  127 
Those types of regions with an above average share of children below five 
years also have an above average CBR, i.e. Type 3 – Family Potentials, Type 
6 – Young Potentials and Type 7 – Overseas. Even if the in-flow of migrants 
is not further increasing, a high potential for sustained natural population 
growth can be awarded to these three types, which represent around 29% of 
the EU27+4 population. However, migration does not play the same pivotal 
role in all three types or regions. While a positive net migration rate is 
certainly the main driver of population development in Type 6 – Young 
Potentials, the net migration rate is rather ambivalent in regions of Type 3 – 
Family Potentials and even negative on average in Type 7 – Overseas. 
Nevertheless, these three types of regions can boast themselves with a 
strictly positive natural population balance, contrary to all other types. 
 
The manifold reasons for the sustaining low fertility rates in more developed 
countries over the last decades and the (political) measures to increase 
fertility are the topic of extended research. Meanwhile the scientific commu-
nity agrees, that the drivers of low fertility are behavioural aspects in connec-
tion with societal changes (as explained by the concept of the SDT – see 
Chapter 2.2.5). Furthermore, certain demographic structures (i.e. age 
structural effects) contribute to low rates of fertility – when measured by the 
CBR. It was already demonstrated in the previous chapter that a high(er) 
proportion of people in the reproductive age can lead to a higher number of 
births (e.g. Type 3 – Family Potentials and Type 6 – Young Potentials).  
 
Missing Mothers 
But it always takes two to become parents; thanks to the progress made in 
reproductive technologies, nowadays it takes, at the very least, only a 
mother. By no way, however, more children will be born, if there are not 
enough mothers. Indeed, a distorted sex ratio in the prime reproductive age 
is also influencing fertility rates. Some regions, especially peripheral regions 
of Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, are lacking potential mothers due to out-
migration of young women aged 20 to 29 years (see Map A2.12). In some 
regions the sex ratio of the age group 20 to 29 is heavily distorted. The most 
constrained ratios close to 180 men to 100 women can be observed on some 
Aegean islands and in North-eastern Greece.106  But also some other regions 
of Type 5 are potentially affected by “missing mothers”, e.g. the entire East 
of Germany, except of the urban regions of Berlin (DE30) and Leipzig 
(DED3), and peripheral areas of Sweden and Finland. 
Population Ageing 
According to the DEMIFER Interim Report (ESPON 2009:37), the main effects 
of population ageing arise from the increase in the costs of retirement 
schemes, the increase in demand for health care and long-term care and the 
slowing growth of the working age population. Especially the latter two 
arguments affect the regional scale, whereby pension schemes are solely 
discussed and applied on the supra-regional level of nation states. 
 
                                               
106 The corresponding average sex ratio at age 20 to 29 years of all ESPON space regions is 104 
men to 100 women. 
  128 
 
Figure 49: Elderly age groups per type of region: Share of population 65+ and 80+ (2005)  
and annual average increase of these age groups (2001-2005). 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
 
While connecting the ageing indicators to the types of regions of the demo-
graphic typology, we will start with the share and growth rates of the old and 
oldest old (aged 65+ and 80+), before portraying the old age dependency 
ratio (i.e. the number of persons 65 years and over per one hundred persons 
15 to 64 years). This ratio provides the information, how many persons aged 
15 to 64 years will potentially come up for the increasing costs of a higher 
share of retired persons and the connected higher expenses for health care. 
Finally, the potentials of long-term elderly care within families will be dis-
cussed by means of the Parent Support Ratio (PaSR), which is the number of 
persons 85 years old and over per one hundred persons 50 to 64 years – i.e. 
the children of those aged 85 years and older. 
 
The Old and the Oldest Old 
The share of people 65+ was already discussed in Chapter 4.2.2 with respect 
to the input variables of the cluster analysis. Especially Type 4 – Challenge of 
Ageing and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline feature high proportions of people 
aged 65 years and older. This also holds true for the share of the “oldest old” 
(i.e. 80+), with the addition of Type 1 – Euro Standard (see Fig. 49 and also 
Map A1.02 and A2.13). The latter can be explained by the relative high life 
expectancy of Type 1. Because regions of Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing have 
the highest average life expectancy of all types of regions (see also Chapter 
4.2.3), the proportion of the oldest old (avg. 5.63%) is also the highest 
across the EU27+4. With respect to the high share of people aged 65+ in 
Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, the proportion of people 80 years and older 
(avg. 4.28%) is relatively small due to the lower life expectancy in this type 
of region. Below average proportions of people aged 65+ and 80+ can be 
found in Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force, Type 3 – Family Potentials, 
Type 6 – Young Potentials and Type 7 – Overseas. 
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Figure 50: Old age dependency ratio (2005) and average annual increase (2001-2005) 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
 
Because of the strongly varying life expectancy among the different kinds of 
regions, the increase of the age group 80+ delivers a partially different 
picture. Again, the young types of regions (Type 6 – Young Potentials and 
Type 7 – Overseas) have above average increases in the age group 80+, but 
simultaneously also a very low share. Type 1 – Euro Standard, with an above 
average proportion of people in the age group 80 years and older display 
below average increases, as does Type 3 – Family Potentials. Type 4 – 
Challenge of Ageing, with the highest overall share of people 80+ and the 
highest life expectancy, still shows above average increases. The highest 
increases of the age group 80+ can be observed in Type 2 – Challenge of 
Transition, illustrating that this type is coined by the lowest – but fortunately 
increasing – average life expectancy. 
 
Old Age Dependency Ratio 
In 2005, the old age dependency ratio (OADR) was 25/100 in the EU27+4. 
That means that there were 25 persons aged 65 years and older per one 
hundred persons between 15 and 64 years (see Fig. 50 and also Map A2.16). 
Above average values can be found in Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (avg. 
32/100), Type 5 – Challenge of Decline (avg. 29/100) and in Type 1 – Euro 
Standard (avg. 27/100). The highest OADR (avg. 42/100) can be found in 
the region of Liguria (Italy), which also has the highest share of people 65+ 
(26.51%). All other types of regions feature below average ratios, the lowest 
in Type 7 – Overseas (avg. 14/100). 
 
Compared with the overall annual average increase of the OADR between 
2001 and 2005 (1.01%), Type 5 – Challenge of Decline has to burden the 
highest annual average increase (2.32%), especially East Germany and the 
northern regions of Greece (up to 5.5%). Type 6 – Young Potentials is the 
only type with a decreasing OADR (-0.55%) due to the high share of (young) 
immigrants. All other types of regions display increases around the overall 
average (between 0.60% and 1.51%). 
 
Parent Support Ratio 
One can assume that people at a certain old age are in the pronounced need 
for long-term care or, at best, need some help to master the routines of daily 
life. The parent support ratio (PaSR) supposes that this is the fact for most 
people aged 85 years and older. In this respect the PaSR is a measure for 
potential elderly care within families, represented by the number of persons 
85 years and older per one hundred persons 50 to 64 years  – i.e. the 
children of those aged 85 years and older (see Fig. 51).   
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Figure 51:  
Parent support 
ratio (PaSR) per 
type of region 
(2005) 
 
Data source: 
ESPON 2013 
Database 
 
By 2005, the PaSR in the EU27+4 was around 9/100, i.e. nine people aged 
85+ per one hundred persons of their children’s generation (aged 50 to 64 
years). One has to realise that the care of elderly might be a full-time job 
without any compensatory time. Keeping this in mind, the reciprocal ratio of 
around eleven persons aged 55 to 64 years per every person aged 85+ 
implies that nearly 10% of the older workforce would be needed to care for 
the oldest old, if there would be no public elderly care. Because elderly care 
within families is still almost exclusively conducted by women, the labour 
force participation of women aged 55 to 64 would decrease dramatically 
within a scenario of a higher share of oldest old in need of care and no social 
safety net available.  
 
The lowest PaSR can be observed in those types of regions with the lowest 
life expectancies: i.e. Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force (avg. 6/100) and 
Type 7 – Overseas (avg. 7/100). Consequently, the highest PaSR can be 
found where the life expectancy is highest, i.e. Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing 
(avg. 12/100). The PaSR of Type 1 – Euro Standard (avg. 10/100) is slightly 
above average. Type 3 – Family Potentials and Type 6 – Young Potentials 
show ratios around the overall average. The highest regional PaSR of more 
than 15/100 – i.e. not even 7 persons aged 55 to 64 years per every person 
aged 85 years and older – can be found in the regions of Liguria/ITC3 (Italy), 
Castillia y Leon/ES41 and Aragon/ES24 (both Spain), which are all regions of 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (see Map A2.18). 
Labour Force 
The biggest demographic challenge in regard to the labour force is a slowing 
growth of the working age population (Fig. 26 and Map A2.21). The age 
group 20 to 64 years constitutes the core of the labour force, because of a 
generally increasing educational attainment – nowadays only a few people 
start working full-time before age 20 – because of an official retirement entry 
age around age 65 in most European countries.  Another age structural 
aspect in respect to the economic performance of a society is the dependency 
ratio (Fig. 52 and Map A2.19), which is the sum of the old age dependency 
ratio (see above) and the youth dependency ratio (Map A2.16 and A2.20). 
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Figure 52: 
Dependency ratio 
per type of 
region (2005) 
 
Data source: 
ESPON 2013 
Database 
 
 
Dependency Ratio 
The (total) dependency ratio is providing an overview of the ratio of the 
potentially economic active population (age 15 to 64) in relation to the not 
yet active age group (below age 15) and the not anymore economically 
active age group (65 years and older).107  The model of the so-called “Demo-
graphic Dividend” (see Chapter 2.2.3) assumes that a low dependency ratio 
has a positive effect on the per capita income growth (BLOOM, CANNING & 
SEVILLA 2002:33f). 
 
With respect to the “Demographic Dividend”, Type 2 – Challenge of Labour 
Force with an average total dependency ratio of 44/100, boasts the highest 
demographic bonus. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that 
fertility started to decline not so long ago – from 1990 on – in the former 
socialist CEE countries. However, by 2005 the last strong birth cohorts, which 
were born before 1990, were already older than 15 years, resulting in a very 
low youth dependency ratio (YDR). On the other hand, population ageing is 
not very advanced (yet) in Type 2 regions, due to the low life expectancy in 
this type of region. Apart from Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force, also Type 
6 – Young Potentials features a relatively low total dependency ratio (avg. 
45/100). 
 
Dependency ratios above EU27+4 average can be observed in Type 7 – 
Overseas (avg. 54/100), Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and in Type 1 – Euro 
Standard (both avg. 53/100). In the case of Type 4, the high dependency 
ratio is determined by a high OADR. By contrast, a high YDR (avg. 40/100) 
causes the high dependency ratio in Type 7. The dependency ratio of Type 1 
– Euro Standard is nearly equally affected by the YDR (avg. 26/100) and the 
OADR (avg. 27/100). The highest dependency ratios overall (of more than 
60/100) can be found in the regions of Liguria/ITC3, Limousin/FR63 and 
Dorset and Somerset/UKK2 (all Type 4 – Challenge of Decline regions) and in 
Guyane/FR93 (Type 7 – Overseas) – see Map A2.19. 
 
Working Age Population 
Figure 53 illustrates the proportion of the working age population in 2005, 
i.e. the population aged 20 to 64 years, and the corresponding annual 
average growth rates for the period 2001 to 2005. The also portrayed age 
groups (20 to 39 years and 50 to 64 years – see Map A2.01 and A2.22) 
represent the younger, respectively older working age population. The 
                                               
107 The simplifying assumptions, on which the concept of dependency ratios is based on, were 
already discussed in Chapter 2.1.2. 
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proportion of the younger working age population (20 to 39 years) is also 
used as an input variable of the cluster analysis (see Chapter 4.2.2). These 
two age groups are shown separately because of the relationship of age and 
productivity (GÖBEL & ZWICK 2009). In general, it is assumed that the 
younger working age population is more innovative, while the older working 
age population is benefiting from long-term experience. The question, if 
either the younger or the older working age population is more productive, is 
generally hard to measure and still in discussion (cf. ESPON 2009b:9ff). 
 
The share of the working age population is directly connected to the depend-
ency ratios.108 Practically, the principles of the model of the “Demographic 
Dividend” (see Chapter 2.2.3) can also be expressed by means of the propor-
tion of the age group 20 to 64 years (i.e. 60.65% in the EU27+4). The 
regions with the highest proportions are often urban regions, with shares of 
65% and more (see Map A2.21).  
 
Type 6 – Young Potentials and Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force feature 
the highest average shares of the age group 20 to 64 years (62.88% and 
62.72%), and also of the young working age population aged 20 to 39 years 
(avg. 32.26% and 30.43%). Type 7 – Overseas also shows a very high 
proportion of the young working age population (avg. 30.40%). Because 
Type 7 has the lowest average share of older workers aged 50 to 64 years 
(12.57%), the share of the age group 20 to 64 years in Type 7 (avg. 
57.14%) is also below the overall average. The average proportion of the 
working age population in regions of Type 3 – Family Potentials, Type 4 – 
Challenge of Ageing and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline is around the EU27+4 
average of 60%. In regard to both working age groups, Type 3 – Family 
Potentials has above average proportions of the younger working age popula-
tion and below average proportions of the older working age population. This 
is exactly the opposite in regions of Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 5 
– Challenge of Decline. Besides Type 7 – Overseas, only Type 1 – Euro 
Standard features below EU27+4 proportions of people in the working age 
(avg. 59.35%), but – contrary to Type 7 – simultaneously above average 
proportions of the older working age population. Therefore, regions of Type 1 
– Euro Standard have the lowest share of younger working age population 
(avg. 25.68%). 
 
In general, the highest proportions of the younger working age population 
(35% and more) can be found in urban regions and, apart from that, in 
regions of Type 6 – Young Potentials (see Map A2.01). By contrast, the 
regions with the highest shares of older working age population (20% and 
more) are located in Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force (including the entire 
Czech Republic), Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing, Type 5 – Challenge of 
Decline, as well as in some Type 3 – Family Potentials regions in Southern 
Norway and the UK. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
108 Please note that the here used definition of working age population (20 to 64 years) and 
(potentially) economically active population (15 to 64 years) are not equivalent. 
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Figure 53: Working age population per type of region: Share of population aged 20-64, 20-39 and 
50-64 years (2005) and annual average increase of these age groups (2001-2005).  
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
 
The overall annual average increase of the working age population (20 to 64 
years) in regions of the EU27+4 during the period 2001 to 2005 was 0.50%. 
Type 6 – Young Potentials shows the highest overall annual average in-
creases (2.66%), whereby both the younger and the older working age 
population were increasing. Type 7 – Overseas also has a strongly increasing 
working age population (avg. p.a. 1.47%), but, contrary to Type 6, only the 
older working age population is growing in Type 7, while the younger working 
age population is stagnating. The annual average growth rate of the working 
age population of Type 1 – Family Potentials (0.31%) and of Type 5 – 
Challenge of Decline (-1.25%) are both below average, whereby the working 
age population of Type 1 is still increasing, while it is already declining in 
Type 5. The younger working age population of both types of regions was 
declining on average by around one percent every year between 2001 and 
2005, while the older working age population was increasing in Type 1 (avg. 
p.a. 1.15%) and declining in Type 5 (avg. p.a. -0.11%).  
 
In all other types of regions (Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force, Type 3 – 
Family Potentials and Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing), a slight increase of the 
age group 20 to 64 years can be observed for the period 2001 to 2005. While 
the younger working age population increased on a low level in Type 2 (avg. 
p.a. 0.26%), it is even decreasing in Type 3 and Type 4 (avg. p.a. -0.51% 
and -0.15% respectively). The older working age population is increasing in 
all three types on average between one and two percent per year. For a 
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further differentiation on the scale of NUTS 2, see Maps A2.23 to A2.25, 
which are illustrating the annual average increase of the working age popula-
tion aged 20 to 64 years.  
 
Labour Force Replacement Ratio 
The Labour Force Replacement Ratio (Fig. 54 and Map A2.26) is the ratio of 
the working age population who will retire in the course of the next ten years 
and of the age group 10 to 19 years, which should replace them.109 A value 
of 100 means that the older workforce will be replaced by the endogenous 
youth aged 10 to 19 years (in 2005) by 1:1; a value below 100 means that 
the replacement level will not be reached. 
 
The highest labour force replacement potential can be awarded to Type 7 – 
Overseas, where every older worker can be potentially replaced by nearly 2.4 
younger workers. Keeping in mind that this type of region shows a negative 
migration rate, one can assume that not all those teenagers (aged 10 to 19 
years by 2005) will join the local workforce during the next ten years and 
that, at least, some of them will migrate to mainland Europe, and thus to one 
of the other six types of regions. 
 
Far below the ratio of Type 7, but still above the EU27+4 average of 110/100 
is the labour force replacement ratio of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force 
(avg. 123/100), Type 3 – Family Potentials and of Type 6 – Young Potentials 
(both avg. 117/100). Because Type 6 also features a very strong in-
migration, the actual replacement potential might be even higher. 
 
The labour force replacement ratio of Type 1 – Euro Standard (avg. 103/100) 
is relatively balanced and close to the EU27+4 average. Because of the 
positive net migration rate of Type 1, these regions can also assume to 
replace their older working age population in the years until 2015 without 
any problems. 
 
A sub-replacement ratio can be observed for Type 5 – Challenge of Decline 
(avg. 97/100) and especially for Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (avg. 81/100). 
In the case of Type 4, this very low labour force replacement ratio could be 
balanced, if the strictly positive migration rate of the period 2001 to 2005 can 
be prolonged; quite contrary to the regions of Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, 
which are featuring a clearly negative average migration rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54: 
Labour force 
replacement 
ratio per type of 
region (2005) 
 
Data source: 
ESPON 2013 
Database 
                                               
109 The labour force replacement ratio is based on a “no migration” scenario, assuming that the 
replacing age group will neither be boosted by young immigrants, or will become migrants 
themselves and hence will boost the young workforce of other regions in Europe or elsewhere. 
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4.3.5 Demography by Type of Region – A brief Summary 
This chapter aims to summarize the demographic characteristics of each type 
of region by 2005 beyond the variables used in the cluster analysis. Special 
emphasis is placed on the population development and the demographic 
challenges of low fertility, population ageing and the size of the working age 
population. 
Type 1 – Euro Standard 
The total population development in regions of Type 1 was predominately 
positive during the period 2001 and 2005 (avg. p.a. 3.5 per 1,000) and is 
closely matching the EU27+4 average. In fact, only 7 of the 79 regions of 
Type 1 have a negative population development and 39 regions can be 
labelled “double positive” when referring to both components of the popula-
tion balance: the natural population balance as well as the net migration 
balance. The other 33 regions have a negative population balance but still 
feature overall population increases due to positive migratory balances. The 
age structure of Type 1 is comparable to that of the entire EU27+4 popula-
tion, whereas the baby boom bulge of the age group 35 to 55 years is 
strongly pronounced because of weaker cohorts in the younger ages. 
 
In 2005, regions of Type 1 – Euro Standard had an average TFR of 1.64, 
which is above the EU27+4 average (1.53), while also the life expectancy at 
birth (79.1 years) is one year above the overall average. Furthermore, a 
predominately positive net migration rate contributes to the overall positive 
population development in this type of region. 
 
Speaking of demographic challenges, low fertility seems not to be the major 
problem in regions of Type 1. However, the process of population ageing – 
measured by the share of the old (65+) and oldest old (80+) – is well 
advanced compared to the EU27+4 average. This results in a below average 
share of working age population, especially when considering that the 
younger working age population (20 to 39 years) even decreased during the 
period 2001 to 2005. 
Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force 
Type 2 is rather ambivalent when it comes to the components of population 
development and is stagnating with respect to population growth (avg. p.a.  
-0.71 per 1,000). However, the majority of regions of this type show a 
negative population development, whereas a third of all Type 2 regions are 
“double negative” referring to the natural population balance and the migra-
tory balance. The age structure clearly differs from that of the EU27+4 
population, because of the lower proportion of the younger (below 10 years) 
and older population (55 years and older). The age group between 15 and 29 
years is above average, while people between 35 and 44 years show propor-
tions below the overall average. 
 
The average total fertility rate (1.29) of Type 2 regions was the lowest of all 
types of regions in 2005, as is the life expectancy of 75.1 years. The annual 
average net migration rate (0.08 per 1,000) is rather balanced and hence 
below the EU27+4 average. 
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The low levels of fertility, if prevailing, will be a major challenge for this type 
of region. The last strong birth cohorts entered the labour market between 
2005 and 2010. This contributes to an above LFS space average share of 
younger adults aged 20 to 29 years, while the proportion of the entire 
working age population is just around average. Further sufficient labour 
supply might not be provided without increasing immigration. At the mo-
ment, the relatively low life expectancy is mitigating population ageing. 
However, with no further in-migration and an ongoing lowest-low fertility, the 
demographic table might turn to the worse for this type of region. 
Type 3 – Family Potentials 
All but two regions of Type 3 feature a population increase and 40 out of 55 
regions can be declared as “double positive” with respect to both components 
of the population development. This results in a strong annual average 
population increase of 5.84 (per 1,000). Type 3 features an age structure, 
which matches the overall average in the prime age of the labour force (20 to 
59 years). Younger and older age groups reveal a favourable weighting. 
 
As the title “Family Potentials” implies, the average TFR of 1.75 does not 
pose a serious challenge for this type of region. The average life expectancy 
of 79.3 years is also relatively high and thus above the EU27+4 average. 
Because of the considerable high birth rates and a moderate in-migration, 
the share of the elderly is below the overall average, despite the relative high 
live expectancy at birth in this type of region. The share of the working age 
population is around average, and was still increasing between 2001 and 
2005. 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing 
Similar to Type 3, all Type 4 regions but one experience population increases, 
although 24 of the 33 regions feature a negative natural population develop-
ment. Hence the population increase is driven by a strictly positive net 
migration rate, on average 9.42 per 1,000. As the title of this type indicates, 
the share of the younger population below age 30 is clearly underrepre-
sented, while the proportion of the older age groups (55 years and older) is 
significantly higher in comparison to the EU27+4 age structure. 
 
The average TFR of Type 4 regions amounts to 1.41 and is below the overall 
average. However, the average life expectancy of 80.2 years is the highest of 
all types of regions. As a result, the share of elderly in Type 4, be it the old 
or oldest old, is by far the highest. Albeit the low birth rates and the high 
share of elderly people, the proportion of the working age population is just 
slightly below the EU27+4 average and was even increasing between 2001 
and 2005. This proves that migration can mitigate low fertility and population 
ageing to some extent, especially when tackling the challenge of maintaining 
the size of the labour force.  
Type 5 – Challenge of Decline 
Out of the 38 regions of this type, only two regions withstand a decline of 
population size because of their positive migratory balance. In fact, 17 
regions are in line with the “double negative” type of population develop-
ment. Taking the low TFR (1.36) and the strictly negative net migration 
balance (avg. p.a. -4.59 per 1,000) into account, the age groups 15 years 
and younger and 25 to 34 years are clearly underrepresented in the age 
structure of Type 5. Only the proportion of the older age groups above age 
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55 is significantly higher compared to the EU27+4. Because of this rather 
unfavourable age structure, the share of the elder population is clearly above 
the overall average, although the average life expectancy at birth (77.3 
years) is relatively low. 
 
Such a demographic setting also affects the working age population. At a 
glance, the proportion of people aged 20 to 64 years is just slightly below the 
EU27+4 average. However, the share of younger adults aged 20 to 39 years 
is clearly below that average, will the share of older workers aged 55 to 64 
years is above the overall average. The share of the working age population, 
especially of the younger workforce, already declined during the period 2001 
to 2005. 
Type 6 – Young Potentials 
Type 6 regions are nearly entirely absorbed by the “double positive” category 
of population development. Only one region had a slightly negative natural 
population balance between 2001 and 2005, but was still showing a popula-
tion increase due to a positive migratory balance. As the title of this type of 
region suggests, Type 6 – Young Potentials shows considerable high shares in 
the younger ages, especially in the age groups 20 to 44 years and below 5 
years. 
 
The average TFR of Type 6 regions (1.50) is very close to the EU27+4 
average, while the life expectancy (79.8 years) is above average. The strictly 
positive population development is driven by strong annual average net 
migration gains (17.1 per 1,000 between 2001 and 2005). These consider-
able in-flows are also reflected by the young age structure and contribute to 
the relatively low proportions of elderly people in this type of region. The 
share of the working age population is not only above the EU27+4 average, it 
is also the youngest and features the strongest increases of all types of 
regions. 
Type 7 – Overseas 
The demographic characteristics of Type 7 are strongly contrasted from those 
of the six main types. The positive population development in all five regions 
of this type is driven by a strong natural population increase, while the 
average net migration balance was negative between 2001 and 2005. 
Because of a TFR of around 2.5 and a life expectancy of just 75.1 years, the 
age structure of Type 7 could be indeed depicted in the form of a pyramid, 
where each age group is stronger than the subsequent age group of higher 
age. 
 
The proportion of elderly people is by far the lowest of all types of regions. 
The same can be said about the share of working age population. However, 
the share of the younger working age population aged 20 to 39 years is the 
second highest next to Type 2.  
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5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
In order to achieve the principle aim of this thesis, i.e. the development of a 
typology of European regions based on demographic variables and the 
linkage of the resulting typology to socio-economic variables (cf. Chapter 
1.2), this chapter describes the process and results of connecting the Euro-
pean Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) to the demographic typology. 
 
5.1 Linking the Demographic Typology with Socio-economic 
Variables 
First, the state of research with respect to the relationship of demography 
and economy will be pointed out in brief, before sketching out the EU-LFS 
and the necessary steps in order to link the EU-LFS data set to the demo-
graphic typology. 
 
5.1.1 The Relationship of Demography & Economy 
In a report on the interrelationship of demography and economy, published 
in an annex to the DEMIFER report, RAUHUT (2009:58ff) argues that the 
causality – both in terms of direction and magnitude – between demographic 
changes and economic performance is, at least, unclear:  
 
“(…) we appear to be stuck in the hen-and-the-egg dilemma  
as science has not been able so far to show which came first.”  
Daniel RAUHUT (2009:58) 
 
The main arguments behind that conclusion are based on a number of 
theoretical and methodological aspects. Basically, the relationship between 
demography and economic performance is systemic rather than linear 
(RAUHUT 2009:44ff). Nevertheless, most analyses – often based on the 
neoclassical economic theory (cf. Chapter 2.2.4) – concentrate on the direct 
economic effects of demographic change, without taking the manifold indirect 
effects (e.g. political, institutional, social and psychological aspects) into 
account (ibid.; p. 58). Furthermore, the question of scale cannot be ignored. 
Although most analyses focus on the national level, the regional and local 
level might reveal a better picture of the underlying processes. In fact, 
demographic and economic developments at the regional level are often 
contradictory to the national level, while corresponding policies are generally 
made and implemented at the national level (ibid.; p. 45f). 
 
5.1.2 Towards a Combined Socio-economic & Demographic Typology? 
The examination of the effects of demographic developments and migration 
flows in various types of regions with respect to socio-economic characteris-
tics is an explicit requirement of the DEMIFER project (cf. ESPON 2008b:6). 
Avoiding to build theoretical models to achieve a consistent view of the 
mechanisms actually in place, the coming analysis (starting with Chapter 5.2) 
will go the “agnostic way” – as CROIX, LINDH & MALMBERG (2006:1) call it, 
analysing solely the empirical relationship between demographic and socio-
economic variables at the regional level of NUTS 2.  
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Based on the final cluster solution, i.e. the typology of the demographic 
status in 2005 (see Chapter 4.2), there are two ways to construct a com-
bined demographic and socio-economic typology: 
 
• Extension of the demographic data set with socio-economic variables 
to construct an extended typology with the method of cluster analysis.  
• Linkage of the demographic typology with the European Labour Force 
Survey. In this case the EU-LFS indicators will not be included in the 
typology, but will instead be used as dependent variables for a further 
illustration of the classification result achieved by the cluster analysis. 
 
Due to the mutual relationship between demography and economy (cf. 
Chapter 5.1.1), adding economic variables to the demographic data set of 
the typology (“extension”) would complicate the interpretation of the classifi-
cation. Therefore, the typology will be kept strictly demographic and the EU-
LFS 2007 data set will be linked in order to describe the economic perform-
ance of the types of regions resulting from the demographic typology.  
 
5.1.3 The European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) 
The EU-LFS is a quarterly household sample survey, conducted in the 27 
Member States of the EU, as well as in the Candidate Countries and in 
(some) EFTA countries (EC 2009b:ii). This survey provides results on labour 
participation of people aged 15+ as well as of persons outside the labour 
force. Since 1983, the Labour Force Survey is conducted by National Statisti-
cal Institutes (NSI) across Europe and is centrally processed by Eurostat.110 
 
“By its very nature it is a particularly rich data base relating to vari-
ous conditions and opportunities in the working life of individuals (…) 
and on other aspects of the social structures of European societies.” 
Walter MÜLLER & Markus GANGL (2000:1) 
 
Compared to other databases the LFS offers several advantages, especially 
when used for comparative studies: e.g. rather large samples of respondents 
that allow stable estimates even for selected social groups (cf. MÜLLER & 
GANGL 2000:1f). In general, the information is based on detailed classifica-
tion schemas, such as NACE for economic activity, ISCO for occupation, 
ISCED for education and NUTS for regional data.111 
 
5.1.4 Linking the Labour Force Survey to the Demographic Typology 
Having said that the EU-LFS relies on detailed information schemes, in fact 
the data set is not as consistent as it would be desirable. Because of its 
sample structure – especially the spatial aggregation (see below) – the EU-
LFS indicators could not be used as input variables for the cluster analysis. 
Nevertheless, the cluster solution (i.e. types of regions) can be described 
even more accurately by using the EU-LFS.  
                                               
110 For more information on the EU-LFS, please visit the Eurostat website at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/lfs (retrieved 25.03.2010). 
111 A full list (and explanation) of all EU-LFS indicators can be obtained from the EU Labour Force 
Survey Database User Guide (EC 2009c). 
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Spatial Adaption of the Demographic Typology 
Two major spatial restrictions regarding the EU-LFS data set prevented the 
use of EU-LFS indicators as input variables for the cluster analysis of Euro-
pean (NUTS 2) regions. First, the EU-LFS data set does not cover the entire 
EU27+4 (or ESPON space); the following ESPON countries and regions are 
missing: 
 
• Malta, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, as well as 
• the French Overseas Departments and Territories of Martinique, Gua-
deloupe, Guyane and Réunion 
 
Second, the spatial structure of the EU-LFS data set, although aiming to stick 
to NUTS 2 level, shows a few exceptions with respect to the consistency of 
the spatial aggregation. In the case of some countries, the edited data is not 
following the principle of NUTS 2 aggregation, i.e.: 
 
• NUTS 1 level … Austria, Germany and the UK 
• NUTS 0 level … the Netherlands 
 
In order to analyse the EU-LFS data set linked to the demographic typology, 
the actual EU-LFS spatial aggregation had to be taken into account. Another 
cluster analysis was carried out, based on the same input variables and 
methodology as applied for the original demographic typology (see Chapter 
4.1.3). The result of the adapted cluster solution proved to be stable in 
regard to the original typology (for details see Annex 6 – “Adapting the 
Typology to the EU-LFS 2007 Data Set”). 
 
The main changes of the adapted typology with respect to the original 
typology can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Reduced number of regions – due to missing countries and different 
NUTS levels (see above). Around 2% of the EU27+4 (or ESPON space) 
population and 14 regions are not covered by the EU-LFS 2007 data 
set (i.e. “Type 0”). 
• Different population size (and number of regions) per type of region – 
especially Type 5 – Challenge of Decline diminished due to the aggre-
gation to the NUTS 1 level. In the case of Germany, only two West 
German NUTS 1 regions remained in Type 5, contrary to the classifica-
tion at NUTS 2 level – resulting in the conventional German East-West-
divide. 
• Variable ranges and average values per type of region changed slightly 
– due to the differences in the spatial aggregation. 
• Type 7 – Overseas became irrelevant for the EU-LFS analysis – due to 
the exclusion of the French Overseas Departments and Territories (see 
above), only two regions remain in this type in the LFS adapted version 
of the demographic typology. These two regions, Ceuta and Melilla, 
constitute just about 0.03% of the entire EU27+4 (or ESPON space) 
population.  
 
In the EU-LFS adapted typology (see Map 10 below), the EU27+4 (or ESPON 
space) consists of 222 regions at different NUTS levels, instead of 286 
regions in the final classification at the scale of NUTS 2 (cf. Map 8). Out of 
these 222 regions, the EU-LFS 2007 is covering 208 regions (i.e. the “LFS 
space”). The remaining 14 regions (i.e. Malta, Iceland, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein, as well as the French Overseas Departments and Territories) 
were not analysed and are listed as “Type 0” (see Map 10 below). 
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Map 10: Typology of the demographic status in 2005, LFS Adaption 
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5.2 Socio-economic Indictors 
Based on the most recent EU-LFS 2007 data set, the economic performance 
of the demographically distinguished types of regions (Chapter 5.2.1) will be 
discussed by means of socio-economic characteristics, with a special empha-
sis on the foreign population (5.2.2), educational composition (5.2.3), as well 
as labour status (5.2.4) and economic activity (5.2.5) by age, sex and origin. 
Additional figures, maps and tables of the therefore used indicators (by type 
of region) can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
As just mentioned in Chapter 5.1.4, the LFS data set is – contrary to the 
demographic typology – not strictly aligned to the NUTS 2 level and thus 
does not cover all EU27+4 (or ESPON space) regions. For that reason this 
analysis is restricted to the so-called “LFS space”, i.e. the EU27+4 without 
Malta, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and the French Overseas Depart-
ments and Territories of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane and Réunion. 
Furthermore, the EU-LFS indicators mentioned in the following are based on 
the year 2007, only the GDP figures (Chapter 5.2.1) were taken from the 
ESPON 2013 Database and thus relate to 2005, matching the base year of 
the demographic typology. 
 
5.2.1 Economic Performance (GDP) 
The gross domestic product (GDP) is a general accepted measure for eco-
nomic performance – which should not be equated with “wealth” in any 
way.112 When comparing differences by GDP, it makes sense to take (also) 
the purchasing power parity (PPP) into account and to apply a per capita 
approach. It is worth noting that the here used GDP figures are based on 
data of the year (2001 to) 2005. Consequently, this analysis does not reflect 
any effects of the recent global economic downturn. 
 
In terms of GDP level by 2005 and the annual average GDP growth between 
2001 and 2005, Figure 55 illustrates the range (bar) and the average (short 
blue line) of every type of region (Type 1-6) in regard to the overall average 
of all LFS space regions (horizontal line across the chart area).  
 
In general, the comparison of GDP/Euro and GDP/PPP, both by level and 
growth, does not reveal significant differences for any type of region, neither 
in regard to each other, nor with respect to the overall average. However, 
differences between GDP/Euro and GDP/PPP can be found in the range of 
each type of region – see also Map A4.01 to A4.04. 
                                               
112 According to the definition of Eurostat/OECD (EC 2006:254), GDP can be estimated using three 
alternative approaches, which in theory yield the same result, namely: (a) the production approach 
– which sums all the value added generated by the country’s resident institutional sectors during 
the accounting period; (b) the expenditure approach – which sums all the final expenditures 
incurred by the country’s resident institutional sectors during the accounting period; and (c) the 
income approach – which sums all the factor incomes paid by the country’s resident institutional 
sectors engaged in domestic production during the accounting period.  
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Figure 55: GDP (2005) as an average of EU27 and GDP growth (avg. p.a. 2001-2005)  
in Euro/inh. and PPP/inh. per type of region 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
 
GDP Level by 2005 
Distinctive Western and Northern European types of regions, i.e. Type 1 – 
Euro Standard and Type 3 – Family Potentials, show the highest GDP in Euro 
and also per capita, clearly above the average of the LFS space as well as the 
EU27 average, which is marked by the 100-line. These types of regions cover 
most of the countries that followed a market-orientated economy at least 
since the mid 20th century (UK, France, the Benelux countries, West Ger-
many, Austria and the Scandinavian countries). 
 
The so-called “new growth regions”, because of their pronounced population 
growth between 2001 and 2005, of Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 6 
– Young Potentials, also show above LFS space average GDP values close to 
the EU27 average. Both types of regions – to be found on the Iberian Penin-
sula, in Southern France, Northern Italy, Ireland and Cyprus – also feature 
the smallest ranges and are thus relatively homogeneous in terms of GDP 
level in 2005. 
 
Only the distinctive Eastern European types, Type 2 – Challenge of Labour 
Force and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, show below LFS average values, 
reaching a GDP-PPP per capita of 67% (Type 2) and 73.5% (Type 5) of the 
EU27 average. 
 
The broad range of the regional GDP per capita (2005), especially in Type 2 – 
Challenge of Labour Force and Type 3 – Family Potentials, is due to the 
inclusion of regions with economically high performing urban centres. In the 
case of Type 2, these are first and foremost Hamburg (DE6) and the Danish 
capital region of Hovedstaden (DK01) including Copenhagen. In Type 3, the 
regions with remarkable high GDP figures (i.e. above 200% of the EU27 
average) are Luxembourg (LU00), the Brussels region (BE10), London (UKI) 
and Stockholm (SE11). 
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GDP Growth 2001-2005 
Looking at the average annual GDP growth between 2001 and 2005, the 
economically better performing (“richer”) types of regions have the weakest 
GDP growth, i.e. Type 1, Type 3 and also Type 4 – all below the overall 
average (indicated by the horizontal line across the chart area of Fig. 55). In 
the case of Type 3, the negative GDP growth between 2001 and 2005 in 
some northern Italian regions (e.g. Abruzzo/ITF1, Emilia-Romagna/ITD5, 
Provincia Autonoma Trento/ITD2, Umbria/ITE2, Lombardia/ITC4 and 
Piemonte/ITC1 – see Map A4.04) contributes to the weak overall GDP growth 
of this type of region. The GDP growth per capita of Type 6 – Young Poten-
tials roughly matches the overall average of the LFS space (i.e. 5% GDP/Euro 
p.a., respectively 4% GDP/PPP p.a.).  
 
Generally speaking, the highest GDP growth can be found in those types of 
regions with the weakest GDP values: i.e. Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force 
and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline).113 However, the average values per type 
of region do not reflect the heterogeneity (i.e. the broad range) of regional 
GDP growth (2001-2005) within the different types of regions, especially 
within Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force. Some “double weak GDP” regions 
– i.e. regions with a low GDP per capita level (2005) on the one hand and 
weak GDP per capita growth rates (2001-2005) on the other hand – can be 
found e.g. in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary (Type 2) and also in Bulgaria 
(Type 5) – cf. Map A4.01 – A4.04. 
 
5.2.2 Foreign Population 
The demographic typology comprises only a single migratory indicator: the 
net migration rate (cf. Chapter 4.2.2). The EU-LFS data set sheds more light 
on the foreign population (by 2007) of each particular type of region. In this 
respect, this chapter aims to deliver an extended description of the migrant 
stock by type of region.  
 
The EU-LFS offers two indicators with respect to the migratory background: 
“country of birth” and “citizenship (nationality)”. These additional (stock) 
indicators can be further distinguished by the “years of residence in this 
Member State”.114  Unfortunately, an analysis of the indicator “country of 
birth” is not possible, because this particular indicator is missing for Germany 
and Ireland. In the case of Ireland, the indicator “years of residence in this 
Member State” is also not available. 
 
For this reasons, the analysis of the foreign population is limited to the 
citizenship indicator, distinguishing between three groups: 
 
• National … non migrants (citizenship of the Member State) 
• EU27 … migrants with a citizenship from another EU27 country and 
• Non-EU … so-called third-country migrants with a citizenship from a 
Non-EU country. 
 
 
                                               
113 A correlation calculation of GDP/Euro 2005 and GDP/Euro growth 2001-2005 (by NUTS regions) 
revealed a coefficient of -0.545 (and -0.375 for GDP/PPP). This means: The higher the GDP level, 
the lower the GDP growth. 
114 The terms “citizenship” and “nationality” are used synonymously in this thesis. 
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Table 10: Population by citizenship and type of region (2007) 
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
Population by Citizenship 
Certainly, the nationality is by far,+ not the perfect indicator. It would be 
preferable to have the country of birth available, in fact in relation to the 
nationality and the years of residence (in this Member State). However, the 
citizenship (nationality) is a commonly used and understood indicator, which 
can be applied without further explanation when illustrating the migrant 
stock per type of region.115 A first overview of the population by sex and 
origin (citizenship) can be obtained from Table 10 and Map A4.05 – A4.07.  
 
Across the LFS space, the foreign population (measured by citizenship) 
amounts to around 25 million people or 5% of the total population. Differen-
tiated by origin (EU27 and Non-EU), it is striking that the stock of Non-EU 
migrants (3.31%) is almost twice as high as the stock of EU27 migrants 
(1.75%).116 The overall sex ratio is generally well balanced, although female 
migrants are slightly outnumbering male migrants. 
 
The largest migrant stocks in absolute numbers (see Tab. 10) can be found in 
Type 1 – Euro Standard (around 9 million) and Type 3 – Family Potentials 
(around 6 million). Further significant migrant stocks can be observed in the 
regions of Type 6 – Young Potentials and Type 4 – Challenge of Decline. By 
2007, around 7.5 million foreigners, i.e. roughly 30% of all migrants in the 
LFS space, were living in the “new growth regions” of Type 4 and Type 6, 
although the combined population of these two types of regions amounts to 
just about 20% of the total LFS space population. The two distinctive Eastern 
European types of regions, i.e. Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force and Type 
5 – Challenge of Decline, constitute around 30% of the overall LFS space 
population, but account only for less than 10% of its foreign population. 
 
By far the largest shares of foreign population by 2007 (see Tab 10 and also 
Map A4.05) can be found in the regions of Type 6 – Young Potentials (avg. 
10.8%), especially in the Spanish regions of Valencia/ES52 and Andalucia/ 
ES61 as well as on the Baleares/ES53 (15% and more). Closest to that by 
some distance are the regions of Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (avg. 6.9%). 
Both, Type 1 – Euro Standard and Type 3 – Family Potentials, have an 
                                               
115 If not other mentioned, the terms “migrants” or “foreign population” refers to the nationality 
(citizenship) only. 
116 In the context of the indicator “nationality” it is worth noting that EU (or EFTA) citizens living in 
another EU country might have only minor intentions to gain the citizenship of the country they are 
living in – in sharp contrast to Non-EU migrants (cf. Chapter 3.2.5). 
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average share of 5.7% of foreign citizens, with outstanding high shares of 
20% and more in the urban regions of London/UKI, Brussels/BE10 and 
Luxembourg/LU00 (all Type 3). Only Type 5 – Challenge of Decline (avg. 
2.2%) and Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force (avg. 1.4%) feature foreign 
population stocks below the LFS space average (of 5.1%), whereby some 
distinctive urban regions (Berlin/DE30, Hamburg/DE60, Copenhagen/DK01, 
Athens/GR30 – all Type 2) have considerable higher shares of migrants of 
close to 10%. In terms of the other regions of Type 5, Estonia has a consid-
erable high share of foreign population (roughly 16%), which is related to the 
high amount of Russian citizens in the Baltic countries in general (cf. Chapter 
2.2.6 and 3.3.5). 
Ratio of EU27 to Non-EU Migrants 
When analysing the foreign population stocks in LFS space regions by origin 
(EU27 vs. Non-EU citizens), it is striking that nearly twice as many migrants 
have a Non-EU citizenship (16.2 million) compared to those with a citizenship 
from another EU27 country (8.6 million). Indeed, not only the total number 
and the proportion of the foreign population is differing by type of region, 
also the origin of the respective migrant population varies strongly (see Tab. 
11 and also Map A4.06 and A4.07). This particular differentiation between 
EU27 and Non-EU citizens is far more than a subtle distinction, because any 
EU27 citizen can move and stay within the EU (and EEA) without those 
restrictions applied to Non-EU citizens – e.g. freedom of establishment or 
labour laws. Furthermore, the host society applies different standards to EU 
citizens – especially from EU15 countries – and Non-EU-citizens when it 
comes to the topic of integration.  
 
Taking only the foreign population by nationality into account, the highest 
ratios of three to four Non-EU citizens per every EU27 citizen can be ob-
served in those types of regions with the smallest foreign population stocks, 
i.e. Type 5 – Challenge of Decline and Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force. 
Other types of regions with above LFS space average ratios of 2.8 and 2.2 
(Non-EU citizens per every EU27 citizen) are Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing 
and Type 6 – Young Potentials. Those types of regions, which feature the 
highest migrant stocks by absolute numbers, i.e. Type 1 – Euro Standard and 
Type 3 – Family Potentials, show the smallest ratios of 1.6 and 1.5 when 
differentiating between Non-EU and EU27 citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Foreign population stock by nationality per type of region (2007)  
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
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Foreign Population by Age 
The age of immigrants is of special interest when analysing the role of 
migration with respect to the quantitative demands of the labour market. 
Figure 56 shows the size of the foreign population by age, which is further 
distinguished between EU27 and Non-EU citizens in Figure 56.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56:  
Share of foreign 
population by 
citizenship and 
age per type of 
region (2007) 
 
Data source:  
EU-LFS 2007 
(EUROSTAT 
2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57:  
Share of foreign  
population by  
                                                                                                                citizenship, origin  
and age per type 
                   of region (2007) 
 
 Data source:  
 EU-LFS 2007 
 (EUROSTAT 
2008) 
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Across all types of regions, the peak age of the foreign population is between 
20 to 39 years (see Fig. 56). In regions of Type 6 – Young Potentials, with its 
extraordinary high share of migrants, more than 20% of the population aged 
25 to 34 years holds a foreign citizenship. With respect to all regions of the 
LFS space, this proportion is close to 10%. In general, the foreign population 
is clearly clustered around working age in all types of regions, apart from 
Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, where 
the foreign population stock is nearly non-existing or very low. 
 
The age distribution of the foreign population from other EU27 countries is 
more balanced compared to Non-EU citizens (cf. Fig. 57). In regions of Type 
6 – Young Potentials (with the highest migrants stocks relative to the total 
population) and of Type 3 – Family Potentials, the share of EU27 migrants in 
the older age groups (above age 60) is remarkable high, even though there 
are only minor differences by age in Type 3. A high share of elder foreigners 
either indicates that those regions are traditional migrant destinations with 
ongoing migration flows and a hence culminated foreign population stock, or 
that these regions are attractive for retirement migration. When looking at 
the geographical distribution of Type 6 – Young Potentials, the latter could be 
true, at least to some extent. Spanish Type 6 regions like the Baleares/ES53 
and Canaries/ES70 are both very popular domiciles of German retirees, while 
wealthy British pensioners favour the south coast of the Spanish mainland 
(cf. KRÖHNERT et al. 2008:76). However, retirement migration is only very 
rarely, if ever, the main aspect of a high proportion of foreign population. 
Older migrants are usually rather wealthy and demand a certain degree of 
services, which are in turn often supplied by even more and younger migrant 
labourers. 
 
Looking at the numerically superior group of migrants with Non-EU citizen-
ships (Fig. 57/bottom), the age-specific migrant stocks of Type 1 – Euro 
Standard, Type 3 – Family Potentials and Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing are 
relatively similar and very close to the LFS space average. Type 4 – Chal-
lenge of Ageing features an extraordinary high share of very young migrants 
(below age 20). This could be an indication that Non-EU citizens, contrary to 
EU27 citizens, are bringing their children with them to a large extent when 
migrating to this type of region. The foreign population stock is nearly non-
existing or very low in regions of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force and 
Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, but the age distribution of these few migrants 
is quite comparable. 
Length of Stay 
The validity of the indicator “length of stay”, which refers to the years of 
residence in the Member State (MS) – and thus not necessarily to the same 
NUTS region – is restricted due to the missing data for Ireland. However, at 
this point the indicator “length of stay” is used to differentiate between 
traditional and relatively new migrant destinations with respect to the 
different types of regions. Table 12 features the population of every type of 
region by years of residency, distinguishing between “natives” (born in the 
MS), recently settled migrants (1 to 5 years), longer-settled migrants (5 to 
10 years) and long-term migrants (10 years and more). 
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Table 12: 
Population by 
length of stay 
per type of 
region (2007)  
 
Data source:  
EU-LFS 2007 
(EUROSTAT 
2008) 
 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and especially Type 6 – Young Potentials, 
indeed seem to be “new growth regions”, as the length of stay of the major-
ity of the migrant stock is less than 10 years. Contrary to that, Type 1 – Euro 
Standard and Type 3 – Family Potentials, can be seen as traditional migrant 
destinations, simply because the majority of the migrant population settles in 
these types of regions since more than a decade. Logically, those types of 
regions with no significant foreign population stocks – i.e. Type 2 – Challenge 
of Labour Force and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline – also did not experience 
any significant in-migration recently. In these types of regions, the vast 
majority of the anyhow minor stock of migrants is attributable to in-
migrations, which took place more than 10 years ago (i.e. before 1997).  
 
5.2.3 Educational Level 
After illustrating the economic performance (by GDP level and growth) and 
the quantities of particular migrant populations (by 2007) for each of the 
demographically distinguished types of regions, this chapter examines the 
population characteristics in respect to education (by age, sex and origin) of 
each type of region.117 
Education 
In regard to the human capital – which is according to LUTZ & SCHERBOV 
(2005:18) defined by the health (often measured by life expectancy) and the 
educational level of a population – the highest level of formal education (age 
15+) will be discussed by aggregating the ISCED classification into four 
groups:118 
 
• No formal education – ISCED 0 
• Basic education (compulsory education) – ISCED 1 and 2 
• Secondary education – ISCED 3 and 4 
• Tertiary education – ISCED 5 and 6 
 
 
 
                                               
117 Type 7 – Overseas, consisting of only two NUTS 2 regions (Ceuta and Melilla) will not be 
explicitely discussed. 
118 For more information on the ISCED classification, see: 
www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm (retrieved 09.11.2009) 
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Figure 58: Population by highest level of education per type of region (2007)  
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
 
In terms of the educational composition only the population 15+ is taken into 
account. A breakdown by highest educational level below age 15 would make 
no sense, as younger age groups did not even finish compulsory education 
(i.e. basic education). Moreover, at age 15 most people can still expect a 
transition to a higher educational level. When determining solely the share of 
tertiary educated people, the age group 25+ is commonly applied because of 
the associated longer educational attainment. For practical reasons, the age 
group 15+ will be used for the coming analysis. 
 
Taking the overall LFS space population aged 15 years and older into ac-
count, less than two percent have no formal education, around one third 
(35%) have only basic or compulsory education, nearly half of the population 
enjoyed a upper secondary education and around 19% gained a tertiary 
education (see Fig. 58). The highest shares of tertiary educated people (15+) 
can be found in Type 6 – Young Potentials, Type 3 – Family Potentials and 
Type 1 – euro Standard (all above 20%). By contrast, the lowest shares 
(below 15%) must be attributed to Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force and 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing.  
 
Focussing on the other end of the educational scale, the highest shares of 
lower educated people (i.e. no formal education and basic education com-
bined) can be observed in Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 6 – Young 
Potentials with more than 50%. In the case of Type 6, this results in a very 
low share of secondary educated persons and in a rather imbalanced educa-
tional composition with a high proportion of both higher (tertiary) and lower 
educated people. By contrast, the proportion of secondary educated people is 
highest with more than 50% in the distinctive Eastern European types of 
regions – i.e. Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force and Type 5 – Challenge of 
Decline. The proportion of people without any formal education is indeed 
infinitesimal small in all types of regions (below 2.5%), besides Type 4 – 
Challenge of Ageing with more than four percent. 
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Figure 59:  
Share of tertiary 
educated 
population by 
age per type of 
region (2007)  
 
Data source:  
EU-LFS 2007 
(EUROSTAT 
2008) 
 
 
 
 
The gender perspective shows a clear female overrepresentation in the lower 
educational levels (no formal and basic education), while men are overrepre-
sented at the higher educational levels (secondary and tertiary education). 
However, the future of higher education will be female. The gender gap is 
shifting to female advantage at younger ages, resulting in a higher female 
proportion of tertiary educated people below 40 years. 
 
When differentiating the educational level by age and type of region, the 
share of the population (15+) with tertiary education might be the most 
meaningful indicator (see Fig. 59 and Map A4.08). In general, the proportion 
of persons with tertiary education is decreasing by age, signifying the in-
creasing importance of higher education. Only in regions of Type 5 – Chal-
lenge of Decline, there is no increase in the proportion of tertiary educated 
people in the younger ages below 40 years, while this type of region achieves 
the highest proportions of tertiary education among the elder population 
aged 55 and older. Taking the considerable negative migration balance of 
Type 5 regions into account, one could assume that the younger and better-
educated people might have emigrated first. 
 
However, the figures indicate that tertiary educational attainment is changing 
to the better in all other types of regions, especially in Type 3 – Family 
Potentials and Type 6 – Young Potentials. These two types of regions show 
the highest proportions of younger people below age 35 with a tertiary 
education (of more than 40%). Also in regions of Type 2 – Challenge of 
Labour Force and Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing, significant progress is being 
made when comparing the tertiary educational attainment of the younger 
between 25 and 30 years (above 25%) and the older population, let’s say 
above age 50 with less than 15%. 
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Table 13: Highest formal education by nationality per type of region (2007) 
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
 
Considering the migratory background of the entire LFS space population by 
nationality – distinguishing between nationals, EU27 citizens and migrants 
from Non-EU countries – the educational composition of the national popula-
tion and the foreign population from other EU27 countries is very similar (see 
Tab. 13). Compared to these two groups, migrants from Non-EU countries 
are clearly less educated. Nearly 50% of the Non-EU foreign population aged 
15 years and older only has a lower education (i.e. no formal or basic educa-
tion). Generally speaking, migrants from another EU27 country are higher 
educated than Non-EU migrants. When considering only the tertiary educa-
tion of people older than 15 years, this proportion of highly educated people 
is even considerably higher among EU27 citizens (23.5%) when compared to 
the national population (18.8%). Looking at the different types of regions, by 
far the highest shares of highly educated migrants from other EU27 countries 
(31%) can be observed in Type 6 – Young Potentials. Besides that, the 
educational level of EU27 citizens succeed the national population also in all 
other types of regions, except for Type 1 – Euro Standard.  
 
Nevertheless, the foreign population from Non-EU countries is clearly over-
represented compared to EU27 citizens, but clearly underrepresented when it 
comes to higher education. This educational gap clearly becomes apparent, 
when looking at the share with no formal education at all (4.2%). The 
proportion of migrants from Non-EU countries with no formal education is 
highest in Type 3 – Family Potentials and Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (both 
more than 8%). In fact, when looking at these educational figures and 
considering the labour market bifurcation in accordance to the theory of 
“Dual Labour Market” (see Chapter 2.2.6), one might feel compelled to 
ascribe nationals and EU27 citizens strictly to the primary sector (providing 
high wages and steady jobs for the better educated), while migrants from 
outside the EU27 must be attributed to the secondary sector (offering only 
low wages, as well as little stability and opportunities for advancement). An 
analysis of the labour status and economic activity in the coming chapters 
will show if migrants from Non-EU countries really occupy especially the low 
segments of production and services. 
 
5.2.4 Labour Status 
The labour status (by ILO definition) will be approached by the unemploy-
ment rate and the labour force participation rate, focussing not only on the 
total working age population (15 to 64 years), but also looking at the 
younger (15 to 24 years) and older labour force (55 to 64 years), with a 
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special emphasis on the migrant labour force.119  Beyond that, the “Real” 
Dependency Ratio will be examined, which depicts the ratio of the actually 
economical active population (i.e. all employed persons aged 15 to 74 years) 
in respect to the economical inactive population (i.e. all others). 
Unemployment Rate (2007) 
By 2007, the LFS space unemployment rate (15 to 64 years) amounted to 
7.2% (see Fig. 60/left), which closely corresponds with the unemployment 
rate of the EU27 (7.1%) published by Eurostat. Compared to the overall 
figures (15 to 64 years), the youth unemployment (15.3% in the age 15 to 
24 years) is more than twice as high. By contrast, the unemployment rate of 
older workers (5.5%) is considerably lower, even in regard to the overall 
unemployment rate. The female unemployment rate is higher in all age 
groups when compared to men. Differentiating by nationality (see Fig. 
60/right), the unemployment rate of the national population is the lowest 
(6.9%), whereby the unemployment rate of EU27 migrants (7.6%) is just 
slightly higher. Compared to these two groups, the unemployment rate of 
Non-EU citizens (13.6%) is nearly twice as high.  
 
Type 5 – Challenge of Decline had by far the highest unemployment rate by 
2007 (11.1%). In all other types of regions, the unemployment rate was 
ranging between 5.4% (Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing) and 8.3% (Challenge 
of Ageing). When differentiating by age (see Tab. A5.03), Type 2 – Challenge 
of Labour Force has the highest youth unemployment (18.7%), while the 
lowest can be observed in Type 1 – Euro Standard (13.0%). With respect to 
the older workforce (55 to 64 years), the highest unemployment rates must 
be attributed to Type 5 – Challenge of Decline (12.4%) and the lowest to 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (2.9%).120  In all other types of regions, the 
unemployment rate of older workers is between 4.3% (Type 3 – Family 
Potentials) and 5.8% (Type 6 – Young Potentials). 
 
As mentioned before, the female unemployment rate is higher when com-
pared to men, which is true for all types of regions (see Tab. A5.06). The 
widest gender gap can be observed in regions of Type 6 – Young Potentials: 
women: 10.2%; men: 6.4%. In Type 1 – Euro Standard, not only the general 
unemployment rate but also the gender gap is the smallest of all types of 
regions: 6.5% for women and 6.2% for men. By 2007, the highest female 
unemployment rate was observed in Type 5 – Challenge of Decline (11.8%). 
The extent of the gender gap in respect to the unemployment rate is also 
differing by age and type of region. For the younger female labour force (15 
to 24 years), the gap is widest in Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing (women: 
19.0%; men: 13.2%) and Type 6 – Young Potentials (women: 19.5%; men: 
14.9%). In regions of Type 1 – Euro Standard and Type 3 – Family Poten-
tials, this particular gender gap is not only the smallest of all types of re-
gions, beyond that, it is even to the advantage of young women. For the 
older female labour force (55 to 64 years), the gender gap in the unemploy-
ment rate is less distinct and most likely recognisable in Type 5 – Challenge 
                                               
119 For labour force concepts and definitions, see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/methodology/
definitions (accessed 09.11.2009) 
120 The relatively low unemployment rate of older workers (aged 15 to 64 years) in Type 4 – 
Challenge of Ageing, which includes many northern Italian regions, might be biased by the Italian 
retirement scheme. The age of retirement in Italy varies between 57 and 65 years, resulting in an 
effective retirement age of 59 years for men and 62 years for women. From 2008 on, the Italian 
retirement age will be steadily increased (RYMKEVITCH & VILLOSIO 2007:18). 
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of Decline and Type 6 – Young Potentials. In both types of regions, the 
female unemployment rate (55 to 64 years) surpasses those of men by 
roughly two percent. 
 
Duration of Unemployment 
Taking the duration of unemployment into account (see Tab. A5.04 and Map 
A4.10), the age group 15 to 64 years is equally balanced in regard to short-
term and long-term unemployment: 42% of all unemployed persons are 
jobless since less than 6 month, while 42% are without employment since 
one year or longer – indicating that only 16% are unemployed between 6 and 
12 month. In the age group 15 to 24 years, more than 50% are short-term 
unemployed, contrary to the group of older workers aged 55 to 64 years, 
where more than 60% are unemployed since one year or longer. When it 
comes to the duration of unemployment, there are no significant gender 
differences recognisable for any age group.  
 
Differentiating by type of region, Type 3 – Family Potentials and especially 
Type 1 – Euro Standard are very close to the LFS space average when it 
comes to the duration of employment. In the distinctive Eastern European 
regions of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force and Type 5 – Challenge of 
Decline, more than 50% of all unemployed persons are long-term unem-
ployed – i.e. out of work since more than one year. Contrary to that, short-
term unemployment of less than half a year is prevailing in regions of Type 4 
– Challenge of Ageing (51%) and Type 6 – Young Potentials (66%). 
 
Figure 60: Unemployment rate by age and origin per type of region (2007) 
Data source: EUROSTAT / EU-LFS (2007) 
 
Figure 61: Labour force participation rate by age and origin per type of region (2007) 
Data source: EUROSTAT / EU-LFS (2007) 
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Labour Force Participation Rate (2007) 
The labour force participation rate (15 to 64 years) amounted to 65.4% in 
the LFS space by 2007 (see Fig. 61 below and Map A4.11).121  Differentiating 
between younger (15 to 24 years) and older workforce (55 to 64 years), it is 
worth noting that both age groups feature considerably lower participation 
rates compared to all ages. Distinguishing between these two age groups, 
the labour force participation rate of older workers (44.9%) is higher than 
those of the younger (37.4%). However, the very low labour force participa-
tion of younger people aged 15 to 24 years must be seen in the context of a 
prolonged educational period in upper secondary and tertiary education (cf. 
Chapter 5.2.3). The labour force participation rate of the elderly (65 years 
and older) is 4.7% across the LFS space.  
 
The gender perspective delivers a clear picture: The LFS space labour force 
participation rate of women (58.4% for the age group 15 to 64 years) is 
clearly lagging behind those of men (72.4%), in fact in all age groups and 
types of regions. Taking the migratory background into account, EU27 
citizens show the highest labour force participation rate (70.2%), clearly 
above the national working age population (65.5%). With only 59.3%, Non-
EU citizens have the lowest labour force participation rate. 
 
The highest labour force participation rate (15 to 64 years) can be observed 
in Type 1 – Euro Standard (69.0%) and the lowest in regions of Type 2 – 
Challenge of Labour Force (60.3%). In all other types of regions, the labour 
force participation rate is closely around the LFS space average of 65.4%.  
 
When distinguishing by age, the same patterns as observed for the entire 
labour force (15 to 64 years) are prevailing. In the age group 15 to 24 years, 
the highest participation rates can be found in regions of Type 1 – Euro 
Standard (44.7%), followed by Type 6 – Young Potentials (41.2%) and Type 
3 – Family Potentials (40.9%). In all other types of regions, the labour force 
participation rate of the younger is below the LFS space average, while it is 
the lowest in regions of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force (27.9%). The 
same is true for the older labour force (55 to 64 years). In this age group, 
the highest participation rates can be observed again in Type 1 (51.8%) and 
the lowest in Type 2 and Type 4 (both around 38%). 
 
Focussing on the foreign labour force, the participation rate of EU27 citizens 
is – as already mentioned – not only above those of Non-EU citizens, but 
even higher than those of nationals. That proves to be true for all types of 
regions, except for Type 5 – Challenge of Decline and Type 6 – Young 
Potentials. In regions of Type 5, with a very low share of foreign population, 
the participation rates of nationals and Non-EU citizens are just about equal 
(64.0% and 63.2% respectively). The labour force participation rate of EU27 
citizens in Type 5 of 57.8% is remarkably low compared to all other types of 
regions. However, in regions of Type 6, the labour force participation rate of 
nationals (65.2%) is lower than those of foreign citizens, whereas EU27 
citizens and Non-EU citizens feature nearly equal rates of 70.0% and 69.6% 
respectively.  
 
 
                                               
121 According to the ILO definition, the labour force participation rate is the share of all employed 
and unemployed persons relative to all persons in the respective age group. 
  156 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 62:  
“Real” dependency ratio 
per type of region (2007) 
 
Data source:  
EUROSTAT /  
EU-LFS (2007) 
 
 
Real Dependency Ratio 
Contrary to the commonly used age-related dependency ratio (cf. Chapter 
3.1.2), the “Real” Dependency Ratio (or “worker to non-worker ratio”) – i.e. 
the ratio of all employed persons aged 15 to 74 years in regard to the rest of 
the population (unemployed and inactive persons at all ages) – demonstrates 
that by 2007 around 121 non-employed persons at all ages were actually 
dependent on the labour productivity of 100 employed persons, when taking 
the entire LFS space into account (see Fig. 62 and also Map A4.12).122  
 
This ratio is by far the lowest in Type 1 – Euro Standard, where 100 em-
ployed persons aged 15 to 74 years are opposed to 113 unemployed and 
inactive persons (at all ages). Besides that, this “real” dependency ratio is 
below the LFS space average in regions of Type 6 – Young Potentials 
(115/100) and Type 3 – Young Potentials (118/100). Above LFS space 
average ratios can be observed in Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force 
(132/100), Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline 
(both 128/100). 
 
When looking at these figures, it becomes obvious that this ratio is not only 
determined by demographic factors, but also by the participation in the 
labour force or – to be exact – by the employment rate at all ages. For sure, 
the low ratio of Type 1 – Euro Standard must be attributed to the consider-
able high labour force participation in this type of region (cf. Fig. 61), while 
the relative high proportion of people in the working age contributes to the 
low ratios in Type 6 – Young Potentials and Type 3 – Young Potentials. With 
respect to Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, 
the opposite is true.  
 
Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force is a good example, that a favourable age 
structure alone is not the panacea for a high share of economic active people. 
This type features a relatively high share of people in the working age and 
also shows only a moderate proportion of elderly people aged 65 years and 
older. Nonetheless, because the labour force participation rate of Type 2 is 
the lowest of all types of regions (see Fig. 61), it also has to bear the highest 
“real” dependency ratio. 
 
                                               
122 Please note, that this ratio does not take savings into account, which are contributing, at least to 
some extent, to the livelihood of retired persons. 
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5.2.5 Economic Activity (Occupation) 
Coming to the economic activity of the LFS space population, first the three 
main economic sectors are in the spotlight (Fig. 63). In this respect, the 
service sector is clearly the dominating economic activity, employing more 
than two thirds (67%) of the LFS space labour force. Around 28% work in 
the industrial sector and the remaining five percent work in the primary 
agricultural sector. 
 
The highest proportion of people employed in the service sector can be found 
in Type 1 – Euro Standard and Type 3 – Family Potentials (in both cases 
above 70%), while it is by far the lowest in Type 2 – Challenge of Labour 
Force (57%). In return, the industrial sector is the strongest in Type 2 
(30.7%) and the lowest in Type 3 (22.7%). Some sharp distinctions between 
the different types of regions become apparent when looking at the agricul-
tural sector, which is considerably strong in regions of Type 2 (11.5%) and 
just very weak in regions of Type 1 and Type 3 (both around 2.5%) 
 
Because these three main economic sectors do not provide enough detailed 
information about the actual economic activity – especially in the extremely 
broad service sector – a further differentiation of the total labour force (aged 
15 to 64 years) by nationality was conducted according to the more detailed 
ISCO-88 classification (see Tab. A5.05 and A5.06).123  With respect to the 
share of all employed persons aged 15 to 64 years in the entire LFS space, 
the main activities in the service sector are “wholesale and retail trade” 
(14.2%), “health and social work” (9.8%), “real estate, renting and business 
activities” (9.6%), “construction” (8.2%), “public administration” (7.2%), 
“education” (7.0%) and “hotels and restaurants” (4.2%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63: 
Economic activity 
(age 15 to 64 
years) by sector 
per type of region 
(2007) 
 
Data source:  
EU-LFS 2007 
(EUROSTAT 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
123 For more information on the ISCO (88) classification, see: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/index.htm (retrieved 11.11.2009) 
  158 
It was already mentioned before, that regions of Type 2 – Challenge of 
Labour Force feature the highest proportions in the agricultural sector, which 
is only differentiated between “agriculture” and “fishing” when referring to 
the ISCO-88 classification (see Tab. A5.05). In the industrial sector, the 
relatively low shares in “manufacturing” of Type 3 –Family Potentials and 
Type 6 – Young Potentials (both below 15%) is most striking. When differen-
tiating within the very broad service sector, a more refined distinction is 
possible by using the ISCO-88 classification.124 Considering the different 
types of regions, some noticeable deviations from the LFS space average can 
be distinguished. In regions of Type 1 – Euro Standard and Type 3 – Family 
Potentials, for instance, the sector “health and social work” is more pro-
nounced (both 12.3%) than in other types of regions (LFS space avg.: 
9.8%). The same is true for the sector “financial intermediation”, although 
this sector is not particularly labour intensive. Employees in “private house-
holds” are overrepresented in regions of Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and 
Type 6 – Young Potentials – i.e. two to three times higher compared to the 
LFS space average.125 Moreover, in regions of Type 6, the sectors “construc-
tion” (13.3%) and “hotels and restaurants” (7.1%) are much more pro-
nounced compared to the LFS space average (8.2% and 4.2% respectively). 
The sector “real estate” (LFS space avg.: 9.6%) is however clearly underrep-
resented in the distinctive Eastern European regions of Type 2 (6.8%) and 
Type 5 (7.3%). 
 
Considering only the foreign labour force (see Tab. A5.06), especially Non-EU 
citizens are clearly overrepresented in the service sectors “private house-
holds”, “hotels and restaurants”, “construction” and “extraterritorial organisa-
tions”. Conversely, the migrant labour force of the LFS space is underrepre-
sented in sectors like “public administration”, “education”, the (often state-
owned) industrial sector “electricity, gas and water supply” and also in the 
agricultural sector. When differentiating by types of regions and compared to 
the national labour force, it is striking that the foreign labour force, especially 
from other EU27 countries, is clearly overrepresented in the agricultural 
sector in regions of Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 6 – Young 
Potentials. In the industrial sector “manufacturing”, by comparison, foreign 
citizens show a relatively high proportion in Type 1 – Euro Standard, Type 4 
– Challenge of Ageing, and also in regions of Type 5 – Challenge of Decline. 
When speaking about the above-mentioned high share of foreign workers in 
the service sector “construction”, this applies to all types of regions, besides 
Type 1 – Euro Standard, where this sector is quite evenly stocked with 
nationals and foreigners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
124 The ISCO-88 classification is sub-dividing the service sector into 12 economic activities. 
125 One might doubt that all employees in private households are properly registered. 
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5.3 Socio-Economic Characteristics by Type of Region 
Hereafter, the six main types of the demographic typology (cf. Chapter 
4.2.3) will be discussed individually by the socio-economic indicators ob-
tained from the EU-LFS 2007 data set, complemented by GDP data from the 
period 2001 to 2005. 
 
5.3.1 Type 1 – Euro Standard 
Demographically, Type 1 – Euro Standard is relatively close to the EU27+4 
and LFS space average in respect to the variables used for the demographic 
typology: the share of the age groups 20 to 39 years and 65 years and older, 
as well as the components of population development, i.e. the natural 
population balance and the net migration rate (cf. Chapter 4.2.2). 
 
In terms of economic performance, Type 1 – Euro Standard shows an above 
average GDP-PPP per capita level of 109% of the EU27 average (= 100), 
spanning from 67% (Sicily/ITG1) to 143% (Antwerpen/BE21). Like other 
regions with above average GDP levels, Type 1 regions featured a below 
average annual GDP growth of 2.9% between 2001 and 2005 compared to 
the GDP growth of the entire LFS space (3.9%).  
 
Type 1 – Euro Standard has a foreign population of nearly 9 million people. 
This is the largest migrant stock of all types of regions, while the share of the 
foreign population (5.7%) is just above the LFS space average (5.1%). The 
vast majority of the foreign population live in this type of region for 10 years 
or more. 
 
Referring to the highest formal education of persons above age 15, Type 1 
features above average shares of upper secondary (51.3%) and tertiary 
educated people (20.6%). Unlike in other types of regions, the national 
population of Type 1 shows higher proportions of tertiary educated people 
compared to foreigners with a EU27 citizenship. People above age 15 with no 
formal education (0.8%) are literally imperceptible in this type of region. 
 
The unemployment rate of Type 1 (6.3%) is below the LFS space average, 
whereas the unemployment rate of the foreign labour force – EU27 citizens 
(7.6%) and Non-EU citizens (15.5%) – is slightly above the LFS space 
average. The labour force participation rate of 69.0% is the highest of all 
types of regions. Especially the participation of women (63.0%) is far above 
the LFS space average (58.4%). Only the labour force participation rate of 
Non-EU citizens (53.8%) is below the overall average of 59.3%. 
 
In regard to the economic activities of the labour force, Type 1 has the 
second highest share of people employed in the broad service sector (70.7%) 
and particularly in the “health and social work” sector (12.3%). Focussing on 
the economic activity of the migrant workforce in Type 1, foreign citizens are 
clearly overrepresented within services like “hotels and restaurants” and 
“private households” and also in the “manufacturing” industry, but underrep-
resented within service sectors like “public administration” and – speaking 
especially of Non-EU citizens – “financial intermediation” and  “education”. 
Besides that, employees with a foreign citizenship rarely work in the agricul-
tural or industrial sector. 
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5.3.2 Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force  
This type of region can be demographically characterised by its high share of 
young adults (cf. Chapter 4.2.2) and is challenged to bring and establish 
these young people into the labour force.  
 
Regions of Type 2 are clearly underperforming in terms of GDP-PPP per 
capita level with only 66% of the EU27 average. On the one hand, Type 2 
covers Bulgarian and Romanian regions with a GDP-PPP level of less than 
30% of the EU27 average, on the other hand, it also includes Western 
European urban regions like Hamburg with a GDP-PPP per capita level that is 
twice as high as the EU27 average. Apart from that, the annual average 
GDP-PPP growth rate between 2001 and 2005 (5.7%) is the highest of all 
types of regions, whereby those regions with the lowest GDP-PPP level show 
the highest annual growth rates of 10% and more. Besides the lowest GDP-
PPP level of all types of regions, Type 2 also features the lowest share of 
foreign population (1.4%). The majority of this migrant population is already 
established since 10 years or longer in regions of Type 2, a clear indication 
that no significant in-flows occurred in recent years.  
 
Although less than one third of the population (aged 15 years or older) has 
only a basic or no formal education, the share of tertiary educated people 
(14.8%) is still below the LFS space average (18.8%). Hence, the share of 
the population with secondary education (51.7%) is the highest of all types 
of regions. Looking only at the younger adults with a tertiary education, this 
share has nearly reached the LFS space average. Interestingly, although 
irrelevant by quantity, the foreign population shows a significantly higher 
share of tertiary educated people compared to the national population. 
 
Speaking of the labour status of Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force, the 
unemployment rate was 8.3% in 2007, and thus just one percentage point 
above the LFS space average. Focussing on the younger labour force, the 
strong age group between 15 to 24 years has to bear an unemployment rate 
of 18.7%, which is the highest youth unemployment rate of all types of 
regions. Despite that, Type 2 also has the lowest labour force participation 
rate, especially in the younger age groups (27.1%) when compared to LFS 
space average (37.6%). But then again, the labour force participation of 
people aged 65+ (6.6%) is the highest, especially for men (9.4%). 
 
In terms of the economic activities, Type 2 shows the highest proportion of 
people working in the agricultural (11.5%) and industrial sector (31.5%) and 
the lowest in services (57.0%). Further differentiated, the high proportion of 
employees in the industrial sector can be traced back to a relatively strong 
mining industry, besides an overall high share of employees in the manufac-
turing sector. Contrary to that, many service sectors show below LFS space 
average proportions of employees (i.e. “private households”, “health and 
social work”, financial intermediation”, “real estate, renting and business 
activities” and “hotels and restaurants”). Despite the minor stock of foreign 
population, their workforce seems to be concentrated in just a few sectors. 
Above all, there is a considerable concentration in the sector “private house-
holds”, where the share of migrant workers is 20 to 25 times higher com-
pared to the national population. 
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5.3.3 Type 3 – Family Potentials 
The demographically motivated title of Type 3 – Family Potentials refers to 
the relatively young age structure and the strictly positive natural population 
balance between 2001 and 2005 (cf. Chapter 4.2.2).  
 
In 2005, the average GDP-PPP per capita level of Type 3 regions amounted 
to 124% of the EU27 average and is the highest of all types of regions, 
ranging from 68% in Puglia (ITF4) to 264% in Luxembourg (LU00). The 
average GDP-PPP growth rate between 2001 and 2005 of 2.6% per year is, 
however, below the LFS space average. Contrary to the overall trend of high 
GDP growth in regions with low GDP levels (cf. Chapter 5.2.1), those regions 
with the lowest GDP levels – i.e. the Italian regions of Puglia (ITF4) and 
Campania (ITF3) – have also the weakest or even a negative GDP growth  
(-0.1% and 0.5%), while some regions with high GDP levels also feature 
above LFS space average GDP growth, e.g. London (UKI), Stockholm (SE11), 
and especially Luxembourg with an average annual GDP-PPP growth of 6.3%.  
 
Regions of Type 3 – Family Potentials have the second highest proportion of 
foreign population (6.9%), of which nearly two thirds are residing in this type 
of region since more than 10 years. Similar to Type 1 – Euro Standard, two 
out of three immigrants hold a Non-EU citizenship. 
 
In terms of the human capital stock, the proportion of tertiary educated 
people amounts to 22.9% (LFS space average: 18.8%) and is increasing 
strongly in younger ages – at age 35, for instance, this share is around 37%. 
The proportion of higher educated EU27 citizens in Type 3 regions is 27% 
and hence also clearly above the LFS space average. The remarkably high 
share of younger adults with higher education is even more contrasted from 
the LFS space average. Apart from that, the proportion of people with no 
formal education is relatively high (2.4%). 
 
The unemployment rate of 6.8% is relatively low, as is the unemployment 
rate of older workers aged 55 to 64 years of 4.3%. The youth unemployment 
rate of 14.8% is also below the LFS space average (15.3%). Remarkably, the 
female youth unemployment rate is even below those of young men. Fur-
thermore, the average duration of unemployment is rather short-termed at 
all ages. Considering the foreign labour force, the unemployment rate of 
EU27 citizens (6.3%) is even below those of the national labour force (6.5%) 
– a phenomenon unique to Type 3. In general, the labour force participation 
rate matches the LFS space average closely. In fact, the labour force partici-
pation rate of EU27 citizens of more than 70% is outstanding compared to 
other types of regions. 
 
When it comes to economic activities, Type 3 – Family Potentials features the 
strongest service sector (74.8%), and thus the weakest agricultural and 
industrial sectors. Within the broad service sector, especially “financial 
intermediation”, “real estate, renting and business activities” and “health and 
social work” are much more pronounced compared to the LFS space average. 
Looking at the differences between the national and the foreign workforce, 
above all, immigrants are overrepresented in sectors attributed to the 
secondary labour market, for instance in the “private households” sector. 
Differentiated by origin, especially EU27 migrants are employed in “construc-
tion”, whereas Non-EU migrants are overrepresented within sectors like 
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“hotels and restaurants”, “real estate, renting and business activities”, and 
also in the “mining” sector. 
 
5.3.4 Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing 
A considerable high proportion of elderly people (aged 65 years and older) 
distinguish this type of region from the others. Besides that, Type 4 has a 
slightly negative natural population balance, albeit a high share of young 
adults in the reproductive age. A strong in-migration surplus is the driver of 
the prevalent positive population development (cf. Chapter 4.2.2). 
 
The GDP-PPP per capita level matches the EU27 average and is slightly above 
the LFS space average. Compared to other types of regions, Type 4 only has 
a relative narrow regional GDP-PPP variance, ranging from 64% of the EU27 
average in Portugal’s Centro region (PT16) to 136% in Lombardia (ITC4). 
The average GDP-PPP per capita growth between 2001 and 2005 (1.85% 
p.a.) was only half of the LFS space growth. Further differentiated, many 
Italian regions of Type 4 had a negative or just a very weak GDP-PPP growth 
(of less than 0.25% p.a.), while Spanish Type 4 regions featured annual 
growth rates of 5% and more. 
 
As mentioned above, this type of region is experiencing a strong in-migration 
resulting in a proportion of the population with a foreign citizenship of 5.7% 
by 2007, which equals Type 1. The majority of the foreign population just 
immigrated recently (less than 5 years ago) and is of Non-EU origin. A 
peculiarity of this type of region is the relative high share of young migrants 
below age 20 from Non-EU countries. 
 
More than 50% of the population aged 15+ only have a basic or no formal 
education at all. The share of the latter (4.3%) is the highest and the propor-
tion of tertiary educated people (13.8%) is the lowest of all types of regions. 
In regard to the foreign population, the educational composition is similar to 
the LFS space distribution: EU27 citizens are better educated and Non-EU 
migrants are less educated in comparison to the national population. 
 
Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing has the lowest overall unemployment rates 
(5.4%), while the gender gap is the widest: 4.2% for men and 7.0% for 
women. The same is true in terms of the youth unemployment rate (15.6%), 
which is 13.2% for men and 17.1% for women. Apart from that, also the 
unemployment rate of the foreign labour force is the lowest of all types of 
regions, especially for Non-EU citizens (10.2%). Beyond that, the majority of 
all unemployed persons are short-term unemployed. In general, the labour 
force participation rate corresponds to the LFS space average and is rela-
tively balanced in terms of national population, EU27 and Non-EU citizens. 
 
The distribution of the labour force with regard to the economic activity is 
comparable to the distribution in the entire LFS space, only the sectors 
“hotels and restaurants”, “private households” and especially “fishing” are 
stronger represented. Like in other types of regions, foreign citizens are 
overrepresented in sectors like “private households” (ten times more than 
the national workforce), “construction” and “hotels and restaurants”, and 
especially EU27 citizens – contrary to other types of regions – also in the 
agricultural sector. 
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5.3.5 Type 5 – Challenge of Decline 
The title of Type 5 – Challenge of Decline refers to a strictly negative popula-
tion development, driven by both a negative natural population balance as 
well as a negative net migration rate (cf. Chapter 4.2.2). Together this leads 
to a significant population decrease coupled with population ageing.  
 
In terms of economic performance, the average GDP-PPP per capita level of 
2005 was similar to Type 2, and thus below the LFS space average. The 
regional bandwidth ranges from just 27% of the EU27 average in Severoza-
paden (BG31) to 157% in Bremen (DE50). By contrast, the annual average 
GDP-PPP per capita growth rate between 2001 and 2005 of 4.7% is above 
LFS space average – again very similar to Type 2. It ranges from 0.5% in 
Molise (ITF2) up to 11.5% in Estonia.  The share of the foreign population of 
2.2% is rather small, whereby Non-EU citizens dominate by a factor of 4. 
Just around 20% of the foreign population stock moved during the last 10 
years to regions of Type 5. 
 
At first glance, the educational composition of Type 5 looks well off by 
matching roughly the composition of the overall LFS space population. 
Considering only the higher educated population by age, one stumbles over 
the fact that it is, in fact, not increasing by younger ages, as it does in all 
other types of regions. Distinguishing by origin, the share of tertiary edu-
cated Non-EU citizens is higher than those of the national population – a 
phenomenon, which is unique to regions of Type 5 and Type 2.  
 
The unemployment rate in Type 5 – Challenge of Decline (11.1%) was the 
highest of all types of regions in 2007. It is noticeable that the unemploy-
ment rate of older workers between 55 and 64 years (12.4%) is by far the 
highest, whereby the youth unemployment is just slightly above the LFS 
space average. The unemployment rate of immigrants with EU27 citizenship 
(16.3%) is the highest, but might be distorted by the low share of foreign 
population in general. Beyond that, long-term unemployment is pervasive in 
this type of region. The labour force participation rate of 64.0% is just 
slightly below the LFS space average. 
 
With respect to the distribution of the economic activities, Type 5 features a 
relatively weak service sector, similar to Type 2. Thus, the agricultural and 
industrial sector together absorb more than a third of the total workforce. In 
the service sector, it is especially the number of employees within “public 
administration” that is considerably high in comparison to all other types of 
regions. Conversely, some other service sectors are underrepresented, e.g. 
“financial intermediation”, “real estate, renting and business services” and 
especially “private households”. The relative small foreign labour force is 
employed, above all, in the industrial sector. 
 
5.3.6 Type 6 – Young Potentials 
This type of region can be demographically characterised by its relatively 
young age structure and the consistently positive population development of 
both components: a positive natural population balance and a positive net 
migration (cf. Chapter 4.2.2). 
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From the point of view of economic performance, Type 6 matches the LFS 
space average, be it by GDP-PPP level or growth. The regional GDP-PPP level 
ranges from 80% of the EU27 average in Andalucia (ES61) to 158% in 
Southern and Eastern Ireland (IE01). Among all Type 6 regions, Andalucia 
features the highest annual average GDP-PPP growth of 5.9% between 2001 
and 2005. 
 
The foreign population stock of 10.8% in 2007 and the strong in-flow of 
migrants between 2001 and 2005 are outstanding, whereby migrants from 
Non-EU countries are dominating. The proportion of older immigrants (aged 
50 or older), primarily from EU27 countries, is the highest of all types of 
regions. The vast majority of all immigrants are residing in this type of region 
since less than 10 years. 
 
The population of Type 6 – Young Potentials has the highest share of people 
with only basic education (52.2%), and simultaneously the highest share of 
people with tertiary education (23.3%), which is driven by an exceptional 
high share of tertiary educated younger adults below age 35. As a result the 
proportion of upper secondary educated people (22.3%) is by far the lowest 
of all types of regions. Similar to the national population, most of the Non-EU 
citizens also enjoyed only a basic education. However, the share of tertiary 
educated EU27 citizens (30.8%) is the highest of all types of regions. 
 
In terms of the labour status, regions of Type 6 feature unemployment rates 
above the LFS space average: 8.0% overall and 17% for the age group 15 to 
24 years. Similar to Type 4, the female unemployment rate is substantially 
higher at all ages compared to those of men. Around two thirds of all unem-
ployed persons and three quarters of the younger unemployed persons aged 
15 to 24 years are short-term job seekers. The unemployment rate of Non-
EU citizens (11.1%) is the second lowest next to Type 4. The overall labour 
force participation rate (66.0%) corresponds to the LFS space average and 
the labour force participation rate of younger people aged 15 to 24 years 
(41.2%) is the highest overall. In general, a considerable gender is prevailing 
in regard to all labour status indicators. 
 
Looking at the distribution of the labour force within the economic activities 
in this type of region, the proportion of the three main sectors – i.e. agricul-
ture, industry and services – is very close to the LFS average. When further 
differentiating, the share of employees in some particular sectors significantly 
deviates from the overall average. The sector “private household”, for 
instance, employs three times more people compared to the LFS space 
average. Besides that, also sectors like “hotels and restaurants” and “con-
struction” are overrepresented. Only relatively few people are employed in 
the sectors “health and social work”, “public administration” and “education”. 
The foreign labour force is overrepresented in sectors like “private house-
holds”, “hotels and restaurants”, “construction”, and in the agricultural 
sector, and is underrepresented in “public administration”, “financial inter-
mediation”, “education”, “health and social work”, “wholesale and retail 
trade”, as well as in the industrial sector.  
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5.4 Comparing the Types of Regions 
After discussing the socio-economic characteristics of the different types of 
regions, this chapter concludes the analysis of the EU-LFS data set with a 
comparison of the different types of regions. For a better differentiation, 
Table 14 also portrays the main indicators per type of region in relation to 
the LFS space average (= 100). 
 
Table 14: Socio-economic indicators per type of region 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database & EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
 
Above all, the analysis of the EU-LFS 2007 data set demonstrates, that the 
geographical patterns revealed by the demographic typology (see Chapter 
4.2.4) also withstand a socio-economic examination. Some (dis-)similarities 
can be distinguished quite well. 
 
Type 1 & 3 
The regions of Type 1 – Euro Standard and Type 3 – Family Potentials are 
concentrated in the central-western and northern parts of the EU27+4 
territory. Both types feature values close to the EU27+4 and LFS space 
average with respect to the demographic variables used in the cluster 
analysis. These two types of regions share some common socio-economic 
characteristics: 
  
• Above average GDP-PPP per capita level (2005) 
• Below average annual GDP-PPP growth rates (2001-2005) 
• Above average share of migrants (2007) 
• Above average share of tertiary educated people (2007) 
• Below average unemployment rate (2007) 
• Above average labour force participation (2007) 
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Type 2 & 5 
The two distinctive Eastern European types of regions, Type 2 – Challenge of 
Labour Force and Type 5 – Challenge of Decline, also cover some Western 
European urban regions and Northern and Southern European peripheral 
regions. Demographically, both types are affected by a population decrease. 
These losses are more dramatic in Type 5, which also has to bear pro-
nounced population ageing. In terms of to the socio-economic orientation, 
the similarities of Type 2 and Type 5, as listed below, are contrary to Type 1 
and Type 3: 
 
• Below average GDP-PPP per capita level (by 2005) 
• Above average annual GDP-PPP growth rates (2001-2005) 
• Below average share of migrants (2007) 
• Below average share of tertiary educated people (2007); especially in 
Type 2. 
• Above average unemployment rate (2007) 
• Below average labour force participation (2007) 
 
Type 4 & 6 
The regions covered by Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing and Type 6 – Young 
Potentials are located mainly in the southern and western parts of Europe. 
Because of the strong net migration gains and hence overall population 
increases, both types of regions constitute demographic growth regions. The 
socio-economic similarities can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Above average GDP-PPP per capita level (2005) – similar to Type 1 and 
Type 3. 
• Above average share of foreign population (2007) – similar to Type 1 
and Type 3, whereby the foreign population stock of Type 2 and Type 5 
results from rather recent in-flows – contrary to Type 1 and Type 3. 
• Around average labour force participation (2007) 
 
However, these two types of regions cannot be aggregated and thus distin-
guished as easily by means of socio-economic indicators as the other two 
groups of regions. Some indicators show significant differences, when com-
paring Type 4 and Type 6: 
 
• GDP-PPP growth rates (between 2001 and 2005) are above the LFS 
space average in Type 6 and below average in Type 4. 
• The share of tertiary educated people (2007) is above LFS space aver-
age in Type 6 and below average in Type 4. 
• The unemployment rate (2007) is above LFS space average in Type 6 
and below average in Type 4.  
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This final chapter summarises the analyses conducted in this thesis, which 
focuses on the demography of Europe and its regions, with a special empha-
sis on the territory of the EU27+4 (Chapter 6.1). Based on the aims and 
objectives explained in Chapter 1.2, the research findings are presented in 
Chapter 6.2, while some thoughts with respect to research limitations and 
the consequent potentials for further research are outlined in Chapter 6.3. 
6.1 Summary 
The aim of this diploma thesis – and also of the research resumed under 
Activity 2 (UNIVIE) of the ESPON project DEMIFER (see Chapter 1.1) – was 
to develop a typology of European regions based on demographic variables 
and to link the resulting typology to economic variables. This newly devel-
oped classification will serve as basis for subsequently elaborated models, 
projections and case studies within the DEMIFER project and sheds more 
light on the main research question (cf. Chapter 1.2): 
 
“How will the demographic development, i.e. natural population  
development as well as migration, affect different types of regions 
and cities?” 
 
A “demographic toolbox” was compiled in Chapter 2 before tackling the 
necessary demographic analyses. This toolbox outlines the basics of demo-
graphy by addressing commonly used demographic indicators, the most 
important theories and models, as well as the principles of population projec-
tions. Chapter 3 discussed the state of the demography of Europe. First, the 
scale of Europe countries was addressed, followed by a spatial analysis of 
European regions on NUTS 2 level, before investigating the question, if 
something like a European demographic regime exists. This question was 
assessed by an analysis of the convergence and/or divergence of demo-
graphic trends and patterns at different scales. 
 
Based on the awareness, that particular demographic trends and patterns 
exist across Europe, the thesis approached the actual task of developing a 
classification of European regions based on demographic variables. Chapter 
4.1 described the making of this classification by means of cluster analyses. 
The resulting typology of the demographic status of European NUTS 2 
regions in 2005 was presented in Chapter 4.2. The subsequent Chapter 4.3 
further illustrated the classification achieved by applying more and more 
refined demographic indicators. In order to link the resulting demographic 
typology to socio-economic variables, Chapter 5 analysed the EU-LFS 2007 
data set in terms of the different types of regions originated from the final 
cluster solution.   
 
6.2 Research Findings 
Hereafter, the research findings and also its limitations will be addressed 
according to the aims and the research objectives of this thesis.  
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Drivers of Demographic Change 
In Chapter 3, Europe’s demographic status and trends, as well as the under-
lying population dynamics were presented in order to identify the drivers of 
demographic change. In the second half of the 20th century, Europe’s demo-
graphy was shaped by the final stages of the demographic transition, with a 
previously unconceivable decline in the levels of fertility and especially 
mortality. The emergence of new post-modern values like self-fulfilment, 
personal freedom of choice, individual life styles and emancipation affects 
family foundation and have demographic consequences (BILLARI & 
LIEFBROER 2005:1f; van de KAA 2008:23). As a result, fertility dropped 
below replacement level and natural population growth rates became nega-
tive. This happened first in Northern and Western Europe during the 1970s 
and 1980s in the aftermath of the fading baby boom. Southern Europe 
followed with some delay, and after the fall of the “Iron Curtain” no stone 
was left standing in Eastern Europe, also in terms of demography.  
 
“Societal change often shows up ﬁrst in demographic indicators, and 
almost all of cultural evolution (…) has a demographic component.” 
Paul R. EHRLICH (2008:111) 
 
At the turn of the millennium, population numbers in large parts of Europe 
were kept from falling dramatically only because of the influx of migrants 
(van de KAA 2008:14). Beyond any doubt, by today migration became the 
driver of demographic change in Europe. At least since the early 1990s, 
European population growth has been mainly caused by international migra-
tion and some 80% of recent overall population growth results from migra-
tion (ESPON 2009:22). 
A Converging or Diverging European Demographic Regime? 
To some extent, some demographic developments across European countries 
have been following the same trends since 1950, e.g. the decline of fertility 
or the increase in life expectancy, while others again, e.g. net migration rates 
or population growth rates do not show any convergence at all. Based on the 
elaborations in Chapter 3.4, it can be stated that similar directions in the 
development of particular demographic indicators can be observed, rather 
than convergence by definition.  
 
Weak trends of demographic convergence across Europe, coupled with 
regional heterogeneity lead to the conclusion that different countries and 
regions are affected differently by different demographic trends. The results 
are different patterns of demographic challenges. Population decline, for 
instance, which is often assumed as the major demographic challenge, seems 
to be a regional problem rather than a threat for all of Europe (cf. SOBOTKA 
2008:30).  
 
“Specific indices of convergence (or divergence)  
do not seem to have been developed.” 
David A. COLEMAN (2002:323) 
 
The question of convergence and divergence of demographic developments 
must be considered more in-depth, when aiming for a more satisfying 
answer. Such an analysis should concentrate on the process of change itself 
and should apply a more specified methodology such as statistical ap-
proaches to similarity or multi-level analysis (cf. COLEMAN 2002:323f). 
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Demographic Typology of European Regions 
The developed typology of 286 NUTS 2 regions is a comprehensive classifica-
tion of the demographic structure and short-term trends in the EU27+4, 
based on four variables: the share of the age groups 20 to 39 years and 65 
years and older in 2005, as well as the annual average natural population 
increase and the net migration rate during the period 2001 to 2005. The 
typology distinguishes between seven types of regions, and in addition 
between two to four subtypes each, which are affected differently by demo-
graphic and migratory flows (see below). This regional level classification 
enables the user to capture the demographic diversity of European regions in 
2005 at first glance.  
 
• Type 1 – Euro Standard comes close to the overall average of the 
EU27+4 with respect to the indicators used in the cluster analysis. 
However, the age structure is slightly older than the average. Overall, 
a stagnating natural population balance and a positive net migration 
rate prevails.  
• Type 2 – Challenge of Labour Force features a high share of population 
in young working ages and a slight population decline, which is driven 
by a negative natural population development. 
• Type 3 – Family Potentials has a slightly younger than average age 
structure and high natural population increases, as well as a positive 
net migration rate. 
• Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing is characterised by older populations and 
a natural population decrease. Nevertheless, the population size still 
increases due to a strong net migration surplus. 
• Type 5 – Challenge of Decline is shaped by a negative natural popula-
tion balance, as well as a negative migratory balance. In consequence, 
this leads to depopulation accompanied by demographic ageing. 
• Type 6 – Young Potentials features a young age structure, a positive 
natural population increase, as well as a strong migratory surplus. 
• Type 7 – Overseas is featuring considerable high shares in the young 
ages and by far the lowest share of elder population. The strong natu-
ral population increase is more than counterbalancing the negative mi-
gratory balance. 
 
Beyond demographic characteristics, the typology reveals spatial patterns in 
terms of the geographical distribution of the different types of regions, such 
as distinctive Northern and Western European types (Type 1 and Type 3), 
Eastern European and peripheral types (Type 2 and Type 5) and rather 
Southern European types (Type 4 and Type 6), as well as a non-European 
mainland type (Type 7).  
 
Demographic Challenges 
An additional analysis illustrates the demographic characteristics of the 
different types of regions by means of more and more refined variables, 
which were not used in the cluster analysis (see Chapter 4.3). This analysis 
concentrates on population development and the demographic challenges of 
low fertility, population ageing and the size of the working age population. 
 
“A regional level classification would allow extremes within  
each region that may not be identified at a national scale (…)  
to be more clearly identified.” 
Daniel W. VICKERS (2006:289) 
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First and foremost, population decline is a demographic challenge for the two 
distinctive Eastern European types of regions of Type 2 and especially of 
Type 5. All other types of regions had a positive population development 
during the period 2001 and 2005. These two types of regions and – to some 
extent – also Type 4 must be alerted by the impact of low fertility. All other 
types of regions have higher levels of fertility, although still below the 
replacement level. Only in Type 7 regions, the level of fertility is predomi-
nately around or above two children per woman. In terms of the population 
development between 2001 and 2005, indeed all other types of regions, 
besides Type 2 and Type 5, compensated below replacement fertility by 
immigration. 
 
Demographic ageing is measured by the share of the older age groups, most 
commonly by the age group 65 years and older, which is in general the 
strongest growing age group. Above average proportions of elder populations 
can be observed in Type 1, Type 4 and Type 5. The highest shares can be 
found in Type 4, which also features the highest life expectancy of all types 
of regions. However, in Type 4 the impacts of demographic ageing are 
mitigated by a strong influx of younger migrants. Although the average live 
expectancy in regions of Type 5 is the lowest next to Type 2 regions, the 
widespread emigration of the younger drives the already prevalent process of 
demographic ageing even further. In Type 1, the speed of ageing is rather 
moderate due to reasonable fertility rates and a predominately positive 
migratory balance. All other types of regions show below average shares of 
elderly people, supported either by higher levels of fertility (Type 3 and Type 
7), or by strong migratory surpluses (Type 6). By contrast, the relatively low 
share of elderly in Type 2 regions is due to the momentum originating from 
the last strong birth cohorts born before 1990, and because of the lowest life 
expectancy of all types of regions. Both characteristics are typical for Eastern 
European populations. 
 
When it comes to the size of the labour force, which is almost exclusively 
constituted by people in the main working ages between 20 and 64 years, 
challenges are bound to occur in the foreseeable future in all types of re-
gions, except of Type 2 and Type 6. The share of working age population is 
around average in Type 1, Type 3, Type 4 and Type 5. Only in Type 7, this 
proportion is clearly below the average. Nevertheless, if Type 7 can prevent 
its high proportion of younger people from emigrating in large numbers, the 
share of the working age population will increase considerably in the coming 
years. In Type 1, Type 3 and Type 4, the share of the working age population 
still increases. However, this growth is driven by increases in the older 
working age population (55 to 64 years), while the proportion of younger 
adults (20 to 39 years) already decreased during the period 2001 to 2005. 
Only in Type 5, the size of the entire working age population is already 
shrinking. On top of that, it is especially the decrease in the share of the 
younger working age population, which is the decisive factor for the shrinking 
labour force of Type 5. In Type 2 and Type 6, the proportion of the popula-
tion in working ages is not only clearly above the overall average, it is even 
still increasing, especially the younger working age population.  
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Socio-economic Illustration of the Classification 
Using the European Labour Force Survey proved to be a fruitful approach to 
link the demographic typology with socio-economic data. Although the EU-
LFS 2007 data set is not as consistent as it would be desirable (cf. Chapter 
5.1.4), it enables the examination of the relationship between demographic 
and socio-economic differences for the six main types of regions. In the EU-
LFS adapted typology, Type 7 was not analysed as it only consists of two 
regions (i.e. Ceuta and Melilla). 
 
“The European Labour Force Survey is undoubtly one of the core 
databases for the comparative study of European Societies.” 
Walter MÜLLER & Markus GANGL (2000:1) 
 
The analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of the different types of 
demographically distinguished regions includes indicators of the economic 
performance, i.e. GDP per capita levels of 2005 and annual average growth 
rates between 2001 and 2005, which were taken from the ESPON 2013 
Database. All other indicators, i.e. share of foreign population, highest level 
of education, as well as unemployment rate and labour force participation 
rate, are related to the year 2007 and are obtained from the EU-LFS 2007 
data set. When examining the socio-economic characteristics, a special 
emphasis was placed on the foreign population, distinguishing between 
national population and immigrants with a foreign citizenship, either from 
another EU27 country or from outside the EU27 (cf. Chapter 5.2) 
 
When differentiating by economic performance, those types of region with 
GDP-PPP per capita levels above the EU27 average in 2005, i.e. Type 1, Type 
3, Type 4 and Type 6, show GDP-PPP per capita growth rates (2001-2005) 
below the EU27 average. Only in Type 6, the annual average GDP-PPP per 
capita growth rate is close to the EU27 average. In those types of regions 
with below EU27 GDP-PPP per capita levels, i.e. Type 2 and Type 5, the 
reverse is true. Considerable stocks of foreign populations can be found in 
types of regions with above average GDP-PPP per capita levels. 
 
The highest proportion of foreign population by 2007 and also the strongest 
net migration gains between 2001 and 2005 can be observed in Type 6, and 
the highest stock of foreign population (2007) by absolute numbers in  
Type 1. There are considerable differences with respect to the origin of the 
foreign population, as well as in regard to the length of stay. In regions of 
the EU27+4, the stock of Non-EU citizens is almost twice as high as the stock 
of EU27 migrants. The highest proportions of immigrants from other EU27 
countries can be found in Type 1 and Type 3. Differentiated by the length of 
stay, Type 4 and Type 6 constitute “new demographic growth regions”, 
where the majority of the foreign population immigrated during the last ten 
years. By contrast, about two thirds of the foreign population stocks of  
Type 1 and Type 3 have been living in these types of regions since ten years 
or longer. 
 
Taking the share of tertiary educated people aged 15 years and over in 2007 
as an indicator for the human capital stock, this proportion is highest in  
Type 6 and Type 3, followed by Type 1. In regions of Type 5, the share of 
higher educated people is around the overall average, but does not increase 
in younger ages, as it does in all other types of regions. On average, the 
share of tertiary educated people is lowest in regions of Type 2 and Type 4. 
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In terms of the foreign population, the share of EU27 citizens with higher 
education surpasses those of the national population, especially in Type 6, 
while Non-EU citizens are in general less educated. 
 
By far the highest unemployment rates (2007) can be observed in regions of 
Type 5, followed by Type 2 and Type 6, while the unemployment is below the 
overall average in Type 1, Type 3 and lowest in Type 4. In general, the 
unemployment rate of the national population and EU27 citizens is about 
equal, while the unemployment rate of Non-EU citizens is almost twice as 
high. Long-term unemployment of one year and longer is prevalent in regions 
of Type 2 and Type 5, while the majority of all unemployed persons in Type 4 
and Type 6 is jobless for less than six months. In regions of Type 1 and Type 
3, the distribution of long-term and short-term unemployment is quite 
balanced. The labour force participation rate (2007) is highest in Type 1 and 
lowest in Type 2. All other types of regions feature participation rates close to 
the overall average. When differentiating the labour force participation by 
age, sex and origin, more pronounced distinctions are striking. The participa-
tion of the younger (15 to 24 years) and the older (55 to 64 years) is far 
below the average of all ages (15 to 64 years) and there is a considerable 
gender gap to the disadvantage of women, in fact at all ages and in all types 
of regions. Focussing on the foreign labour force, the participation rate of 
EU27 citizens is higher compared with Non-EU citizens, and even higher than 
the participation of nationals. That proves to be true for all types of regions, 
except for Type 5 and Type 6. With respect to Type 5, the low share of 
foreign population might bias this result. However, the labour force participa-
tion of the foreign population of Type 6, be it EU27 citizens or Non-EU 
citizens, is higher compared to the national working age population. 
The Power of Regions 
When zooming beyond the geography of nation states, an often-
underestimated extent of regional heterogeneity of demographic characteris-
tics becomes apparent, especially with respect to population development. 
Without denying the strong influence of national systems, e.g. family welfare 
in regard to fertility behaviour, Europe’s regions show demographic vari-
ances, which exceed those at the country level by far (see Chapter 3.3). 
 
As Phil REES pointed out in a poignant remark during a DEMIFER meeting in 
early 2010, all the hopes and worries projected into demography per se can 
be both confirmed and discarded when looking at the variety at the regional 
scale. Nearly every conceivable demographic scenario can be found only by 
looking at the map of Europe. On the one hand, there are regions like Liguria 
in Italy (Type 4 – Challenge of Ageing), where population ageing was already 
so far advanced by 2005 – more than 26.5% were older than 65 years – as it 
is projected for the whole of Europe not before 2050. Nevertheless, the 
population of Liguria will not become extinct. In fact, it even increases in size 
due to immigration. The GDP-PPP per capita level is above and unemploy-
ment is below the EU27 average. Economically, Liguria seems to be an 
attractive place to live. There are even a few urban European regions, for 
instance Vienna (Type 6 – Young Potentials), where the population did not 
only increase in recent years, but also became younger (cf. LUTZ et al. 
2003). On the other hand, there are depopulated regions like Severozapaden 
in the Northwest of Bulgaria (i.e. Type 5 – Challenge of Decline), where the 
age structure is already so distorted that every birth is counterbalanced by 
more than two deaths. The share of young adults is decreasing dramatically, 
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and the same is true for the entire working population. On top of that, the 
GDP-PPP per capita level does not even reach 10% of the EU27 average, 
while the unemployment rate outperforms the European average by far. If 
the challenge of population decline in regions like Severozapaden can be 
tackled in a constructive way – which remains to be seen – we might gain 
valuable insights on how to solve, or even avoid such circumstances on a 
broader spatial scale. 
 
Europe’s demographic future – in its full range – is already depicted in 
today’s regions. Regions are blueprints for demographic worst-case scenarios 
and examples for best practise, as well as for unexpected processes as 
illustrated by the example of Vienna. The demographic knowledge grounded 
in regions should not be left unexploited. 
Added Value of the Regional Typology 
A classification is an important first step in all research areas and always 
serves a specific purpose (cf. VICKERS 2006a:288f). In this respect and for 
the last time, the main research question of this thesis shall be raised: How 
will the demographic development, i.e. natural development of population as 
well as migration, affect different types of regions and cities?  
 
The typology of the demographic status sheds light on the prevailing demo-
graphic pluralism across Europe. At the beginning of the 21st century, the 
demographic landscape of European regions offers diverse and heterogene-
ous spatial patterns beyond traditional categories like growth and decline. 
The regional classification reveals the similarities within this heterogeneity. 
Demographic ageing, although varying by extent and rate of increase, 
prevails across Europe. However, population ageing and growth do not 
exclude each other. Only a small number of regions are affected by distinct 
depopulation. Indeed, in the vast majority of regions fertility levels are below 
replacement level, which accelerates the process of population ageing. 
Nevertheless, most populations still increase due to a moderate to strong 
influx of international migrants. International migration was the main driver 
of this predominately positive population development in most regions 
between 2001 and 2005. Although international migration is mitigating the 
speed of ageing, it will be no panacea for all demographic challenges in 
Europe as demonstrated by the development of the size of the working age 
population. In general, the share of the working age population (20 to 64 
years) still increases, but the proportion of the younger workforce already 
declines in many regions.  
 
“(…) if population issues are to be addressed properly by  
policy measures, they require a prior spatial assessment.” 
Marcia CALDAS DE CASTRO (2007:17) 
 
Besides the scientific applications within the DEMIFER project – i.e. the 
utilization of the different types of regions as input and output areas for the 
scenarios and projections as well as the choice of appropriate case studies – 
this classification of 286 European regions is addressed to policy makers and 
researchers interested in demographic and socio-economic differences at the 
regional level. The information, which can be gained from the analyses based 
on the regional level typology, might be a useful addition to perspectives 
often focused exclusively on the state of nation states. The European Union’s 
Community Policies identified the ongoing demographic changes as one of 
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the main challenges in the context of social and economic cohesion (EC 
2008a:1). It is impossible to aim for 286 different policies for every NUTS 2 
region. In order to obtain homogeneous spatial patterns as a point of depar-
ture, a regional aggregation in terms of clustering makes sense. It facilitates 
the identification of similar challenges and solutions and enables to compare 
the various impacts of different regional policies. 
 
6.3 Potential for Further Research 
At this final point, a few thoughts for potential further research with respect 
to the demographic typology shall be mentioned. Above all, the question of 
scale – a geographer’s destiny – could be addressed by means of different 
approaches, be it temporal or spatial.      
 
The presented regional demographic typology of the demographic status in 
2005 reveals different kinds of regions by assessing the effects of demo-
graphic and migratory flows on the size and structure of the population. 
Although taking the short-term trends of the period 2001 to 2005 into 
account, the classification refers to the demographic status by 2005. In order 
to examine changes over time, be it demographic or socio-economic, it would 
be interesting to apply the classification to other periods of time, accounting 
for the past (e.g. 1996 to 2000) as well as for the presence (2006 to 2010). 
Thinking of potential changes of socio-economic and demographic behaviour 
associated with the impacts of the recent economic crisis, a comparison of 
the period 2001 to 2005 – constituting the pre-crises status – with later 
periods could provide valuable insights into the associated societal impacts. 
However, the explanatory power of a regional demographic status typology, 
as presented in this thesis, will be always linked to a certain period. When 
applied to another date in time, a cluster analysis will deliver a different 
result, implicating different cluster characteristics and deviating cluster 
numbers. This might complicate the comparison to some extent, rendering a 
meaningful interpretation impossible. 
 
Another possibility to overcome the snapshot character of a status classifica-
tion is the application of trend indicators, e.g. growth rates. However, this 
might solve the issue of the static nature of the applied indicators, but would 
open the door for other analytical problems, e.g.: how to connect particular 
trends to an actual status without weighting procedures, which are compli-
cating the interpretation? This would be a contradiction to the very own 
meaning of a classification, i.e. the simplification of a complex data set. 
 
The question of scale – be it temporal or spatial – is always connected to the 
question of data availability. With respect to the given data situation, the 
final classification was elaborated at NUTS 2 level, although NUTS 3 would 
have been preferable from the analytical point of view. The spatial resolution 
of NUTS 2 does not allow the explicit examination of certain smaller aggre-
gated territories like urban regions. However, other ways and means will be 
accomplished in order to analyse the assumingly important role of cities and 
urban societies with respect to demographic change. 
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APPENDIX 1 – MAPPING EUROPE OF THE NATIONS 
 
Map A1.01: Population Growth (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.02: Crude Birth Rate (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.03: Total Fertility Rate (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.04: Mean Age at First Birth (2005) 
Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, Eurostat (for Belgium in 2006),  
VID 2008 (for Italy in 2006), ZAKHAROV 2008 (for Russia) and TURKSTAT 2007 (for Turkey). 
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Map A1.05: Adjusted Total Fertility Rate (2003-2005) 
Source: European Demographic Data Sheet 2008 (VID 2008) 
 
 
Map A1.06: Crude Death Rate (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.07: Infant Mortality Rate (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.08: Life Expectancy at Birth (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.09: Life Expectancy at Birth for Men (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.10: Life Expectancy at Birth for Women (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.11: Gender Gap in Life Expectancy at Birth (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.12: Migrant Population Stock (2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – International Migration Report 2006 
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Map A1.13: Net Migration Rate (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.14: Natural Population Balance (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.15: Total Population Balance (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.16: Median Age (2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.17: Population aged 65 years and more (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.18: Population aged 80 years and more (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.19: Healthy Life Years of Men in the EU25 (2005) 
Source: Eurostat for population data, Eurostat SILC for disability data, and EHEMU for calculations. 
 
 
Map A1.20: Healthy Life Years of Women in the EU25 (2005) 
Source: Eurostat for population data, Eurostat SILC for disability data, and EHEMU for calculations. 
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Map A1.21: Ratio of Healthy Life Years to Life Expectancy of Men 
(2005) 
Source: Eurostat for population data, Eurostat SILC for disability data, and EHEMU for calculations. 
 
 
Map A1.22: Ratio of Healthy Life Years to Life Expectancy of Women 
(2005) 
Source: Eurostat for population data, Eurostat SILC for disability data, and EHEMU for calculations. 
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Map A1.23: Remaining Life Expectancy of 15 years or less (2007) 
Source: VID (2008), European Demographic Data Sheet 2008 
 
 
Map A1.24: Population aged 00-14 years (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.25: Population aged 15-64 years (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.26: Old Age Dependency Ratio (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.27: Young Age Dependency Ratio (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
 
 
Map A1.28: Dependency Ratio (2000-2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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Map A1.29: Population Age 20-64 (2005) 
Source: UN Population Division – World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision 
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APPENDIX 3 – MAPPING THE CLASSIFICATION 
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APPENDIX 4 – MAPPING THE EU-LFS 
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APPENDIX 5 – ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Table A5.01:  
Cluster and External Variables, per Type of Region. 
Data source: ESPON 2013 Database 
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Table A5.02: Highest formal education (15+) by sex (2007) 
 
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
 
Table A5.03: ILO Labour Status (15+) by age and sex (2007)  
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
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Table A5.04:  
Duration of unemployment by age and sex (2007) 
 
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
 
Table A5.05: Economic activity by ISCO sector – age 15-64 (2007) 
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
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Table A5.07: Economic activity by ISCO sector and Nationality, age 
15-64 years (2007) 
Data source: EU-LFS 2007 (EUROSTAT 2008) 
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APPENDIX 6 – ASSIGNMENTS & ADAPTATIONS 
Assignment of Outlier Regions 
Addressing the final classification, the number of cases changed – in total 
and per type – in the course of the integration of some outlier regions from 
the original Type 7 to one of the other six types of the classification. It was 
necessary to aggregate the two NUTS 2 regions of London into one NUTS 1 
region. 
 
The original Type 7 of the (k-Means) classification included 10 regions (see 
Tab. 2) and constituted a special type of significant outlier regions. By 
reassigning five outlier-regions – Inner London (UKI1), Flevoland (NL23), 
Iceland (IS00), Île de France/Paris (FR10) and Southern and Eastern Ireland 
(IE02), we not only achieved the inclusion of some important regions, e.g. 
the metropolises of London and Paris, into the six main types, but also 
managed to give Type 7 – now including only regions outside the European 
mainland (continent) a more significant meaning, besides being a type of 
outlier regions. 
 
Table A6.01: Assignment of Outlier Regions 
 
 
The assignment was done by means of the particular values and ranges of 
the four cluster variables (see Tab. A4.02). In doing so, it was necessary to 
aggregate the two NUTS 2 regions of London (UKI1, UKI2) into one NUTS 1 
region (UKI), because the values of the proportion of the age group 20 to 39 
years of Inner London (43,16%) are far beyond the corresponding ranges of 
the six main types. 
 
As a consequence of the adaption of these five outlier-regions, the ranges 
and average values of Type 3, Type 6 and Type 7, as well as the overall (EU 
27+4) ranges and average values changed in respect to the result of the 
original classification (see Tab A4.02). 
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Adapting the Demographic Typology to the EU-LFS 2007 Data Set 
As mentioned in Chapter 5.1.3, the original demographic typology (see 
Chapter 5) had to be adapted to the EU-LFS 2007 spatial structure, which is 
(a) not covering all ESPON countries (Malta, Iceland, Switzerland and Liech-
tenstein, as well as the French Overseas Departments and Territories of 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyane and Réunion are not included) and is (b) 
deviating from the NUTS 2 scheme in some cases, e.g. regions in Austria, 
Germany and UK are aggregated to NUTS 1 level, while there is no regional 
differentiation for the Netherlands at all.  
 
Table A6.02:  
Data set comparison: Typology (2005) vs. EU-LFS (2007) 
 
Another cluster analysis was carried out, based on the same input variables 
and methodology as applied for the original demographic typology (see 
Chapter 2.3). The result of the adapted cluster solution proved to be stable in 
regard to the original typology (see Tab. A6.02). 
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